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ABSTRACT
EXPLAINING NUCLEAR ENERGY PURSUANCE: A COMPARISON OF THE
UNITED STATES, GERMANY, AND JAPAN
Lauren Emily McKee
Old Dominion University, 2014
Director: Dr. Steve Yetiv

Energy is critical to the functioning o f the global economy and seriously impacts
global security as well. What factors influence the extent to which countries will pursue
nuclear energy in their overall mix of energy approaches? This dissertation explores this
critical question by analyzing the nuclear energy policies o f the United States, Germany
and Japan. Rather than citizen opposition or proximity to nuclear disasters, it seems that a
country’s access to other resources through natural endowments or trading relationships
offers the best explanation for nuclear energy pursuance.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

It was in 1818 that Mary Shelley first published the tale o f Dr. Frankenstein and
his monster in Frankenstein; or Prometheus Unbound, a novel which tells o f m an’s need
to use science for innovative creation and the ways in which those creations can be m an’s
undoing. A controversial novel published in the midst o f the 19th century scientific
enlightenment, thoughts o f Dr. Frankenstein’s monster would again come to mind in July
o f 1945 when the United States conducted the first test-detonation o f the nuclear-powered
atomic weapon that would later be used as a prototype for the bomb that was dropped on
Nagasaki, Japan, in August of the same year. It would not be until 1954, nine years later,
that nuclear power would be harnessed to create energy for a power grid at the former
Soviet Union’s Obinisk Nuclear Power Plant. Since then, nuclear energy has proven to be
a man-made power that theoretically has the potential to free humans from their
dependence on fossil fuels for clean energy yet has remained controversial for many
reasons.
To its favor, nuclear power is a sustainable energy source that cleanly produces
electricity without releasing carbon emissions into the atmosphere and can increase
energy security by reducing foreign dependence on other energy sources. Despite these
positive attributes, fear still persist that the costs of nuclear technology outweigh the
potential benefits. Past nuclear disasters have demonstrated the consequences of the
potential instability o f nuclear energy production, such as the spread o f radiation leakages
over large geographical distances and the contamination o f water supplies. The storage of
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nuclear waste is also a controversial issue as well as health-related side effects in
communities where nuclear reactors operate. The spread of nuclear technology to terrorist
groups or unstable states for use as weaponry is also o f concern to the international
community. Pro-nuclear supporters claim that tougher safety regulations and increased
security measures can solve most of these problems associated with nuclear energy, and
any risk incurred is worth the independence from dirty and expensive fossil fuels that
nuclear energy could provide.
The arguments for and against nuclear energy are many and varied, and it would
be a difficult task to credit one side as being any more correct than the other. Rather than
pursue such a line o f inquiry, this project will instead attempt to methodically and
objectively identify which variables seem to be most important in determining a
country’s nuclear energy policy. In other words, this project seeks to offer an explanatory
theory for contemporary decisions about pursuing or not pursuing nuclear energy in the
United States (US), Germany and Japan. The impetus for this project began with the
March 2011 nuclear incident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant and the varying
responses different countries around the world had to this occurrence. While all
expressed concern for the victims of what came to be known as the “triple disaster”
related to the Tohoku Earthquake, the resulting tsunami, and the nuclear disaster, what I
found most interesting was the way this event caused countries to react to nuclear
technology within their own borders. The US, for example, continued its pursuance of
nuclear energy and, in early 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) even
approved the first new reactor construction project in early since 1978. In the months
following March 2011, Germany gradually revealed an energy plan that would include
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completely abandoning nuclear energy by the year 2022 and a renewed focus on
renewable energy alternatives based on wind and photovoltaic (solar) sources. Japan, a
country still dealing with forced evacuations o f thousands of people from Fukushima
Prefecture and attempts at radioactivity contamination and reactor decommission, chose
to close all reactors in operation over the course o f 2011 and 2012 for safety reevaluation;
however, the current energy plan for Japan’s future includes continued reliance o f nuclear
energy.
And so the puzzle of post-Fukushima nuclear energy policy had begun to unfold.
Why would German Chancellor Angela Merkel choose to abandon nuclear energy when
she and her majority Christian Democratic Party (CDU) had run (and won) in 2009 on a
pro-nuclear platform, even voting to extend the lives o f existing reactors another two
decades? The majority Democratic Party o f Japan and 2011 Prime Minister Naoto Kan
similarly vowed that Japan would move away from nuclear energy, but a 2012 landslide
victory for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) reversed that course and current Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe assures citizens that nuclear energy is necessary for economic
growth. As a counter-balance to these reactions, the US chose to increase its reliance on
nuclear energy through the construction of new nuclear reactors. It was because o f these
varying reactions to Fukushima that these three countries were chosen as particularly
suitable cases to study, but also because these three countries are so similar in many
regards: all economically developed, wealthy, democratic, “Western” countries. By
controlling for these similar variables, this project will attempt to explain the differences
in their current nuclear energy policies by testing various hypotheses in each case to
determine their impact on nuclear energy pursuance.
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The first hypothesis that will be tested is that countries where public opinion is
more favorable toward nuclear energy are more likely to pursue nuclear energy.
Conversely, countries where public opinion in opposition to nuclear energy is higher will
be less likely to pursue nuclear energy. Public opinion will be measured by using polling
data collected within each country that asks variations of questions related to approval of
nuclear energy. In a perfect world, this polling data would be collected by the same
independent source in each country at the same intervals o f time over a number o f years
by asking a similar sampling o f respondents the same question. Unfortunately, this type
of data does not exist. Even so, reliable opinion polling information is nonetheless
available in each country, and that information is what will be used here. The idea behind
including public opinion as an independent variable is that, especially in strong
democracies represented by these three case studies, society possesses some agency in
influencing government decisions. Opinion polling alone may not reflect this, so a
qualitative analysis o f actions related to shifts in public opinion, specifically, recent
voting patterns and protest activity, are also included as a supplement to this variable.
The second set of hypotheses to be tested deal with nuclear accidents, specifically,
Three Mile Island (1979), Chernobyl (1986), and Fukushima (2011). This section will
partially incorporate data from opinion polls conducted over time to explore whether past
nuclear disasters have had any correlating impact on approval for nuclear energy. The
hypothesis is simply that nuclear disasters, regardless of where they happen, negatively
affect decisions to pursue nuclear energy. Each disaster is examined in each case study by
examining levels of nuclear energy output, reactors approved over time to look for
decreases o f each following Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima. I additionally
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discuss any changes to nuclear energy policy in the US, Germany and Japan following
these disasters.
The final hypotheses focus on domestic resources and international and regional
energy trading relationships. The hypothesis is that the greater a country’s endowment of
natural resources (oil, coal and natural gas) the less likely it will be to pursue nuclear
energy while countries that lack natural resource endowments will be more likely to
pursue nuclear energy. Additionally, countries that have reliable and affordable trading
options for energy resources are less likely to pursue nuclear energy while countries that
lack reliable and affordable energy trading options are more likely to pursue nuclear
energy. Here, “reliable” trading options are defined broadly as trading partners that
possess stable supplies of energy resources and are likely to continue exporting this
energy resource into the foreseeable future. “Affordable” is defined as a price that is
comparable to prices other countries are paying for the same energy source without
adding on additional expenses for lengthy transport or to construct additional
infrastructure to receive imports. This variable attempts to capture countries’ likelihood
to pursue nuclear energy in light of other possible energy options that may be available to
them either because they have access to domestic resources or because they can easily
and cheaply obtain them from other sources. This hypothesis will be tested by first
looking at what other energy sources make up electrical energy generation, where those
energy sources come from, and then qualitatively analyzing both the future availability of
those resources and the current and projected future prices o f those sources.

For

example, if a country has an abundant source o f domestic natural gas, oil or coal, it will
be more likely to use those sources rather than choose nuclear energy. Or, if a country has
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a friendly trading relationship with other countries that possess these natural resources
and this trading relationship allows the country to buy them at reasonable prices, then that
country will also be less likely to pursue nuclear energy.
By examining these variables in the US, Germany and Japan, this project will
make three important contributions to the existing body o f knowledge. First, it will
update the existing literature on nuclear energy policy since the Fukushima disaster of
2011. This course o f questioning is not necessarily new, as will be demonstrated in the
following section that contains a literature review. It is, however, one o f the first studies
to take up the topic o f the future viability o f nuclear energy since Fukushima. Secondly,
this is also one o f the only studies to include an Asian country as a case study together
with the US and a European country. Past studies have been much more likely to
compare the US and Sweden, or the US and Germany, or to include France in a similar
constellation o f cases. Any current or future project would be remiss to not include Japan
as it presents an opportunity to study the direct impact o f a nuclear disaster on resolve to
pursue nuclear energy. Since Japan is normally classified as a Western country in terms
o f both democracy and economic development, it possesses the necessary control
variables to methodologically justify inclusion in this study. Lastly, this project’s overall
goal is both explain current nuclear energy pursuance as well as offer future predictions
as to the future viability o f nuclear energy as a power source.
The format o f this project is as follows: the second chapter will offer a look at the
existing literature on nuclear energy beginning around the time o f its first use as an
atomic weapon in World War II and subsequent development around the world as a
civilian energy source. This familiarizes the reader with a general history o f nuclear
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development, the conclusions of existing comparative studies, and illustrates what this
particular project has to offer within this body o f work. The second, third and fourth
chapters are case studies on nuclear energy in the United States, Germany and Japan,
respectively. Each case study follows roughly the same format o f first offering a more
detailed history o f nuclear energy development in each country, followed by sections that
engage the issue o f public opinion, nuclear disasters, and access to other resources. Each
individual case study finishes with conclusions drawn from that particular case study.
The sixth chapter offers an integrative analysis that examines the three case studies taken
together and draws broader conclusions about nuclear pursuance in the three cases and
how those conclusions can be adapted to apply to other democratic, economically
developed countries. The final, concluding chapters first develops an energy outlook for
the United States, Germany and Japan. Lastly, the primary conclusions o f the study are
“tested” in three countries (Russia, China and Ukraine) that do not possess the control
variables o f democracy and economic development to determine the conclusions’
applicability beyond the democratic, developed world.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review will first offer a general overview o f the very early
development of nuclear energy and the debate surrounding it since the 1940s. For
clarity’s sake, the academic literature on the subject of nuclear energy is then divided into
three phases, the first from the 1950s until the 1986 nuclear disaster at Chernobyl; the
second from Chernobyl until the 2011 disaster at Fukushima; and the third from
Fukushima looking forward. Finally, this literature review will focus on comparative
literature that has been produced thus far, dating from 1977 to the present.
Background Literature
Nuclear fission refers to the process in which an atom divides into smaller parts,
thereby releasing a very large amount of energy. This manner o f “splitting” is
descriptively fitting, considering nuclear technology has been a mixed blessing since its
first public use on the 6th of August, 1945. Nuclear technology has the potential to be
both constructive and destructive, and the difference between the peaceful and harmful
natures of the split atom has more to do with politics than with physics. It seems an
almost cruel irony that an energy source once deemed “too cheap to meter” 1 also
possesses the potential to be the most powerful and destructive weapon that humans have
ever created. While the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki showed the world the dark
side o f nuclear technology, nuclear energy supporters worked diligently in the decades
that followed to demonstrate that nuclear technology could be used for good, too. This

1 Quote credited to Lewis Strauss in a speech to the US Atomic Energy Commission, 1954.
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legacy o f duality has followed nuclear energy throughout the decades, beginning truly in
the 1950s and continuing even today.
The 1950s and 1960s were known as “The Atomic Age,” or a time when
optimism for nuclear energy was at an all-time high. James Mahaffey notes that, in
retrospect at least, “the post-World War II years were wildly optimistic and forwardlooking, and it was an optimum time to explore new ideas for energy production”2. In
1953, American President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered his “Atoms for Peace”
address, assuring audiences that his country wanted to be “constructive, not destructive.”
Lewis Strauss, of the infamous “too cheap to meter,” claim, went on to say in the same
1954 speech to the Atomic Energy Commission that people were entering an age in
which their children
...will know o f great famines in the world only as matters o f history; will
travel effortlessly over the seas and under them and through the air with a
minimum of danger and at great speeds, and will experience a lifespan
far longer than ours, as disease yields and man comes to understand
what causes him to age. This is the forecast of an age of peace.3
It would be difficult to find a speech that better illustrates the optimism o f many
governments in the world during the 1950s, though many people still had to be convinced
that nuclear power should not necessarily be associated with mushroom clouds, craters,
and vaporization.
The majority o f the nuclear-focused scholarly literature that accompanied the
years of the 1950s and 1960s can be grouped into two main subject areas: 1) debates on

2 James Mahaffey, Atomic Awakenings: A N ew Look at the H istory and Future o f N uclear P ow er (N ew
York: Pegasus Books, 2009), XV.
3 Mahaffey, Atom ic Awakenings, XVI.
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the decision to use atomic bombs against Japan and nuclear weaponry in general4, and 2)
speculation as to the future o f nuclear technology as a power source.5 Perhaps the most
well-known o f the works on nuclear proliferation is Kissinger’s Nuclear Weapons and
Foreign Policy (1957, 1st ed.) in which he argues that the limited use o f nuclear weapons
need not necessarily escalate into a situation of mutually assured destruction. It was also
during this atomic age that we begin to see the first signs o f states’ failure to separate
nuclear weapons from nuclear energy in the discourse about nuclear energy. The titles of
the books published during the 1950s and 1960s alone allude to the multiple dimensions
of the nuclear debate at the time; for example, G. W endt’s 1956 book titled Nuclear
Energy and Its Uses in Peace can be contrasted with John Bowie’s 1959 work Adapt or
Perish: The Dilemma o f Nuclear Politics.
Despite the reassurances coming from the Atoms for Peace project, even
combined with the air o f excitement and optimism coming from the nuclear science
community, there were still those who were skeptical o f the potential to turn such a
dangerous technology into a peaceful means of energy generation without incurring some
grave cost, whether political or physical. Bertrand Russell, British philosopher and
winner o f the 1950 Nobel Prize for literature, was one such prominent anti-nuclear
activist. Together with Germany physicist Albert Einstein, the very scientist who had
contributed to the creation of the atomic bomb in the 1940s, the two released the RussellEinstein Manifesto in 1955 that called for governments in both the East and the West to
4 See: Shogo Nagaoka, Hiroshima Under Atom ic Bomb A ttack, 1951; Abraham Meyer, Changing Japanese
Attitudes Toward Atomic Weapons (1954); Henry Kissinger, N uclear Weapons and Foreign P olicy (1956);
Burr W. Lyson, Atomic Energy in War and P eace (1951); John Bow ie, Adapt o r Perish: The D ilem m a o f
Nuclear Politics, (1959); Stephen King-Hall, Defense in the N uclear A ge (1959); Pierre-Marie Gallois, The
Balance o f Terror: Strategy o f the Nuclear A ge (1961).
5 See: G. Wendt, Nuclear Energy and Its Uses in Peace (1956); Donald James Hughes, On N uclear
Energy: Its Potential f o r Peacetim e Uses (1957); Werner Heisenberg, Philosophical Problem s o f N uclear
Science (1952); Dewey Larson, The Case Against the N uclear Atom (1956).
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come to some agreement abolishing the possession and use o f nuclear weapons.
“Remember your humanity, and forget the rest,” they say, lest we should all choose death
because “ ...w e cannot forget our quarrels.”6 The Russell-Einstein Manifesto illustrates
the fact that a suspicion o f nuclear energy, at the very least, and an out-right rejection of
nuclear technology in some instances was occurring in both Europe and the U.S. around
the same time. It is Einstein who is often quotes as saying that he knew not with what
weapons World War III would be fought, but he suspected World W ar IV would be
fought with sticks and stones, an observation that clearly demonstrates his pessimism for
the peaceful use o f atomic technology. This duality surrounding the nuclear debate would
continue into the 1970s and 1980s, but the events o f those decades would introduce a new
sense of urgency for testing the viability of energy alternatives, including nuclear energy.
During the 1970s, multiple events coalesced that drastically increased the market
price of oil. From 1947-1967, the price o f a barrel o f oil in United States dollars has risen
less than 2 percent. In the 1970s, however, as the U.S. and then Great Britain began
floating their currencies and their values depreciated, the Organization o f Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) began pricing a barrel of oil against gold. In the years after
this “oil shock,” OPEC was slow to readjust their prices to reflect the depreciation of
currencies around the world. To further complicate matters, in 1973, the Organization of
Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries instituted an embargo against W estern Israeli
supporters that would last until March of 1974. In 1979, political upheavals lowered
Iranian production o f oil and the resulting increases in the price of oil were felt all around
the world as gasoline was rationed, national speed limits were instituted. In Germany, for

6 Sandra Ionno Butcher, “The Origins o f the Russell-Einstein M anifesto,” Pugwash H istory Series, (2005):
1, accessed June 10, 2011, http://www.pugwash.org/about/manifesto.htm.
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example, driving, flying or boating were pastimes all outlawed on Sunday. Japan also
sought to decrease its oil consumption, but benefitted from the oil crisis as well through
increased export o f smaller, more fuel efficient vehicles. In the US, domestic production
and exploration were increased. Perhaps most importantly, the need to find alternative
forms o f energy was finally real and present.
Naturally following these events, there was much scholarship in the 1970s and
1980s that focused on nuclear energy policy. Though much scholarship had been
produced in the past decades either espousing the virtues or vilifying the nature o f nuclear
energy, the first wave o f true literature on the politics o f nuclear energy and the creation
o f nuclear energy policy begins at the end o f the 1970s and reflects the need policy
makers felt for alternative energy exploration after the oil crises o f the past decade7. It
was also during this time that we begin to see a move in the scholarship to separate the
issues of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, and researchers began to focus on the
safety and economic viability o f nuclear energy as an alternative. Following the 1979
nuclear incident at Three Mile Island, the marketplace was flooded with books on nuclear
power and alternative energy sources. Many were written very quickly to satisfy the
public thirst for information on radiation, wastes, nuclear hazards transportation, and
Q

other related topics.

7 See: David M. Elliott, Pat Coyne, Mike George, The P olitics o f N uclear Power (1978); Duncan Lyall
Bum, Nuclear P ow er and the Energy Crisis (1978); Kristen S. Shrader-Frechette, N uclear P ow er and
Public Policy (1980); James Everett Katz, N uclear Pow er in D eveloping Countries: An A nalysis o f
Decision-M aking (1982); Stanley M. Nealey, Public Opinion and N uclear Energy (1983); Eds. W illiam R.
Freudenberg and Eugene A. Rosa, Public Reactions to N uclear P ow er: A re There C ritical M asses? (1984)
Walter A. Rosenbaum, Energy Politics and Public Policy (1987).
8 See Jerry W. Mansfield, The Nuclear P ow er Debate: A Guide to the Literature (1984) for a full
bibliography.
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Mansfield claims in his guide to the literature on nuclear energy that in the years
leading up to 1984, more books were written against nuclear energy than in support o f it.9
Multiple factors could explain this divergence in the literature. One could speculate that
those who are against a movement are frequently more vocal and that nuclear activists
had to shout twice as loudly to have their point heard. It could also have been that there
was more o f a demand in the market for anti-nuclear research, or that the books published
against nuclear energy were well-financed by highly visibly anti-nuclear groups. Or, it
could be that the proliferation o f books supporting the anti-nuclear movement was simply
reflective o f the general sentiment o f the public at the time. In 1986, this debate would
become further complicated by the explosion o f reactor number four at the Chernobyl
plant in current-day Ukraine. Besides fueling the on-going sentiment that the generation
o f nuclear energy was unsafe, neighboring European countries and environmentalist
groups were concerned with the spread o f radiation from Chernobyl that, by some
estimates, reached Helsinki to the north and Munich to the east.10
After 1986, much o f the scholarship that was produced in the second wave was
published in English and focused on what effects the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl would
have on the future of energy policy. Many works attempted to measure public opinion
post-Chernobyl, mainly in Western Europe where the nuclear debate was the strongest
and most diverse.11 There was also a strong push to study nuclear technology in the light

9 Jerry Mansfield, The Nuclear P ow er D ebate: A Guide to the Literature, (New York: Garland, 1984), 2.
10 Jim Smith and Nicholas A. Beresford, Chernobyl: Catastrophe and Consequences, (Chichester: Springer
Books, 2005), 3.
11 See: Peter Gould, Fire in the Rain: The D em ocratic Consequences o f Chernobyl (1990); James M.
Jasper, Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the U nited States, France, and Sweden (1990); D etlaf
Jahn, “Nuclear Power, Energy Policy, and N ew Politics in Sweden and Germany” (1992). Christian
Joppke, M obilizing Against Nuclear Energy: A Comparison o f the US a n d Germany (1992);
Koichi Hasegawa, “A Comparative Study o f Social Movements in the Post-Nuclear Era in Japan and the
United States” (1995); Peter Hodgson, Nuclear Power, Energy and the Environment (1999).
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o f weapons acquisition during this time, and understandably so: both China and India had
already tested nuclear weapons and there were rumors that Pakistan would soon follow
suit.12 This wave o f scholarship also coincided with the beginnings o f the environmental
movement, and the narrative o f “risk” vs. “benefits” begins to also appear as a theme in
the literature.13 As nuclear energy became an attractive possibility to rapidly developing
countries such as China and India, by the turn o f the 21st century, studies were being
published that examined the nuclear energy programs of developing countries as well as
Western ones.14
Comparative Literature
The body o f true comparative literature on nuclear energy spans a gamut o f topics
though is mainly limited in geographical scope to Western Europe and the United States.
Leon Lindberg is the researcher most often credited with composing the ground-breaking
comparative work on the topic of nuclear energy policy The Energy Syndrome:
Comparing National Responses to the Energy Crisis (1977), a work that examines the
construction o f the energy policies of 7 countries15 through a collection of countryspecific essays16. In the introduction to this work, Lindberg identifies three characteristics
common to all o f the case studies in the book: 1) continued increases in energy

12 See: John Lewis and Litai Xue, China Builds the Bomb (1991); Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Nuclear
Weapons and American Interests: Conflicting P olicy Choices (1983); Geogre H. Quester and the Strategic
Studies Institute, Nuclear Pakistan an d Nuclear India: Stable D eterrent or Proliferation Challenge?
(1992); Praful Bidwai and Achin Vinaik, New Nukes: India, Pakistan a n d Global N uclear D isarm am ent
(2000 ).
13 See: Joseph V. Rees, H ostages o f Each Other: The Transformation o f Nuclear Safety Since Three M ile
Island (1994); Gwyneth Cravens, P ow er to Save the World: The Truth About N uclear E nergy (2007).
14 See: M.R. Srinivasan, From Fission to Fusion: The Story o f In d ia ’s Atomic Energy Program (2003);
Jonothan Benjamin-Alvarado, Pow er to the People: Energy a n d the Cuban Nuclear Program (2000); Y iChong Xu, The Politics o f Nuclear Energy in China (2010); Daniel Marcos Bonotto, The P ocos d e Caldas
Hot Spot: A Big Blast fo r Nuclear Energy in B razil (2010).
15 Britain, Canada, France, Hungary, India, Sweden and the United States.
16 Leon Lindberg, The Energy Syndrome: Com paring National Responses to the Energy Crisis, (University
o f Michigan: Lexington Books, 1977).

15
consumption 2) public policies that focus almost exclusively on the supply side and 3)
institutional and structural obstacles to the adoption o f alternative policies, all o f which
make up what Linberg refers to as the Energy Syndrome, a phenomenon which can
explain a lack o f policy reform. Ultimately, Lindberg suggests that, as the boundaries of
energy policy continue to expand, fundamental reforms must be undertaken to if these
energy policy lags and institutional rigidities are to be overcome.
Seven years after the publication o f The Energy Syndrome, in 1984, Michael T.
Hatch notes that the characteristics identified by Lindberg still represent an accurate
assessment o f present energy policy and that Lindberg’s greatest contribution was a
recognition that the creation o f energy policy was only going to become more complex.
Hatch’s work Politics and Nuclear Power: Energy Policy in Western Europe details the
specific responses o f West Germany, France, and the Netherlands to this growing
complexity o f the energy issue17. While the central question of his work is what pushed
nuclear energy to the top o f the political agenda in his chosen cases, his analysis
examines the overall evolution o f energy policy over time in an attempt to identify clear
patterns of cause and effect often muddled by the complexities of energy policy creation.
Hatch’s research concludes that it was not by chance that anti-nuclear forces became a
politicized national movement in the 1970s. While opposition had existed before, it was
not until this decade that the movement became cohesive and comprehensive and pushed
a rational-analytic strategy of the articulation o f energy-related concerns into the national
agenda. However, Hatch disagrees with Lindberg’s assessment that this politicization of
energy concerns would result in a political stale-mate; to the contrary, the opposite is

17 Michael T. Hatch, Politics and Nuclear Power: Energy P olicy in Western Europe, (Lexington, K Y :
University Press o f Kentucky: 1984).
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illustrated by the varying degrees of success enjoyed by governments in the execution of
their overall energy policies18. Hatch concludes that, while an analysis o f overall
decision-making strategies is useful to understating how nuclear energy in particular was
pushed to the top o f the political agenda, it is less useful in accounting for the different
political outcomes in each country.
James M. Jasper takes up this theme of policy divergence in his 1990 comparative
study Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the United States, France and Sweden,
which examines reasons why three countries that illustrated similar enthusiasm for
nuclear energy ultimately diverged in their commitment to nuclear energy19. Jasper takes
a state-driven approach to his analysis, largely because “Political conflicts within the
state are crucial to an explanation of French, Swedish and American commitments to
nuclear energy” (6). Even though decisions made outside the state did matter to some
extent, these decisions were shaped by public policies so that the explanation for the
decision ultimately leads back to the state. In regard to the anti-nuclear movement, while
Hatch states that it politicized the nuclear issue and therefore thrust it onto the political
agenda, Jasper claims that the pro-nuclear movement had far more access to political
structures such as government agencies and politicians than did the anti-nuclear
movement and, as a result, anti-nuclear movements had little effect o f nuclear energy
policies in any country, therefore making it is impossible to explain the policy divergence
by means o f the anti-nuclear movement20. This lack o f efficacy on the part of the antinuclear movement supports Jasper’s structural state-centered bureaucratic approach,

18 Hatch, Politics an d Nuclear P ow er, 191.
19 James M. Jasper, Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the United States, France an d Sweden,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
20 Jasper, Nuclear Politics, 8.
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though it leaves little room for consideration o f the role o f individuals such as elected
officials or scientific elites. In the end, Jasper would acknowledge this shortcoming and
others of a purely structural state-centered approach when studying policy creation. His
overall conclusion as to the divergence o f American, French and Swedish nuclear energy
policy lies in the rigidity o f policy-making structures. Reminiscent o f Linberg’s
conclusions about nuclear politics and political stalemates, Jasper claims that as the
flexibility o f policy-makers in all three countries has shrunk in the past ten years, so has
the potential for revival or reform of nuclear energy policy.
The scholarship in the 1980s and 1990s focused on the role of the state in
determining energy policies, though scholars disagreed to what extent the state is
autonomous from traditional, non-bureaucratic influences. Regardless o f to what extent a
researcher finds it theoretically necessary to follow the lead of scholars such as Theda
Skocpol and “bring the state back in” this theme in the literature suggests the general
politicization o f the production of energy. One influence that reinforces this notion began
appearing in the 1980s and 1990s was the presence of Green parties across Europe. The
first o f these ecological and alternative political groups technically emerged in Britain in
1973, but most European Green parties were not created until a decade or more later. It
was not until the early 1980s that the Green Parties o f Europe would make significant
strides at integration into political structures, especially in Germany where the Green
party Die Griinen attracted nearly a million votes in the Parliamentarian election and won
a significant number of seats for the first time.
German scholar Detlaf Jahn examines the influence of the Green Parties in
Germany and Sweden, the social movements from which the party grew, as well as the
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popular claim at the time that nations such as Germany and Sweden had reached the
limits o f their industrialized growth. 2 1 Jahn claims that these two factors, the increasing
popularity o f Green parties and the peak of growth, are interrelated and explain the
politicization o f energy production, thought the extent to which this production is
politicized varies among countries. By comparing nuclear energy policy on the one hand
and attitudes to and movements against nuclear energy on the other in Germany and
Sweden, Jahn arrives at the conclusion that, in Germany, production is much more
exposed to politicization than is Sweden and therefore stands a greater chance for new
politics to form. Whereas Jasper claimed that Sweden’s bureaucratic flexibility left room
for potential nuclear policy reform in Sweden, Jahn suggests that Sweden’s lack of
politicization implied a decreased chance to institutionalize new energy politics.
Koopmans and Duyvendak would return to this theme o f politicization in 200522 to
examine the construction o f the nuclear “problem” in Germany, France, the Netherlands,
and Switzerland after the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl. In an attempt to explain the
countries’ differing reactions to Chernobyl, the authors conclude that similar conditions
and events (like Chernobyl) do not necessarily lead to consensus reactions: to the
contrary, Chernobyl led to widely divergent interpretations and levels o f antinuclear
mobilization in their case countries, exhibited by varying levels o f success at slowing
down or blocking the expansion of nuclear energy. They ultimately conclude that a
combination o f the political opportunity and framing perspectives is most fruitful in
making sense o f the differential careers o f the nuclear energy conflict in Western Europe.
21 Detlaf Jahn, “Nuclear Power, Energy Policy, and N ew Politics in Sweden and Germany,” Environmental
Politics, 1:3 (1992).
22 Ruud Koopmans and Jan Willem Duyvendak, “The Political Construction o f the Nuclear Energy Issue
and its Impact on the Mobilization o f Antinuclear M ovements in Western Europe.” S ocial P roblem s, 42:2
(1995).
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While Jahn analyzes environmental social movements as a cause o f the
politicization o f energy production, other branches of nuclear energy research examine
these types of movements, particularly that o f the anti-nuclear sentiment, as an effect of
nuclear politicization. One o f the first works on the antinuclear movements in France and
West

Germany,

Dorothy Nelkin

and

Michael

Pollok’s

The Atom

Besieged:

Exparliamentary Dissident in France and Germany23, offers a comparative analysis of
the nuclear opposition in both countries in the 1970s. Perhaps most interesting is the
authors’ discussion of their belief that fear is primarily responsible for fueling the nuclear
opposition, a sentiment which, in their opinion, is fundamentally altering societal make
up but has little effect on nuclear-related decisions which are made by the government
and the nuclear industry. The authors conclude that these broad-based and widespread
movements shared many structural similarities but ultimately differed in their ability to
influence the decision to pursue nuclear power. In Germany, the protest movement
accomplished a (temporary) moratorium on nuclear development by raising questions
about the constitutionality o f nuclear technology. In France, however, where protest is
dismissed an insignificant feature of political culture, ignorance, or demonstrative of
popular resistance to change, there were no similar consequences.24
As demonstrated, the majority o f the comparative research on nuclear energy
throughout the 1970s and 1980s focused primarily on Western Europe, particularly
Germany, Sweden, and France. Perhaps similar political structures, histories, or political
cultures explain this comparative limitation. By the 1990s, however, comparativists
23 Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollok, The Atom Besieged: Exparliamentary D issent in F rance and
Germany, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981).
24 Other works by Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollok: The Politics o f Participation and the Nuclear Debate
in Sweden, the Netherlands, and Austria (1977); “Ideology as Strategy: The Discourse o f the Anti-Nuclear
Movement in France and Germany (1980).
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began widening their lens to capture a wider view o f the nuclear debate beyond just that
of Europe. The first o f these comparisons to include the United States, “Political
Opportunity Structures and Political Protests: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four
Democracies” (Kitschelt, 1986) compares the antinuclear movements o f the United
States, Sweden, France and West Germany, though the focus is not necessarily on the
impact o f the antinuclear movements themselves25. Rather, Kitschelt uses the antinuclear
movements in each of these countries to arrive at a theoretical generalized understanding
of the factors that determine the dynamics of social movements. Echoing the findings of
previous researchers, Kitschelt found that in societies where state capacities to implement
policies were weak yet the system of inputs from society were strong, such as West
Germany and the United States, the antinuclear movement had at least a chance to effect
some change on nuclear development. Where state capacities were stronger, such as
Sweden and France, the decision making process was shielded from the influence from
the antinuclear movement, while Sweden best exemplified the type o f society in which a
system o f inputs and outputs allowed for most policy innovation. These conclusions
about the efficacy o f the German antinuclear movement and the flexibility of Swedish
nuclear policy-making were not necessarily new at the time, though the addition o f the
United States to the comparative equation was.
In 1990, Dieter Rucht responded to Kitschelt’s model o f political opportunity
structures, claiming that it was too simplistic to adequately explain the diversity of
oppositional movement actors, strategies and action repertoires.26 In 1992, Christian

25 Herbert Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protests: Anti-Nuclear Movements in
Four Democracies,” British Journal o f P olitical Science, 16 (1986).
26 Dieter Rucht, “Campaigns, Skirmishes and Battles: Nuclear M ovements in U SA, France and West
Germany” Organization and Environment, 4: 1990.
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Joppke would again take up this debate in his work Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy:
A Comparison o f the US and Germany27. Similar to the work by Rucht and Kitschelt, his
topic harkens back to previous work that attempted to assess the role o f the state in
energy policy decision making. Joppke uses the antinuclear movements as a medium to
studying social movements and ultimately develops a political process perspective that
focuses on the interrelationship between the state and social movements, thus bringing
the state back into the study of process, but also incorporates a state-and-society approach
that would later be popularized by Joel Migdal. Joppke’s model takes into account a
variety o f forces, including different state structures, political cultures, and movement
organizations. Whereas including the United States in comparisons previously presented
a theoretical hurdle, researchers such as Joppke used its inclusion as a way to strengthen
theoretical models with their application to countries with different structures, cultures,
and organizations. Though the intent of these types of studies was a contribution to the
theoretical study o f social movements, they also contributed to a better understanding of
the politics o f nuclear energy as well.
The first study to turn its focus to the nuclear politics of non-W estem countries
was that o f Koichi Hasegawa in his 1995 article “A Comparative Study o f Social
Movements in the Post-Nuclear Era in Japan and the United States.”28 In contrast with
skepticism from the US and other Western countries regarding nuclear energy from the
1970s-2000s, East Asian countries such as China, South Korea and Japan all shared pronuclear energy policies. Hasegawa claims this is because o f the relative strength o f the

27 Christian Joppke, M obilizing Against Nuclear Energy: A Comparison o f the US and Germany,
(Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press, 1992).
28 Koichi Hasegawa, “A Comparative Study o f Social M ovements o f the Post-Nuclear Era in Japan and the
United States,” International Journal o f Japanese Sociology, (1995).
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antinuclear movements o f countries like the US and Germany compared to Asian
countries such as Japan. Using qualitative data studying the antinuclear movements in the
US and Japan, Hasegawa studies 1) political opportunity structures 2) resources, actors,
and major support base 3) framing based on cultural attitudes in both countries.29 He
concludes that a relatively open and decentralized system in the US allowed
environmental groups to become the major influence on the management o f energy
utilities by stressing efficiency and exploring energy alternatives. For sociopolitical
reasons, however, the same influence over nuclear utilities was not shared by the
antinuclear movement in Japan.
The most recent scholarship (prior to 2011) on energy reflects new themes and
trends in the political debate on energy. Most comparative studies still focus on similar
set o f countries, but have changed the focus from solely nuclear energy to more
comprehensive studies o f energy and environmental policies in general. In 2003, Miranda
Schreurs widened the scope beyond just nuclear energy to broad environmental politics in
her comparative study o f American, German and Japanese environmental policymaking.

Schreurs and In-Taek Hyun also released an edited work titled The

Environmental Dimension o f East Asian Energy Security in 2007 that examines issues
such as water scarcity, fishing and pollution, and climate change policies. In 2009, Martin
Chick published a historical comparison o f the development of electricity and energy
policy in Britain, France and the United States.31 This shift in focus is understandable as

29 Hasegawa calls this the “Triangular Model o f Social M ovement A nalysis” (TRIM)
30 Miranda Schreurs, Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany an d the United States, (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
31 Martin Chick. Electricity a n d Energy P olicy in Britain, France an d the United States Since 1945,
(Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009).
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nuclear energy is now increasingly linked with other topics, such as clean energy goals,
economic growth, or energy security and proliferation.
This project is situated within this comparative literature by engaging similar
issues as many o f these previous works, such as the efficacy of public opinion and the
anti-nuclear movement, lasting consequences o f nuclear disasters, and regional and
international dynamics that play a part in determining a country’s overall energy
portfolio. However, this project departs from the general literature on this subject in its
overall explanatory goals. Whereas many previous works have focused on understanding
political processes such as citizen opportunity structures or state capacities by using
nuclear politics as a case study, this project’s goal is to determine the future viability of
nuclear energy by exploring the impact o f citizen movements, public opinion, nuclear
disasters, natural resource endowments and trading relationships in country-specific case
studies. In this way, the independent and dependent variables are reversed and this
project thus offers something new to the literature on nuclear energy.
The following chapters will explore each hypothesis in the United States,
Germany and, finally, in Japan. These case studies will be followed with a chapter of
analysis that unites the three cases with conclusions that return to the original hypotheses
and offer an overall explanation for nuclear energy pursuance in each country. The
concluding chapter will expand the focus o f the study to the issue o f nuclear energy in
other countries beyond the scope o f this project and will offer suggestions for future
research on this topic.
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C H A PT E R 3
NUCLEAR EN ERG Y IN T H E UNITED STATES

Objective
The goals o f this chapter on nuclear energy in the United States are to first offer
an historical background on the development o f nuclear energy in the US. Each country
builds their energy portfolio to meet different demands, and an explanation o f why and
how nuclear energy became a part o f the US energy supply mix lends a greater
understanding o f how citizens view this energy source as well as to what extent the US
chooses to use it. Secondly, this chapter aims to explore the relationship between public
opinion and nuclear energy in an attempt to determine to what extent positive or negative
opinion influences the pursuance o f this energy source. “Nuclear energy pursuance” is
operationalized as the overall percentage nuclear provides to the electrical energy supply.
The hypothesis is that countries with higher levels o f public support for nuclear energy
will more actively pursue nuclear energy and that in countries where negative opinion is
higher, nuclear pursuance will be reduced. Public opinion is measured with opinion
polling data supplemented by qualitative analysis of protest activity and recent voting
activity related to nuclear political agendas. Next, this chapter will analyze data over time
that measures to what extent public opinion and nuclear energy pursuance have changed
in response to nuclear disasters at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima. Lastly,
this chapter will turn to an analysis o f the U S’s natural resource endowments and energy
trading relationships with other countries. The hypothesis here is that if the US possesses
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endowments o f natural resources and/or can easily and affordably obtain energy from
other sources, it will be less likely to pursue nuclear energy.
Development o f Early Energy Policy in the US
Following World War II, nuclear energy was allowed to develop in the US
relatively free o f political controversy or public input. Because o f the highly scientific
and technical nature o f the subject, there were few politicians, members o f Congress or
laypeople who had the resources (or desire) to understand nuclear technology. In
addition, nuclear technology really began as an issue of national security, not necessarily
o f energy production, and so was further insulated by the secrecy and security measures
surrounding the issue. Following the conclusions o f Duffy in Nuclear Politics in
America, the result of this initial insulation was that early American nuclear energy
policy was allowed to grow within a particularly nurturing community composed o f four
key sets o f actors: The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy (JCAE), the nuclear power industry and the scientist and engineers.
This was an important time in American nuclear development. Early enthusiasm for
nuclear power and the overwhelmingly positive perception of nuclear potential allowed
favorable laws and institutions to develop that would set the stage for nuclear policy for
the next two decades.1
Atomic Energy Acts o f 1946 and 1954
It was originally out of a post-war fear for national security that Congress passed
the Atomic Energy Act o f 1946, which effectively legislated a continuation of nuclear
research and gave the Atomic Energy Commission ownership of all atomic materials,
facilities and information from the Manhattan Project. This granting was significant,
1 Robert J. Duffy, Nuclear Politics in America, (Lawrence, KS: University Press o f Kansas, 1997), 26.
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considering that, at the time o f transfer, more than 2,000 military personnel, 4,000
government employees, and 38,000 contactor employees were involved with the project,
and the facilities used by the Manhattan Project swept in scope across the United States.
The structure o f the AEC as well as the five year fixed tenure of its members indicated
that Congress intended to make the committee independent o f the American president, an
action the results o f which were two-fold. First, the AEC would be less susceptible to
legislative influence. Secondly, this independence reduced presidents’ control o f and
effectively their interest in the program. Interestingly enough, it seems that lack of
presidential involvement in nuclear programs has been very common throughout much of
the atomic program’s history.2 In addition, all o f the information accumulated through the
Manhattan Project was marked as confidential and, since nuclear technology was
primarily seen in terms o f security during this time, almost all of the information the AEC
dealt with was marked ‘restricted,’ further insulating the Commission. Clearly this was
intended to be a powerful agency capable o f exercising its agenda relatively free of
confines.
Because the five members of the AEC were without significant technical
knowledge, the 1946 act also created the General Advisory Committee (GAC) which
would advise the AEC on “scientific and technical matters relating to materials,
production,

research,

and development.3 Original

members

included

J.

Robert

Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, (two of the original designers o f the US atomic weapon) and
Glenn Seaborg, three choices which indicate this committee represented truly the top
nuclear scientists appointed by the president. Because o f their extensive scientific
2 Duffy, Nuclear Politics in America, 56.
3 Christopher Bosso, Pesticides and Politics: The Life Cycle o f a Public Issue, (Pittsburg, PA: University o f
Pittsburg Press, 1988.), 197.
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experience, especially with nuclear technology, the AEC often deferred to the GAC on
matters o f policy decisions, a behavior that is not uncommon in science and technology
policy arenas.

In fact, because these two groups worked simultaneously to form

congruence between science and policy, they are often seen as a unitary actor.
Within Congress, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was chosen for their
backgrounds in defense and security rather than for their scientific knowledge. States
with national laboratories and atomic facilities were also represented disproportionately
on the committee, signaling that the value of the program lay not only in terms o f security
but also in its “pork barrel” possibilities. The JCAE operated relatively free o f hindrance
from other Congressional committees for a variety of reasons. First, most o f the funds for
nuclear technology were earmarked for defense spending at the time. The perception of
the program and the Joint Committee as guardians of the atomic secret and its military
application lent credibility and legitimized decision-making. Secondly, the theme of
specialized knowledge is applicable in this instance as well, since the JCAE became an
elite Congressional group to which others consistently and almost without choice
deferred to on all atomic matters. Senator Brian McMahon (D-Conn) is noted as saying:
“Congress has only the most general idea of what the atomic package contains.. .So far as
atomic energy is concerned, Congress simply lacks sufficient knowledge upon which to
discharge its constitutional duties.”4 Without an adequate understanding on nuclear
technology, Congress was shy to impose legislative parameters upon its development.
The Committee’s position was also protected by the perception that one had to be
“qualified” to discuss nuclear energy, a perception which the JCAE created and then

4 Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics, (Chicago:
University o f Chicago Press, 1993), 72.
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strove to reinforce, thus effectively controlling the dissemination o f atomic energy
information to Congress and the public throughout the 1940s and early 1950s.
Cold War Considerations and the 1954 Atomic Energy Act
In 1954, the Soviet Union began operation o f the first nuclear energy power plant
at Obinisk, a station which was state-owned but civilian operated. Because the US and
the USSR were in the beginning stages of the Cold War and the USSR had already tested
their own military nuclear devices, nuclear energy built upon military technology in the
US was considered a necessary part o f the arms race o f the 1950s. The relationship
between military and civilian uses o f nuclear technology in the US at the time was
expansive. For example, private utility companies were given government subsidies to
develop nuclear power plants, and “ ...in 1956 the AEC guaranteed that it would buy the
plutonium these plants produced since it was needed for the governmental development
o f nuclear warheads.”5 By 1957, the U S’s first commercial atomic plant was ready to
begin operation in Shippingport, Pennsylvania.
In an attempt to further the goal o f using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
(while also using the by-products for military ones), the Atomic Energy Act o f 1954
opened the door to greater private industrial and international participation. Power
companies were initially reluctant to invest in nuclear technology with the claim that the
high risks o f atomic energy production made it unlikely that the generation o f nuclear
energy could ever be profitable.6 In response, Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act in
1957 which guaranteed the law would “hold hold harmless [nuclear] licensee and other
persons indemnified” from public liability claims arising from nuclear accidents causing
5 Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear Pow er an d Public Policy: The Social and Ethical Problem s o f Fission
Technology, (N ew York: Springer Publishing, 1980), 10.
6 Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear P ow er and Public Policy, 10.
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damages in total excess of $560 million.7 Originally, the Price-Anderson Act was meant
to only last ten years, with the assumption that the safety and regulatory issues that were
of concern to power companies would be resolved within that time frame. The provisions
in the Price-Anderson Act were extended in 1965 for another ten years, and then
extended again in 1975 and in 1988 the operators’ liability was increased from $700
million to $7 billion. The latest revision o f this act was a part of the Energy Policy Act of
2005 which passed with strong bi-partisan support and extended the limited liability
provision o f the act Price-Anderson Act through December 31, 2025. 8
Because o f the nature o f the Price-Anderson A ct’s limited liability for investors
and increased payout by taxpayers, it has been controversial through the years, though
highly beneficial to electrical companies with nuclear interests. In 1973, a case was
brought to the Supreme Court which challenged the act’s constitutionality. The court
ruled that the act’s goal o f encouraging private investment in energy technology was not
unconstitutional, and the act stood. Many argue that, without this provision, the nuclear
industry in the US would never have survived to present day and, if the limited liability
provision is cut in the future, utility companies will be unlikely to shoulder the financial
burden and risk of constructing nuclear reactors.
Energy Upheaval in the 1970s
After an initial thirty years following WWII in which the same government
agency controlled, promoted and regulated the nuclear industry, in 1975 the Energy
Reorganization Act separated the promotion and regulation functions o f the government
7 Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear P ow er and Public P olicy ,17.
According to the American Nuclear Society, the puipose o f the most recent incarnation o f this act is to
limit the liability private investors could potentially face in the event o f a nuclear disaster, thus removing a
major deterrent from private investment and ensuring greater supply o f nuclear energy in the future.
g
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by abolishing the AEC and creating the Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRA) which is the
precursor to the modem Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Originally, the AEC
was given the dual mission to both promote and regulate nuclear energy, which
contributed to an early development o f regulatory capture between the AEC and the
nuclear industry. The circumstances surrounding this change are that the AEC had
repeatedly been under fire from courts and the public for failing to effectively regulate
nuclear safety standards and for subscribing to the demands o f the industry rather than the
safety of the people. The Reorganization Act therefore created the NRC for regulation
purposes and the Department o f Energy for promotion purposes, but there has long been
a revolving door between the NRC and DOE— and the nuclear industry. It was also
during this time in the early 1970s that, for the first time, nuclear experts and scientists
began coming out against nuclear energy by pointing out potential safety hazards in an
organization that came to be known as the Union o f Concerned Scientists, an
organization that would eventually gain significant international membership. By 1971,
the doubts o f these scientists were beginning to appear in journals and information was
being leaked from inside the AEC as to disagreements among staffer scientists, which the
AEC is rumored to have tried to cover up. Nelkin and Poliak argue that the nuclear
establishment’s legitimacy was sustained by its expertise, and when disagreement
happened within the establishment, that legitimacy was weakened.9 As this scientific
opposition movement became more vocal, the AEC, which had previously been sheltered
from public or governmental opposition, was moved into the public arena.
What had previously been a topic limited to technical scientific discussion, the
1970s saw nuclear energy become an issue of public opinion. The media had previously
9 Nelkin and Poliak, The Atom B eseiged, 85.
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shown little interest in nuclear power, so anti-nuclear groups quickly learned that they
had to bring the issue to public attention. Ralph Nader, who would later earn the title of
the nation’s number one critic of nuclear power, became one of the m ovem ent’s most
outspoken. In 1974, he organized a group called Critical Mass, which was designed to
coordinate the activities of local anti-nuclear activists by providing them with
information and technical expertise. As Duffy notes, like much of the movement activity
of the 1970s, participation like Nader’s attracted media attention and mobilized grass
roots support across the nation.10 It was also in the 1970s that a presidential candidate
addressed the issue of nuclear energy for the first time during a campaign when Jimmy
Carter endorsed an anti-nuclear movement in Oregon. The nuclear industry, which had
grown up insulated from outside pressures and criticism, suddenly found itself spending
millions o f dollars on public relations campaigns to counter its critics.
This gravitation o f nuclear energy from protected industry to public topic of
debate was magnified by the energy crises of the 1970s. The increase in oil prices from
the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo and the 1979 Iranian Revolution had pushed the topic of
energy supply onto a wider stage o f debate and though it would seem logical to assume
these crises helped the prospects o f nuclear energy, promoters of nuclear energy now
found themselves competing with other alternative forms of energy for government
development subsidies. At the same time, government officials began to recognize the
need for a more comprehensive long-term energy policy rather than the ad hoc decisions
that had been characteristic of energy policy in the past. By 1976, there were 23
committees and 51 sub-committees in Congress that were responsible for energy issues.11

10 Mahaffey, Atom ic Awakenings, 68
" Ibid, 70.
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Division in the 1980s
The discourse surrounding nuclear energy in the 1980s was drastically different
from that o f the past two decades. For one, there were two distinct coalitions with
differing nuclear agendas. The ant-nuclear coalition of the time was comprised of
environmental groups such as the Sierra Club, local citizen intervention groups specific
to certain reactors, safety groups like the Union o f Concerned Scientists, and officials at
state and local levels. The White House slid decisively into the pro-nuclear group with
the elections o f Republicans Reagan in 1981 and Bush in 1989, both nuclear supporters.
Other governmental nuclear supporters included the Department o f Energy (DOE) and
various elected officials at the state and local levels, and private support came from
reactor vendors and suppliers, nuclear utilities and construction firms, other private
citizen groups.
Changes in actual energy policy during this time were limited, despite having
presidential support again after an anti-nuclear Carter Administration. The nuclear
accidents at Three Mile Island in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986 precluded any serious
changes that may have eased safety regulations and encouraged investment, and both
presidents were unwilling to expend much political capital in a no-win situation. The two
most important exceptions were the revision o f the Price-Anderson Act in 1988 that
increased the amount the nuclear industry would be responsible for paying should a
disaster happen, and various legislation that attempted to find suitable storage for nuclear
waste. States began increasingly blocking and protesting federal investigation of sites for
nuclear waste repositories within their borders. Disagreements between and among states
and federal legislators and bureaucracies continued through the 1980s until, in 1987,
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Congress designated Yucca Mountain in Nevada as a repository site, even though the
decision was followed by outcry from Western states. Though other storage facilities are
now in operation in most states with nuclear reactors, the largest proposed repository to
date is still located at Yucca Mountain in Nevada, though the site was closed in 2011
under the Obama administration.
Despite the controversy surrounding nuclear energy in the 1970s and 1980s, most
o f the working nuclear reactors that are online in the US today came into operation
between 1967 and 1990.

17

However, reactors are not generally built until 5-6 years after

the sites have been approved and the NRC has reviewed and approved the application for
the reactor. By this timetable, most o f the reactors in operation today were designed and
approved between the late 1950s (when the nuclear sector was still insulated from outside
pressures) and the late 1970s, before anti-nuclear opinion really gained ground. No new
reactors were approved throughout the 1980s, 1990s, or early 2000s.
1992 Energy Policy Act
By 1990, the US was operating 110 nuclear power plants which accounted for 22
percent o f the electricity generated in the US. The problem with the licensing and
construction process for these plants approved and built between the 1960s and 1980s
was that plants were issued a construction permit based on a preliminary design and the
plant’s safety issues were not fully resolved until construction was complete, which
meant the public did not have the details o f the design until after the plant had already
been built. The stipulations regarding licensing in the 1992 Act required the safety
regulations be moved to the front of the three necessary processes: approval o f standard

12 “Nuclear Power in the U SA ,” World Nuclear Association, last updated March 2014, http://www.worldnuclear.org/info/inf41 .html.

34
designs, early site permits (ESPs), and combined construction permits and operating
licenses (COLs). Theoretically, the new process would allow greater opportunity for the
public to be involved in the process and ensure that construction companies would build
the sites according to the design agreed upon in the license.
In the 1990s the Clinton White House instituted deep budget cuts to reactor
technology development and DOE subsidies. By 2005, after the world had seen another
steep increase in the price o f oil following the American intervention in Iraq and
President George W. Bush called for increased production of nuclear power plants, citing
nuclear energy as one of the “safest, cleanest sources o f power in the world.” 13 According
to the Government Accountability Office, between 2002 and 2007, nuclear technology
received $6.2 billion for research, twice as much as fossil fuel programs received.14 If the
Bush administration began a nuclear renaissance, then President Obam a’s administration
and the current NRC has continued it in 2012 with the first new reactors approval since
1979. Following the Fukushima disaster in Japan, President Obama continued his support
o f nuclear energy with a public statement that all energy sources have their potential
downsides, but all still have to be considered in the array that makes up energy supply.15
In his 2012 campaign against Mitt Romney (who has also publicly supported pursuing
nuclear energy) Obama mentioned nuclear technology as an energy source o f the future
and has included its pursuance as part o f his proposed energy policy, as has Romney. In

13 J.R. Pegg, “Bush Calls for Development o f More Nuclear Power,” Environmental News Service, 28 April
2005.
14 Ibid.
15 “Obama Defends Nuclear Energy,” NBC N ew s, 16 March 2011. Accessed June 1, 2011,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42106967/ns/politics-white_house/t/obama-defends-nuclearenergy/#. Uy3 V 6 vld VTk.
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2011, following Fukushima, US Secretary of Energy Steven Chu announced the Obama
administration would continue to support nuclear energy despite the crisis in Japan.
The history o f the early development o f nuclear technology and policy in the US
is important to this research because it illustrates three main issues that will contribute to
the analyses in this project. First, nuclear technology in the US has a long history o f being
a topic one has to be “qualified” to talk about. This creates a separation o f power on 2
levels: at the legislative level, this was seen in the 1940s and 1950s as the AEC created
and then perpetuated its own singular legitimacy on the topic of nuclear energy policy.
Even when the Energy Reconstruction Act separated the regulatory and promotion
functions o f the NRC and the DOE, regulatory capture and revolving door practices
continued.16 This perception of qualification excluded public participation in the nuclear
debate well in to the 1990s until the 1992 Energy Policy Act. Currently, the public has
been granted greater participation in NRC proceedings, and though the general consensus
has been that these public hearings and forums during the initial approval stages are
exercises for show, calls for more public input are beginning to gain some teeth,
evidenced by the recent federal court mandate that the NRC must either allow more
public participation in its decision about fire safety at the Indian Point 3 nuclear reactor in
New York or provide documented evidence as to why such input is impractical or
inappropriate.
Second, nuclear power began as a military imperative in the US. The extent of
nuclear power that was demonstrated in WWII coupled with the arms race of the Cold
War mean that public perception of nuclear energy developed on a different time-line in

16 The consequences o f regulatory capture and revolving door practices w ill be discussed in the conclusions
section o f this chapter.

36
the US than in other places around the world. Because its development was insulated for
so long behind the curtain o f national security secrecy, following a war that did not
necessarily create wide-spread feelings o f governmental mistrust and animosity for
nuclear technology among citizens (unlike post-WWII in Germany) nuclear energy did
not develop in a cloud of controversy, which only came much later in the 1970s, after
most of the reactors currently in use had been approved.
Lastly, this history demonstrates the roots of the anti-nuclear movement in the
US, which grew out o f a community o f scientists rather than from groups o f citizens,
though scientists were eventually able to mobilize them. In the US, the threat o f a nuclear
attack, even from the Soviets, was not effectively linked to nuclear energy until the 1980s
Cold War arms race build-up, at which point most operating nuclear sites had already
been approved. Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons operated in relative separation from
one another in the most important years of licensing and building, and the threat o f
proliferation, though present among the anti-nuclear groups, was a small consideration
early-on. These early beginnings also account for the relatively depressed nature of
nuclear protest in the US.
Nuclear Public Opinion in the United States
The original hypothesis of this project was that in countries where public support
for nuclear energy is high, nuclear energy will have a greater share in a country’s overall
energy supply. Conversely, in countries where public opposition to nuclear energy is
high, there will be less nuclear energy pursuance. This will be tested in the U.S. by first
examining public opinion polls that measure American public support for nuclear energy
at present as well as over time and in reaction to disasters such as Three Mile Island,
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Chernobyl and Fukushima. This data will be compared with nuclear pursuance over time.
The hypothesis is that greater public support for nuclear energy will equal a greater
pursuance o f nuclear energy.
To what extent the US pursues nuclear energy must first be determined. This will
be done with two measures, first by looking at the percentage nuclear currently makes up
o f total electrical energy consumption and secondly by examining the number o f reactors
that have been approved for life extension and new reactors that have been approved for
construction. In 2013, 40 percent of energy consumption in the US was electrical. O f that
40 percent, only 1 percent was supplied by petroleum, while coal provided 37 percent;
natural gas, 30 percent; renewable energy, such as hydro-electric, geothermal, solar,
wind, and biomass, 7 percent; and nuclear, 20 percent.17 Figure 1 illustrates this
distribution:

17 “Prim ary Electrical Energy C onsum ption by Source and Sector, 2013” US Energy Inform ation
A dm inistration, A ccessed O ctober 14, 2013, http://w w w .eia.gov/totalencrgy/.
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Figure 1: Electrical Energy Sources in the U S, 2013.18

In addition, 51 plants have applied to extend the life of their existing reactors; of
those 51 applications, 42 have been approved and the remaining 9 are still under
investigation, which is to say they have neither been approved nor denied. In September
o f 2007, an application was lodged with the NRC for a new reactor in southern Texas, the
first new reactor application in over three decades. There would ultimately be 5
applications for 8 reactors in 2007. The following year, the NRC received 11 applications
for 16 new reactors in the US. In 2012, the first new reactor was approved since 1978 for
a 2-reactor expansion at the Vogtle plant in Georgia. US nuclear pursuance can currently
be characterized as relatively low compared to coal usage at 36 percent and natural gas at
30 percent, but consistent since the mid-1990s. In 1973, nuclear made up 5 percent of

18 D ata com piled b y author from U nited States Energy Inform ation Adm inistration.
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overall electrical energy generation. By the early 1990s, that percentage share had grown
to roughly 20 percent where it has remained ever since.19
In terms of new and existing reactors, the general trend has been for the NRC to
approve life extensions for existing reactors, though with the exception o f the new Vogtle
expansion, few utilities are carrying applications for new reactors through the
construction process to completion. In a few additional instances, reactor life expansions
have been applied for, have been approved, and then intervening economic circumstances
caused plants that were approved well into the future to shut down. For example, in 2008,
the NRC approved an operating license for the Kewaunee Power Station located in
Carlton, Wisconsin, to extent into 2033; however, the plant ceased operation in May of
2013. According to the press release o f the operating utility company, Dominion, the
decision was the result of falling wholesale electricity prices due to cheap natural gas, a
purely economic decision that in no way reflected disapproval o f nuclear energy.

90

In

similar circumstances, the Vermont Yankee plant announced in 2013 that it would close
in 2014 after receiving an extended operating license, again citing similar economic
barriers to continued operation. These occurrences are only marginally important to this
section on public opinion, but will be discussed more fully in the later section on
endowments o f domestic natural resources.
To measure public opinion toward nuclear energy in the US, this research utilizes
information gained from a poll conducted by Gallup which asked the same question in
yearly polls from 1994 through 2012. When asked “Overall, do you strongly favor,
19 “Primary Electrical Energy Consumption by Source and Sector, 2012” US Energy Information
Administration, Accessed October 14, 2013, http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/.
20 “Dominion Shuts Down Kewaunee Power Station Permanently,” Dominion Press Release, May 17,
2013, Accessed March 22, 2014, http://dom.mediaroom.com/2013-05-07-Dominion-Shuts-DownKewaunee-Power-Station-Permanently.
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somewhat favor, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the use of nuclear energy as one
of the ways to provide electricity for the US,” in 1994, 57 percent o f Americans were in
favor o f nuclear power, meaning they either answered that they strongly or somewhat
favor the use o f nuclear energy as one o f the ways to provide electricity for the US. The
highest level o f support was in 2010, when 62 percent o f Americans favored nuclear
power, and the lowest in 2001, when only 46 percent favored nuclear power. In 2012, 57
percent o f respondents again answered that they were in favor o f nuclear power, a
percentage equal to the response in 1994 and only 5 percent less than positive public
opinion at its peak in 2010. Figure 2 illustrates these trends in opinion polling from 19942012 :
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Figure 2: Public O pinion on N uclear Energy in the US, 1994-2012.21

21 “Americans Still Favor Nuclear Power a Year After Fukushima,” Gallup, March 26, 2012, A ccessed July
I, 2012, http://www.gallup.com/poll/153452/Americans-Favor-Nuclear-Power-Year-Fukushima.aspx.
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A basic analysis o f nuclear energy pursuance and public opinion in 2012 alone
reveals very little, considering public opinion for nuclear energy only decreased 5 percent
from 2010-2012 and public opinion against nuclear energy only increased roughly 7
percent in the same time period. To compare that with nuclear energy pursuance in terms
of percentage shares of total energy, nuclear remained steady at from 2010-2012. In this
respect, there was little change in either opinion or pursuance. Nor do minute changes in
public opinion explain the move in 2011 to approve the first new reactors since 1978.
The comparative results o f public support for nuclear and nuclear pursuance show that
while support has fluctuated over the years, varying from 48 percent support at the lowest
and 62 percent at its peak, nuclear pursuance in the US has been consistent since the
1970s, varying only between 18 and 21 percent of overall electrical energy production.
Figure 3 demonstrates this relationship between public opinion data (from previously
cited Gallup polls) and nuclear pursuance from 2000-2011:
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Figure 3: Public A pproval and N uclear Pursuance in the US, 20 0 0 -2 0 1 1.22

Similarly, while opposition to nuclear energy varies, nuclear pursuance remains
steady. Figure 4 demonstrates this relationship:

22 D ata com piled by author from Gallup poll and US Energy Inform ation Adm inistration.
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Figure 4: Public O pposition and N uclear Pursuance in the US, 2000-2011.23

The data so far seems to point to a weak relationship between nuclear support or
opposition and actual changes in nuclear energy pursuit. Fluctuations in public opinion
(which have been small, according to these Gallup polls) have not resulted in any
correlating, consistent changes in nuclear output as a percentage share o f total energy
production. The following section will examine to what extent nuclear disasters had an
impact on public approval for nuclear energy as well as any measurable effect on the
decision to pursue nuclear energy.
Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima
Nuclear pursuance in the US has varied little since the mid-1990s, but polling data
from earlier time periods can be used to measure reactions to the nuclear disasters at the
Three Mile Island accident and Chernobyl. Various media outlets reported that global
citizen support o f nuclear energy dropped directly after Fukushima in 2011, though

23

Data com piled by author from G allup poll and US Energy Inform ation Adm inistration.
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Fukushima was not the first nuclear disaster o f its kind. A smaller, more contained
disaster took place at the Three Mile Island facility in Pennsylvania in 1979, and the
slightly more well-known disaster at Chernobyl, former USSR, happened in 1986. In
order to determine whether Fukushima will have a long-term impact on nuclear
pursuance, one can look to similar disasters like Chernobyl and Three Mile Island and
measure responses over time for trends which may be applicable in the long-term wake of
Fukushima. The hypothesis is that nuclear disasters negatively impact a country’s
decision to pursue nuclear energy. This variable tries to capture public opinion reactions
to disasters that may impact decision to pursue nuclear energy as well as possible post
disaster cost-raising safety enhancements that would create a market-based deterrence to
investing in nuclear energy. Rather than using data that merely measures general support
or opposition to nuclear energy, this section will use polling data that also measures
public support for building new nuclear reactors. The reason for this is that general
questions about supporting or not supporting nuclear energy really only engage
respondents at a theoretical level, or at a level where there is no risk involved. Asking
more specifically about building new reactors makes the response more personal. An
additional hypothesis here is that while people support nuclear energy in theory, they are
less supportive when it comes to the possibility o f a reactor in their community.
The most comprehensive polling data available in the US24 reveals that, despite
data which suggests Americans support nuclear energy in theory (such as that already
provided here by Gallup), they have been increasingly opposed to the reality of
supporting nuclear expansion in the form of building new nuclear reactors. The data

24 Eugene A. Rose, “Public Acceptance o f Nuclear Power: Deja vu all Over Again?” Physics an d Society,
30 (April): 2001.
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reveals that, from 1974-1979, fewer people opposed new reactors with the decline in
support beginning in 1979 following the Three Mile Island incident; however, that trend
was inconsistent. Support for new reactors declined from around 45 percent in 1979 to a
low o f around 40 percent in February o f 1980, but then jumped again to 50 percent
support in April o f 1980 and declined very little until January of 1982. Opposition to new
reactors did spike in February of 1979 from 30 percent to around 45 percent, but then
hovered between 45 percent and 40 percent until a sharp increase in opposition in
February o f 1982. Because there are no significant and consistent increases or decreases
in opposition or support following 1979, there is no clear correlation between the disaster
at Three Mile Island and levels o f public support. Similarly, though nuclear output
decreased between 1979-1980 from a 13 percent share to a 10 percent share, in 1981
nuclear output again rose and climbed consistently until 1986.
Similarly, following Chernobyl in March of 1986, there was an increase in
opposition for new reactors from around 62 percent to 70 percent, but then opposition
levels fell back to 60 percent in April o f 1986 and hovered between 60-70 percent until
January o f 1990. Levels o f support for new reactors had dropped to around 30 percent in
February o f 1986 and rose and fell between 20-30 percent from early 1986 to January of
1990. Again, there is no observable sharp and consistent decrease in levels o f public
support that would demonstrate a strong and lasting impact on American public opinion
resulting from the disasters at Three Mile Island in 1979 or Chernobyl in 1986. Similarly,
there is a decrease in nuclear output from 1986-1987 from a 19 percent share to a 16
percent share, but output levels again began increasing in 1988.

46
Rather than demonstrating that public opinion turned in opposition to nuclear
energy after Three Mile Island or Chernobyl, this data suggests that it was neither Three
Mile Island nor Chernobyl that caused the most drastic and lasting impact on public
opinion for building new reactors, but was rather triggered by the Cold W ar arms race
buildup o f the early 1980s. The most dramatic shift in public support for building new
reactors happened between the polling in April o f 1981 and polling in January o f 1982
when, according to this data, opposition overwhelmed support in what proved to be an
irreversible trend.
To gauge changes in public support for nuclear energy directly following the
Fukushima incident on March 11, 2011, Gallup provides a measure o f public opinion on
new reactors in the US in 2001 and again in 2 0 1 1.25 Table 1 demonstrates the results of
polling in regard to the question: “Which comes closer to your view about increasing the
number o f nuclear power plants in the country— nuclear power is necessary to help solve
the country’s current energy problems, or, the dangers o f nuclear power are too great,
even if it would help solve the country’s current energy problems?”.

25 “Americans Still Favor Nuclear Power a Year After Fukushima.” 26 March 2012. Gallup.
http://www.gallup.com/poll/153452/Americans-Favor-Nuclear-Power-Year-Fukushima.aspx
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Percent Nuclear
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48 percent

MAY 18-20,2001
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Table 1: Support for and O pposition to New N uclear R eactors in the US, 2001-2011.26

Between May 2001 and 25 March o f 2011, directly following the disaster at
Fukushima on March 11 o f 2011, public opinion on increasing the number o f nuclear
power plants has remained fairly steady. This data further suggests there has been no
substantial diminution in support for nuclear power plant construction over this past
decade — despite the current and highly visible nuclear problems in Japan. This initial
reaction to Fukushima showed the American public remained as it was before
Fukushima: fairly equally divided in terms o f new reactors.
This polling information seems to suggest that, though most Americans support
nuclear energy in theory, the practical use o f that energy in terms o f building new
reactors is problematic. When questions about nuclear energy in general are asked, there
is moderate to strong support, but that support decreases when the specific question of
building new reactors is posed. Respondents may see nuclear as a necessary part o f what
should make up future energy sources, yet are uncomfortable with the idea of a nuclear
reactor in their community. This is a typical “Not In My Backyard” response that is
commonly observable in relation to a variety o f issues. Most importantly, it is evident
from the polling data that support has never consistently decreased in response to
26 Ibid.
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previous disasters. Additionally, despite the immediate dip in nuclear output following
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, nuclear output has always recovered to pre-disasters
levels. This negates the hypothesis that nuclear disasters have a negative impact o f
decision to pursue nuclear energy, and though Three Mile Island and Chernobyl caused
temporary “shocks” to both public opinion and nuclear output, neither are long-term
effects and the shifts in both are relatively small.
Despite this consistent support for nuclear energy, however, no new reactors were
approved in the US for well over three decades, from 1978-2007. This trend o f
continuing the life o f existing reactors but not approving new ones may be congruent
with public opinion: Americans believe existing nuclear capacity will play a part in their
future energy supply (approval to continue the life o f existing reactors) but oppose
expanding nuclear capabilities with new reactors (absence of new reactors approved
between 1978 and 2012). However, it is unclear what the causal relationship is in this
case. Did public opinion cause a shift in nuclear pursuance policy for new reactors after
1978, or was the decrease in building new reactors caused by something else (most likely
legal, political and economic road blocks) and the American public interpreted no new
reactors as a beneficial shift in policy after Three Mile Island? It is almost impossible to
clearly state a clear directional relationship.
The most likely scenario is that the nuclear construction take-off in the early
1970s cost electrical companies far more than they expected and saddled rate-payers with
higher bills for decades. Some nuclear reactors approved prior to 1978 continued under
construction until the early 1990s, but by 1985 twenty-eight nuclear plants under
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construction were cancelled.

27

The Shoreham plant on Long Island, for example, was

finished but never brought online. It was not that the NRC was denying applications to
build, but that utility companies were simply not applying for them, or were applying,
starting construction, and then abandoning projects for various reasons. The costs of
building and operating these nuclear facilities with their extensive licensing processes
and safety regulations, especially after the public relations challenges o f the 1970s and
the 1992 Energy Policy Act, became so great that many electrical companies decided the
cost would exceed the benefit, which most likely resulted in the decline o f new reactors
in the following decades. This indicates that the more important relationship in
determining whether to pursue nuclear energy with new reactors may be between the
government (NRC) and the nuclear industry rather than the government and the public,
though markets also play a large role in determining cost-effectiveness and profitability.
In order to better understand the nature o f the anti-nuclear movement in the US and
determine to what extent it had any impact on the decision to pursue nuclear energy, the
following section will offer a qualitative analysis of protests and organized movements
against nuclear energy in the US.
Nuclear Protest in the US
Historically, protest against nuclear energy in the US gained little momentum
until the early 1970s. A government technology that was federally funded and promoted,
nuclear energy reactor production was already in full swing by the time the public knew
enough about it to protest it. By the time a widespread awareness o f nuclear energy
became main-stream in the 1970s, the nuclear industry had already received licenses to
27 Ralph Vartabedian and Ian Duncan, “First N ew US Nuclear Reactors in Decades Approved,” Los
Angeles Times, February 9, 2012, Accessed February 27, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/09/nation/la-na-nuclear-20120210.
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build most o f the 104 reactors currently in operation in the US. The beginnings o f nuclear
opposition began in the 1960s not with the public but in elite scientific circles such as the
Union o f Concerned Scientists, many o f whom were working for the government within
nuclear regulatory fields. In fact, only 12 percent of all licensing application submitted
between 1962 and 1966 were legally contested by local citizen groups.28 However,
between 1967 and 1972, local interveners challenged 73 percent o f all applications
reviewed in the AEC hearings.29 Public interest lawyers, many of whom were skilled trial
lawyers, entered the fray to represent intervening groups, and many o f the hearings
became long and acrimonious with much procedural wrangling which continued
throughout the 1970s.30 Though these hearings delayed the commencement of some
plants’ construction and operation, it is important to note that, in each case where there
were such hearings, licenses were granted at the end of the proceedings.
Though no new reactors were licensed in the US from 1978 until 2012, a number
of hearings have been scheduled in recent years in response to applications filed with the
NRC to extend the operating life of existing plants. Original licenses issued in the 1970s
were good for forty years with the option to renew for another twenty. This means that
the utility owners o f existing plants would begin seeking the option to renew around
1998, allowing for time to proceed through the relicensing process (average time o f 3+
years) and make updates and corrections to the facility before the existing license
expired. Since 1998, 51 plants have applied for renewed licenses.31 For example, the

28 Christian Joppke, M obilizing A gainst Nuclear Energy, 31
29 Ibid. 31.
30 Harold P. Green. “Public Participation in Nuclear Power Plant Licensing.” William a n d M ary Law
Review. 15:3 (1974).
31“Fact Sheet on Reactor License Renewal,” United States Nuclear Regulatory Com m ission, A ccessed
April 5, 2013, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc~collections/fact-sheets/fs-reactor-l icense-renewal.htm l.
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operating license for the Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station in Plymouth, Massachusetts,
was originally scheduled to expire in 2012. In 2006, the Louisiana-based company that
owned Pilgrim, Entergy, filed an application with the NRC to extend the operating life of
the plant until 2032. The local nuclear watchdog organization, Pilgrim Watch, filed
multiple contentions and movements for hearings with the NRC and, according to NRC
protocol, hearings were held on behalf of the group and other concerned citizens
throughout 2011. The proceedings were open to the public and signs, banners, posters
and displays were permitted in accordance with NRC policy.32
Despite repeated hearings initiated by Pilgrim Watch, in M ay o f 2012, the NRC
eventually approved the 20-year extension for the Pilgrim reactor. In 2011, 18 separate
hearings or pre-hearing conferences calls were scheduled to address concerns related to
10 different nuclear operating plants or uranium enrichment facilities, down from 19
hearings in 2010. The lowest number o f hearings held in one year between 2006 and
2012 was 2007, in which only 11 hearings were held. In 2012, the number had increased
to 22 separate events scheduled to address concerns over nuclear licenses.33
In fact, public hearings have taken place for each license renewal application
since the first for Calvert Cliffs in 1998, a hearing at which the local Baltimore Sierra
Club, among others, filed opposed the relicensing of the reactors.34 Every application for
renewal that was filed between 1998 and 2008 was approved between 2000 and 2011
with the exception o f the Indian Point facility filed in 2007. When Indian Point in

32 Docket from NRC proceedings, Matter o f Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. 9 Feb 2011. Docket # 50-293LR http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/MLl 104/ML 110400428.pdf.
33 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Proceedings, 2012. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Accessed April 30, 2013, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc
collections/aslbp/proceedings/201 2 /.
34Kevin McQuaid, “Worries Heard at Nuclear Relicensing Hearing,” Baltimore Sun. July 10, 1998.
Accessed Feb 1 2012.
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Buchanan, New York, initially filed for an extension in 2007, the operating utility
company asserted that because the buried pipes at the facility do not carry radioactive
liquid they were not subject to the aging management review. Two years later in 2009,
however, a leak from these pipes containing thousands o f gallons o f water containing
radioactive material proved Baltimore Gas and Electric Company wrong. As a result,
New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman and Connecticut Attorney General
Robert Snook began lobbying on behalf of their respective states against the NRC
renewing the license for this facility. The operating license is set to expire in December
o f 2015, but the NRC has given Entergy permission to continue operation while the
license renewal application is under review. This is the first instance o f a state countering
the NRC’s relicensing, and also the first instance in which a new license was not granted
1C

in the usual 30 month time frame.
Analysis o f this information indicates that localized opposition to extending the
life new reactors in the form o f formal hearings and challenges has been consistently
present yet ultimately ineffective, considering every relicensing application since 1998,
with the exception o f Indian Point, has been challenged during hearings and then
approved by the NRC. The significant difference with the Indian Point facility is the anti
licensing lobby o f New York and Connecticut as states rather than complaints lodged by
individuals or groups. Separate conclusions can be drawn from this information. First,
opposition to building new reactors exists in the US, but it is localized rather than
nationalized. Nationally, polls reveal that Americans support nuclear pursuance.
Opposition to the actual reality of pursuing nuclear energy in the form o f building new

35 With the exception o f the relicensing o f the Crystal River Unit 3, which has been delayed due to
infrastructural damage.
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reactors exists, but at a more local level among those who live in the communities where
reactors are supposed to be built.
However, that is not to say that significant support in favor o f new reactors does
not exist within communities where reactors are proposed. The first plant to apply for and
be granted a new reactor license since 1978 is a 2 reactor expansion o f the Vogtle plant in
Georgia. During the public hearing proceedings o f April 2008, twelve individuals in total
addressed the panel, five speaking in support o f the Vogtle license and seven against.
Those who spoke in favor of the license mainly represented organizations, such as
Citizens for Nuclear Technology Awareness; the Burke County School Board; the Clean
and Safe Energy Coalition; Columbia County Chamber o f Commerce; Augusta Metro
Chamber o f Commerce; plus individual citizens from local communities. They cited
clean energy, employment benefits, and low electricity prices among the reasons that
SNC had their support to expand the Vogtle plant. Those who spoke against Vogtle’s
license approval were, in contrast, comprised completely o f local citizens who did not
represent groups or organizations, though it was the local anti-nuclear groups that
originally lodged the challenges that instituted the hearings. Their reasons for concern
were fairly consistent: pollution in the Savannah River; damage to local fish and animal
populations; use of water in a drought area; radioactive contamination; high local cancer
rates; waste disposal.36
The Voglte expansion public hearing in 2008 can be classified as fairly
representative o f the relicensing hearings documented since the late 1990s. The interest
and governmental groups represented may go by different names, but most of them put

36 Docket from NRC proceedings, Matter o f Southern Nuclear Operating Company Early Permit for
Vogtle. 20 March 2008. Docket # 5 2-011-ESP http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0808/ML08080Q263.pdf.
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forth the same arguments for continuing the life o f existing reactors: economic growth,
jobs provided, clean energy, and future low energy prices. Local chambers of commerce
tend to support keeping and building reactors, as well as local pro-nuclear and
environmental groups. Those who tend to oppose the reactors are anti-nuclear groups
such as the Sierra Club (which is well represented at many of these NRC hearings) and
local citizens with concerns for their personal quality o f life related to issues of
contamination, cancer, or pollution. As with the applications for renewed licenses, the
application for a license to build the two new reactors at Voglte was eventually approved.
According to the timeline provided by the NRC, new licenses are generally approved or
denied approximately 6 years after their application. SNC applied in 2006, obtained its
ESP in August o f 2009, and then the COL in February of 2012, right on schedule. The
next opportunity for public hearings will occur within the next 6 years during the Plant
Construction/Verification stage.
Secondly, this information suggests that citizen complaints and challenges from
local interest groups matter little in the approval process o f new or existing reactors.
What does seem to matter are challenges brought forth on behalf of states in the licensing
process. Indian Point provides the first opportunity to follow this process o f state
opposition in the US system.
Historically, physical demonstrations and protests have been happening in the US
since the 1970s. Some took place in Washington DC, such as the 65,000 person protest in
1979, and some in New York City such as the 200,000 person protest in the same year. In
1982, the largest anti-nuclear protest in the US took place in New York City’s Central
Park. More often than not, these national demonstrations were organized on behalf of
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international causes like the International Day o f Nuclear Disarmament and Great Peace
March for Global Disarmament, and so were politically focused on nuclear weapons
rather than nuclear energy. To find specific protests against nuclear energy, one has to
look locally. The Clamshell Alliance, for example, was organized in 1976 specifically to
take non-violent action against construction o f the Seabrook nuclear reactor in New
Hampshire. The 4000+ members o f the group, known as “clams” have over the years
continually engaged in “civil disobedience” with some protests resulting in arrests and
the need for National Guard intervention. The Clamshell Alliance inspired similar
protests at the Diablo Canyon plant in California by the Abalone Alliance, and then
across the nation at other nuclear facilities. Despite these protests, both the Seabrook and
Diablo Canyon reactors are currently in operation. There is one instance in the US in
which a local community effectively decommissioned a nuclear power plant by public
vote in 1989 in Sacramento, California. Though the local community initially voted to
embrace the Rancho Seco plant in the mid-1960s, 14 years after its start date they again
voted to decommission to plant, citing problems with fuel storage as their chief
concern.

^7

This remains the sole instance to date in which a reactor already in operation

has been decommissioned as a result o f public vote.
Similarly, there is only one instance in which such protests are believed to have
halted the initial constmction of a nuclear facility, the Black Fox facility, which never
reached the stage o f license application from the NRC. In May o f 1973, the Public
Service Company o f Oklahoma (PSO) announced plans to install Oklahoma’s first
nuclear power plant in Inola, just south o f Tulsa. The local movement against the

37 Andrew Sabey, “Sacramento Shuts Out Rancho Seco,” University o f California Davis Law Brief,
Accessed April 10, 2013. http://environs.law.ucdavis.edU/issues/13/2/articles/sabev-pdf.
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building of this plant, lead mainly by a local school teacher named Carrie Barefoot
Dickerson, buried the construction plans and licensing process under so much legal
wrangling and subsequent construction delays that in 1982, almost ten years after the
reactors were first proposed, PSO cancelled the project called Black Fox due to cost
overruns resulting from the large-scale community opposition to the reactors themselves
and to paying the rate increases necessary to build the reactors.38 Though her efforts in
protesting Black Fox bankrupted her, Dickerson is remembered as being the key actor in
the movement that halted the construction o f a nuclear facility in the US.
Even in the instance of Black Fox, it is difficult to clearly demonstrate that public
opinion against Black Fox’s construction was the sole variable driving the decision to
abandon the project. The main question here is whether or not PSO would have
consented to halt facility construction based solely on reactionary public opinion, or if the
abandonment o f Black Fox had more to do with the increasing costs of building the
reactors the longer the legal wrangling carried on. In the end, the most likely scenario is
that negative public opinion created an anti-Black Fox movement that was able to
mobilize in a way that created real and costly barriers to continuing construction. After
all, similar protests existed in different places and reactor construction proceeded without
delay. In Oklahoma, these costly barriers to construction were the key determinant in
abandoning Black Fox, without which the movement most likely would not have been as
effective.
Ultimately, there is no clear correlation between public opinion and nuclear
energy pursuance in the US. The first hypothesis proposed in this project was that the
38 Scott Thompson, “Rogers Woman Who Fought Black Fox Plant Left Lasting Legacy,” O klah om a‘s
Own, April 28, 2011, Accessed 28 Sept 2011. http://www.newson6.com/storv/14536815/decades-laterclaremore-womans-fight-against-black-fox-plant-still-inspiring.
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greater the support for nuclear energy, the greater the pursuance and, conversely, the
greater the opposition the lesser the pursuance. This relationship between public opinion
and nuclear pursuance has proven weak at best in the US. When asked about nuclear
energy in general, a majority o f Americans consistently support it. When asked
specifically about building new reactors, support decreases. Therefore, it is difficult to
define what public opinion really is in the US. Support is greater in theory, but less so in
practice.
In terms o f voting preferences, both major parties, Democrats and Republicans
alike, are currently pro-nuclear and support an “all of the above” approach to a
comprehensive energy policy. In the 2012 US election, both Democratic and Republican
candidates Barack Obama and Mitt Romney ran on a pro-nuclear platform, though
nuclear energy was not a central issue in the election, coming in far from first after the
economy, healthcare, foreign policy and even after the importance o f other energy
sources like petroleum and natural gas, which were mentioned more frequently by both
candidates during the campaign than was nuclear. The only anti-nuclear political party in
the US is the Green Party, which received .3 percent of the overall national total votes. In
the U S’s two-party, winner-take-all system, voters have little motivation to vote for a
third party, anti-nuclear candidate when the chances of electing a Green Party President
or even Congressional member are slim. Ultimately, American voters are left with only
two viable candidates for President, and, in most cases, for Congress, both o f which
support pro-nuclear platforms.
The greater the protests against nuclear energy the less a country will pursue it has
also been shown to be a weak assertion. Though every re-license application has been
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formally challenged, they have all been approved. Similarly, challenges were raised for
the first new reactor application at Vogtle, which was also approved. The lone exceptions
are the Indian Point reactor, which faced intervention from NY and CT states rather than
just individuals and organizations (and is still underway); the Rancho Seco plant in
California which was abandoned after a negative public referendum; and Black Fox,
which stands as the lone example o f how protests kept a reactor from being built (though
in the end it had more to do with how the protest raised the cost of building the reactor
than with push-back from the public).
The second hypothesis, that nuclear disasters negatively impact decision to pursue
nuclear energy, is also without strong support. The amount of nuclear energy generated
from the early 1980s until 2014 has remained relatively steady, even after Three Mile
Island in 1979, Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011. Of course, most reactors in
operation now that are generating that steady supply of nuclear power were approved
prior to the 1979 Three Mile Island disaster. While it is true that no new reactors were
approved after 1978, that is likely due to market considerations rather than safety or
public approval issues. Various circumstances in the 1970s coalesced to increase the cost
o f investing in nuclear energy: expensive public relations campaigns, necessary for the
first time to counter an emerging anti-nuclear voice; competition with other resources for
subsidization money after increases in the price o f oil; and policy enacted by anti-nuclear
President Jimmy Carter, specifically the 1978 Energy Tax Act which rewarded citizens
with tax credits for home investment in renewable energy all increased the price of initial
investment in nuclear energy. This increased cost is the most likely explanation for the
lack of new reactor applications after 1978. Though Three Mile Island in 1979 and
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Chernobyl in 1986 may have had some reinforcing impact, the market had already
established this decline in nuclear energy investment in the 1970s.
Secondary findings in this case are that nuclear disasters— particularly
Chernobyl, Three Mile Island and, to the extent that it can be tested now, Fukushima—
have no discernible lasting impact on levels of public opinion in the US. Though there
may be a momentary dip in support for nuclear energy, levels o f support eventually
return to pre-disaster levels. Nuclear technology loses the most support when it is
militarized in the sight o f the public. For example, support after Three Mile Island
decreased to a small extent and then rose again, but after the Cold W ar arms build-up
began in the early 1980s, there was a sharp and unrecoverable decrease in support for
nuclear energy.
Additionally, this research finds that support o f nuclear energy in the US varies
nationally and locally. In theory, when asked about using nuclear energy, people tend to
support it. However, when asked specifically about building new reactors, there is less
support. This is a sort o f “not in my backyard” response. When it comes to protesting
reactor applications, states are more successful interveners in the NRC licensing process
than individuals or organizations. Protests brought about by individuals or organizations
have only been successful when they can increase the cost of building a new reactor to
the point where it is no longer economically feasible for the electrical company, as in the
case o f the Black Fox plant.
There should, o f course, be some acknowledgement that true public opinion can
be a difficult variable to capture. While Gallup is a generally reliable source o f polling
information, depending on the makeup of the random sampling, the timing and wording
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o f the questions, and participants’ willingness to answer truthfully, the results of any poll
may not be representative of the true general feelings of a given population. It is for this
reason that a qualitative study o f protest activity and voting preferences have been
included with public opinion polls as these are the most accessible outlets through which
citizens can take action based on their opinions.
Access to Other Resources
Whereas the previous sections sought to determine to what degree public opinion
and nuclear disasters influence pursuance o f nuclear energy, this section will examine
supplies o f other electricity-producing resources with the hypothesis that the greater the
endowment o f or access to domestic natural resources, the less a country will pursue
nuclear energy. Renewable sources and petroleum do account for a small percentage of
electricity generation in each case, but the share is so small that these energy sources are
not yet a sole viable alternative to nuclear in the same way as coal and gas. For this
reason, only coal and natural gas supplies will be considered in the US case.
In 2013, coal provided 37 percent o f American electrical energy, natural gas, 30
percent; and nuclear, 20 percent. In relying on nuclear for 20 percent o f electrical energy
needs, the US is the second largest nuclear consumer in the world, following only France.
In 2011, nuclear made up a significant portion o f overall electrical production in the US,
equal to that o f natural gas. In the past 2 years, however, natural gas usage has increased
from 20 to 30 percent, the result of technological advances in drilling technology that has
granted access to natural gas reserves previously unreachable by existing extraction
methods. Even with this natural gas boom, coal still remains the largest electrical energy
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generation resource, though its usage decreased from 46 percent in 2011 to 37 percent in
2012, the continuation o f a general trend o f decreasing reliance on coal since 2009.39
This hypothesis about nuclear energy in relation to other energy resources can
first be examined by looking at consumption statistics over time to determine whether
using more coal or natural gas at any given time necessarily equaled a reduction in
nuclear generation. Nuclear energy did not have a share in the overall US electrical
consumption until 1958, when 2 trillion BTUs were generated from nuclear. Since then,
the reliance on nuclear has steadily increased; similarly, reliance on coal has likewise
increased steadily until 2012, while reliance on natural gas deceased in the early 1980s
only to increase again in the 1990s.40
As the US economy has expanded since 1950, there have been general increases
in the use o f coal, natural gas, and nuclear energy, with the most significant increases
coming from coal-produced electricity, usage which only began to decrease in 2009.
While there seems to be little relationship between usage of coal and nuclear (both
increased steadily) there is a correlation between natural gas and nuclear. When natural
gas consumption decreased in the early 1980s, nuclear energy consumption increased.
Both consumption levels then remained steady, until the lines cross again in 2012, when
reliance on energy sources for electricity in the US saw fairly significant shifts. Coal
reduced its share from 46 percent to 37 percent; Natural gas increased its share from 20
percent to 30 percent; Nuclear decreased slightly from 21 percent to 19 percent.41

39 Annual Energy Review, 2012, US Energy Information Adm inistration, Accessed April 23, 2014.
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/Decss diagram.cfm.
40 Annual Energy Review, 2012, US Energy Information Administration, Accessed April 23, 2014.
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pecss diagram.cfm.
41 Annual Energy Review, 2012, US Energy Information Administration, Accessed April 23, 2014.
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pecss diagram.cfm.
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The biggest shift in these electrical energy sources came mainly from an increase
in natural gas usage, which resulted in decreases in both coal and, to a much lesser extent,
nuclear. The explanation here is clearly the intense surge in hydraulic fracturing
techniques the US has been experiencing in the past year and the glut o f cheap natural gas
that increased production is creating. While more natural gas did, in this case, mean a
very slight reduction in reliance on nuclear (21 percent to 20 percent) the decrease was
negligible compared to the changes in coal consumption (46 percent to 37 percent).
Nuclear replaced natural gas in the 1980s as the price o f natural gas increased, but as
natural gas prices plummet and the US moves to rely less on coal, there may be future
increases in both natural gas and nuclear.
This fluctuating reliance on different energy choices is not necessarily a new
phenomenon, and has consistently been related to energy resource price. The greatest
boom for new nuclear reactors in the US occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, when coal was
at its highest price and utilities were predicting a robust growth in electrical demand
concurrent with economic growth.42 The 1973 Arab Oil Embargo also resulted in an
increase in the price o f oil. The price o f natural gas, which had historically been coupled
with oil prices, experienced the largest increase up to that point in the 1970s when well
head prices rose from .17 dollars per thousand cubic feet (TCF) in 1970 to $1.18 TCF in
1979 43 It was during this time that most o f the nuclear reactors in operation today were
applied for and licensed. After oil and gas prices stabilized at higher prices in the 1980s,
no new applications for reactors were submitted to the NRC. A second boom in reactor

42 Lucas Davis, “Prospects for Nuclear Power After Fukushima,” Energy Institute at Haas, Working Paper
Series, Accessed August 10, 2013, http://ei.haas.berkelev.edu/pdfyworking papers/WP218.pdf.
43“US Natural Gas Wellhead Price,” US Energy Information Administration, A ccessed August 10, 2013,
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hisbn9190us3a.htm .
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applications occurred in the late 2000s, when natural gas prices were at an all-time high
of $6.25 TCF in 2007 and $7.97 TCF in 2008.44 Similarly, crude oil prices45 rose around
the same time from an average of $56.6446 per barrel in 2005 to $99.67 in 2008.47 Finally,
coal prices also increased from an average of $51.16 in 2007 to $118.79 in 2009.48 These
recent trends demonstrate that when gas, oil, and coal prices are high, applications for
nuclear reactors increase dramatically, from 0 applications in 2006 to 5 applications in
2007 to 11 applications in 2008. Figure 5 illustrates these trends:
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Figure 5: NRC R eactor A pplications, 2000-2011.49

44 “US Natural Gas Wellhead Price,” US Energy Information Administration, A ccessed August 10, 2013,
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3a.htm .
45 Though petroleum in only used in small quantities for electrical energy, I include their prices here to
demonstrate general increased prices in energy sources, and because, historically, oil and gas prices
fluctuated together.
46 West Texas Intermediary (WTI) Prices.
47 “Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB,” US Energy Information Administration, A ccessed August 10,
2013, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=rwtc&f=a.
48 BP Statistical Review o f World Energy Report, A ccessed August 10, 2013.
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/Statisti cal -Rev ie w2 0 12/statistical review o f world energy 2012.pdf
49 Data compiled by the author from US Energy Information Administration.

Many of those plans for new reactors have now been abandoned, however. Other
than the Georgia Vogtle plant, which was approved for a 2 reactor expansion in 2012,
only one other approved site has started construction, in Jenksville, South Carolina. The
Chicago-based utility Exelon, for example, which is the nation’s largest nuclear operator
with 17 units, has postponed its decision on whether to build a twin-unit nuclear plant in
Victoria County, Texas. Two other large nuclear suppliers, NRG Energy and UniStar
Nuclear Energy, have put off building long-planned plants in south Texas and Calvert
County, Maryland, respectively. O f the 11 applications in 2008, four have currently been
shelved indefinitely.50
Based on this data, we can conclude that enthusiasm for expanding nuclear energy
by way of applications for nuclear reactors increases when the price o f gas and coal
increase as well, and when those gas and coal prices decrease, so do nuclear applications
as well as forward movement in building approved reactors. This actually seems fairly
commonsensical and is explainable by the fact that there has to be economic justification
for building a new nuclear reactor, a venture for electrical companies that has become
increasingly costly in the US since the 1970s. In other words, the cost o f building a
reactor should be less than the cost of continuing to buy gas and coal at elevated market
prices. In 2007 and 2008, when gas and coal prices were high, applying for reactor
licenses made economic sense. Since then, however, the fracturing boom in the natural
gas industry has decreased the price o f gas to the point that it makes more economic
sense to increasingly rely on cheap natural gas than to buy coal or pay to build a new
reactor.

50 “Expected N ew Nuclear Power Plant Applications,” Nuclear Regulatory Commission, A ccessed August
19, 2013, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/new-licensing-files/expectcd-ncw-rx-applications.pdf.
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Based on these findings about the past relationship between prices o f coal and
natural gas and nuclear energy pursuance, testing the hypothesis that the higher a
country’s natural resource endowments or ability to obtain energy from reliable sources
and at affordable prices will decrease the likelihood o f nuclear energy pursuance will
allow for future projections on nuclear energy pursuance in the US. In 2011, oil and gas
exploration and production companies operating in the United States added 31.2 trillion
cubic feet of wet natural gas reserves to a new record high o f 348.8 trillion cubic feet.51
This is only the second time in US history that the number of natural gas added proven
reserves had been over 30 trillion cubic feet, the first time occurring in 2010. The 20102011 year added almost 10 percent additional reserve capacity to US natural gas
prospects. In terms o f natural gas pricing, the US natural gas wellhead price has
consistently decreased from its record high o f over $10 per thousand cubic feet in 2008 to
around $3 per thousand cubic feet in 201 1.52 Even accounting for monthly price increases
during the exceptionally cold winter of 2013-2014, the average price of natural gas in the
United States has not been this low since the beginning of the 21st century. In times of
low natural gas prices, interest in continuing or increasing nuclear energy capacity
decreases. This phenomenon explains the previously mentioned closure o f at least two
nuclear plants, the Kewaunee and Vermont Yankee, which had been approved to
continue operation well into the 2030s.
American coal reserves actually surpass natural gas reserves and are, in fact, the
US’s most abundant natural resource. As o f January 1, 2013, the demonstrated reserve

51 “US Crude Oil and Natural Gas Proven Reserves,” Energy Information Administration, Last Udpated
August 1, 2013, Accessed March 23, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves/.
52 “US Natural Gas Wellhead Price,” Accessed 23 March 2014.
http://www.eia. gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm.
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base of recoverable coal in the US was 257 billion short tons and The US Energy
Information Administration predicted that coal production was expected to grow 3.2
percent in 2014. With this much coal abundance, the US only imported 1 percent o f the
coal it used to generate electricity in 2011, while US exports of coal increased from 5
percent o f coal produced domestically to 10 percent in 2 0 1 1.53 Recently pledged clean
energy goals coupled with increased availability o f natural gas have likely contributed to
the decrease in coal reliance. If natural gas abundance continues, as it is likely to do, it is
also likely that reliance on coal will decrease as well, though coal production will
continue as the US begins exporting more coal to other countries. There seems to be little
relationship between coal usage and nuclear reliance, except to say that a guaranteed
domestic endowment o f coal would likely to be a more affordable fall-back option than
nuclear should unlikely circumstances limit natural gas availability.
Though it is established that the US possesses abundant endowments o f coal and
natural gas, two resources on which it depends most heavily for electricity production, it
is still worth mentioning regional energy trading relationships. Since the early 1970s, the
US’s two most significant energy trading partners have been Canada and Mexico. In
2008, the US imported 3.9 and 3.6 million cubic feet (MCF) of natural gas from each
country, respectively. Those numbers have decreased to 2.8 MCF from Canada and 2.7
MCF from Mexico in 2013.54 Both Canada and Mexico also possess large reserves of
coal and natural gas; additionally, all three countries are bound into fair future trading
cooperation with the US by the North American Free Trade Agreement, thus giving the

53 “Coal Explained: Imports and Exports,” Energy Information Administration, Last Updated July 30, 2012,
Accessed March 23, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=coal imports.
54 “US Natural Gas Imports by Country,” Energy Information Administration, Last Updated February 28,
2014, Accessed March 23, 2014, http://ww'w.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_move_impc_sl_a.htm.
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US multiple future options to obtain affordable energy imports from reliable trading
partners should it need to increase imports in the future. The EIA, however, projects that
the net import share o f total US energy consumption will decrease to 4 percent in 2040,
down from 16 percent in 2012 and 30 percent in 2005, and the US will transition from
being a net energy importer to a net exporter.55
This section produces two separate sets of conclusions: First, that coal
consumption and nuclear consumption have little to no correlation in the US. The only
relationship seems to be that the US has consistently used more coal for electrical energy
than nuclear, and will most likely continue to produce large amounts o f coal, even with
lower gas prices, for export purposes. Even with environmental movements against coal
and allegations that it is a “dirty” resource, the current infrastructure in the US is
conducive to using coal while supply remains abundant and prices remain low. The more
clear relationship may actually be between natural gas and coal, evidenced by the
changes in use o f each for electrical energy supply between 2010 and 2012. When natural
gas increases, coal (but not necessarily nuclear) decreases.
Second, when supplies o f natural gas decrease, nuclear energy production
increases. This decreased supply of natural gas increases its price, thereby making
nuclear seem a more attractive energy option. To return to the original hypotheses o f this
section, it seems that the relationship between coal and nuclear is unclear, as usage of
both have steadily increased since the 1950s. There also seems to exist a fluctuating
relationship between gas and nuclear; that is, when there is less gas, there is more

55 “AEO2014 Early Release Overview,” Energy Information Administration, Last Updated December 16,
2013, Accessed March 23, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/earlv production.cfm?src=Anal vsisb3.
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nuclear, and when there is more gas, there is less nuclear (though only small decreases, as
in the case of the 2011-2012 decrease from 21 percent to 20 percent).
Other findings in this section relate to the relationship between the price o f energy
resources and their supply share of US electrical energy. First, when coal and natural gas
prices increase, so do application for new nuclear reactors. This phenomenon is
observable when gas prices were high in the late 1960s and 1970s, when most o f the
reactors in operation today were constructed, and then again in 2007/2008 when gas
prices were high before the US oil and gas fracturing boom. Lastly, when natural gas
prices decrease, so do the applications for new nuclear reactors. As the US supply of
natural gas dramatically increased from 2010-2012 and therefore the prices decreased, the
applications for new reactors have also decreased from 11 applications in 2008 to none in
2012. Furthermore, much of the construction planned for the previously applied for
reactors has slowed if not halted as the high reactor construction costs are difficult to
justify in the face o f abundant and cheap US natural gas and plants previously approved
for extended continued operation are closed because of economic reasons.
Overall, the hypothesis that higher natural resource endowments or reliable and
affordable access to resources through trading will equal decreased pursuit o f nuclear
energy will only become clear in the coming years as operating utility companies apply
or do not apply for extended operating licenses on existing reactors. The voluntary
closure o f the Kewaunee and Vermont Yankee plants for reasons o f economic
insufficiency seems to indicate that this could be a trend if natural gas supplies remain
high and prices remain low. However, the new reactor construction at the Vogtle plant
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seems to tell a different story of the future viability o f nuclear energy, though the
completion and operation o f those two new reactors are still years in the future.
Chapter Conclusions
The relationship between nuclear pursuance and public opinion is weak. Though
opinion has varied over time, nuclear pursuance increased steadily until it reached the 20
percent mark at which it hovers now. This is one interpretation o f the existing data,
though another interpretation must be presented. Because opinion measured at the
generalized national level has actually varied little over time, a consistent pursuance of
nuclear energy could be seen as actually in line with opinion. The argument against this
interpretation is that while generalized national support for nuclear energy has been
relatively consistent, localized and specific opinion against nuclear has been much
stronger. Despite protests and objections from the public, reactor life-extension
applications have consistently been approved by the NRC, thus allowing for the
continued 20 percent reliance on nuclear energy.
One issue that was not initially formulated into a hypothesis but has become
increasingly worth o f consideration throughout this research is that o f the phenomenon of
regulatory capture. Nuclear power seems to be a textbook example o f the problem of
regulatory capture, a situation in which an industry gains control o f and then manipulates
in its favor the agency that is meant to regulate it. The safety requirements set forth and
enforced by the NRC have long been criticized as patchwork at best and negligent at
worst. Victor Gilinsky, who served on the NRC during and after the Three Mile Island
incident, recently said in an interview that the NRC is a “...wholly owned subsidiary of
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the nuclear power industry.”56 In 2008, during his presidential campaign, President
Obama also said that the NRC is a “moribund agency that....has become captive o f the
industry it regulates.”57 The NRC certainly has motivation to keep regulatory oversight
weak. The commission’s defenders have pointed out that it must be cautious because
increased safety measures would equal increased operating costs, which could hurt the
nuclear industry and thus leave the commissioners out o f a job. There have also been
instances o f a “revolving door.” In 2008, Jeffrey Merrifield, who had served on the NRC
since 1997, left the commission to take a job at The Shaw Group, which has a nuclear
division regulated by the NRC.
The likely scenario is that the NRC has continuously made decisions in favor of
the nuclear industry despite other considerations such as public opposition or concerns
about safety after nuclear disasters. In doing so, the commission has placed its own
survival over the integrity o f its office. Public opposition seems to be effective only when
it can create practical and costly barriers for utility companies, such as the case in the
Black Fox plant, or when states intervene in the NRC approval process. Furthermore,
voters have few options for electing anti-nuclear representation at the presidential,
congressional or even local levels given the nature o f the two-party, winner-take-all
system that favors the Democratic and Republican parties, both of which are pro-nuclear.
Ultimately, the market seems to provide the most explanatory power for
decisions to pursue nuclear power. Most reactors in operation today were built in the
1950s, 60s, and 70s, with original operation licenses for 40 years that can be extended for
up to 20 additional years. It is from these reactors that the US gets most o f its nuclear
56 Jeff Goodell, “America’s Nuclear Nightmare,” Rolling Stone Magazine, April 27, 2011, A ccessed March
23, 2014, http://vyww.rollingstone.com/politics/news/america-s-nuclear-nightmare-20110427.
57 Ibid.
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energy. The lack of new reactor applications and construction since the 1980s explains
the steady 20 percent reliance since the 1980s and why we have not seen a significant
increase in nuclear power generation. The early reactor boom brought most o f the
reactors in operation now, but as these projects wore on, utilities companies realized the
immense time and cost involved in constructing nuclear sites. While coal and gas were
abundant and relatively cheap, investing such a large amount of capital into a nuclear site
became less attractive than the more traditional sources o f energy. One may argue that
rate payers actually absorb much o f the initial cost of construction over time, and this is
true, to some extent. However, this increase in electricity rates for citizens is usually quite
unpopular, which can in turn mobilize residents against a nuclear facility, even as it
promises jobs and industry to an area. Citizen protest, if it is strong enough, can lengthen
the process o f licensing and construction, thus again increasing the overall cost o f a given
nuclear site. When citizens can involve states on their behalf, their overall chances of
success increase. While this variable is likely insufficient alone, it may be an added
deterrent to utilities companies to choose nuclear over less controversial and initially
expensive coal or gas. In fact, the Chairman o f one of the largest US nuclear companies
recently commented that he would not break ground on a new reactor until the price of
natural gas was double the current price.

co

Though the government has instituted policies to make investment in nuclear
energy more affordable and with fewer risks for utility companies, it is difficult to say to
what extent the US will pursue nuclear in the future. Once the initial construction costs
are financed, the sites are relatively inexpensive to run, and since this initial cost has
already been absorbed, there is little motivation for the NRC to not re-license an existing
58 Lucas W. Davis, “Prospects for Nuclear Power,” Journal o f Economic Perspectives, 26:1 (2012), 50.

plant. The real question is how many new reactors will be approved and then, more
importantly, actually built and brought online. The new reactor expansion at Vogtle is
already delayed, which may be an indicator of what many utility companies can expect in
the future. Furthermore, with the glut o f cheap natural gas from new technologies and a
large domestic supply of coal readily available (and Canadian and Mexican imports on
stand-by), there may be even less of a motivation to go with expensive and sometimes
unpopular nuclear.
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CHAPTER 4
NUCLEAR ENERGY IN GERMANY

Objective
Following the structure o f the preceding chapter on nuclear energy in the United
States, this case study on Germany aims to first offer a brief background on the
development of nuclear energy policy in Germany. Secondly, this chapter will explore
the relationship between patterns o f nuclear energy pursuance and public opinion in
Germany since the 1970s. Again, “Nuclear energy pursuance” is operationalized as the
overall percentage nuclear provides to the electrical energy supply and public opinion is
measured by using polling data with a supplemental discussion o f protest activity and
voting preferences. The hypothesis is that in countries where nuclear approval is lower,
nuclear pursuance will be lower and, in countries where nuclear approval is higher,
nuclear pursuance will be higher. Next, this chapter will analyze data over time that
measure to what extent public opinion and nuclear energy pursuance have changed in
response to nuclear disasters, specifically disasters at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and
Fukushima. Lastly, this chapter will examine the share nuclear currently makes up of
total German energy consumption with the hypothesis that if Germany has a greater
endowment o f electricity-generating natural resources or greater access to other reliable,
affordable energy resources, its pursuance of nuclear will decrease. The chapter will end
with conclusions based on these findings.
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Development o f Early Energy Policy in Germany
Following World War II, German energy policy was essentially coal policy. The
largest indigenous energy source in Western Europe, domestic coal production and
consumption dominated German energy patterns.1 In the 1950s, however, German coal
became increasingly uncompetitive with oil, which was priced very cheaply at the time.
Despite policies and subsidies aimed at bolstering domestic coal exports, coal production
dropped as Germany began importing more oil from foreign producers. The oil price
shocks o f the 1970s motivated Germany to escalate its on-going investment in nuclear
energy (but also renewable energy sources as well) to increase its energy security and
independence from oil imports. A relative late-comer to nuclear energy competition,
pressure from chemical and electronic companies further pushed nuclear expansion in the
1970s. The first nuclear research reactor came online in Germany in 1957 and the first
commercial reactor opened in 1961, though the vast majority of Germ any’s operating
reactors came online in the 1970s and early 1980s. This increased pursuance o f nuclear
energy was not limited to Germany but was rather quite common policy throughout the
European Economic Community (EEC) at the time. A 1972 projection reported that by
1985, the total installed nuclear power in the EEC would provide 33 percent of total
electricity consumed, an increase that would require the construction o f six to eight new
power plants per year.3
Germany was banned from developing nuclear weapons after World War II, so
the German nuclear industry did not grow up in the shroud of secrecy and protection of

1 Hatch, Politics an d Nuclear Power, 12.
2 Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollack, “Political Parties and the Nuclear Energy Debate in Germany and
France,” Com parative Politics, 12:2(1980), 127-141.
3 Nelkin and Pollack, “Political Parties and the Nuclear Energy Debate in Germany and France,” 127.
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the “national security” label as it did in the United States. However, very similarly to the
US, conventional energy policies in Germany were managed largely by a group of
policy-makers and scientists, known as the Economics Ministry, which was made up of
officials and interested parties from labor and industry. Likewise, the development of
nuclear energy technology was managed primarily by the Bundesministerium fuer
Forschung and Technologie (the Federal Ministry o f Research and Technology, or
BMFT) and experts within the scientific community. Until the 1970s, nuclear technology
was largely ignored by the public and the government officials monitoring and legislating
it enjoyed relative anonymity and isolation.
The 1959 Atomic Energy Act
The purpose of the 1959 Atomic Energy Act was originally two-fold. W hile it
established a framework for regulating nuclear approval, construction, and operation, it
also was fundamentally meant to promote nuclear energy, specifically, to promote private
investment in new reactors by making them affordable. The German Atomic Energy Act
bore striking similarities to the 1946 and 1954 American Atomic Energy Acts that
preceded it by providing for: the privatization o f the nuclear industry; limited and exempt
liability for nuclear investors; and mandatory public hearings in the reactor approval
process. The most significant difference between the German and US Acts lies in the
move away from a centralized federal agency to regulate or grant license approval
(functions o f the NRC in the US) to a Lander (or state-based) control o f licensing
approval where the reactor is to be installed. Public hearings were mandatory prior to
license approval, but only individuals could participate as opposed to organized group
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participation on behalf o f individuals as is allowed in the US. This contributed to the
early regional character o f the anti-nuclear protests in Germany.4
Subsequent Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act: 2002
Though the original version of the German Atomic Energy Act was consolidated
and updated throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the intent to encourage investment in the
nuclear energy sector was preserved until the late 1990s when the Bundestag (German
Parliament) began proposing changes to the Atomic Energy Act and eventually amended
the 1959 Act to the Act on the Peaceful Utilization of Atomic Energy and Protection
Against its Hazards.5 The new policy codified a structured phase-out o f nuclear energy
which granted the remaining reactors in operation an average life-span o f 32 years. This
policy shift was the result of a Red-Green Social Democrat-Green party alliance formed
within the Bundestag in the late 1990s. Following Chernobyl in 1986, the Green Party
gained popularity in Germany and united with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in
1998 under the leadership o f Gerard Schroder. The coalition remained in power in
Germany until 2005, when the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), led by Angela
Merkel, defeated the Social Democrats. This conservative party has remained in the
majority ever since.
Subsequent Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act: 2010
M erkel’s Conservative CDU-Liberal FPD (Free Democratic Party or FPD)
Coalition changed nuclear course again in 2010, rescinding Schroder’s phase-out and
granting further extensions for existing nuclear power plants in exchange for new taxes
on nuclear power that would then subsidize renewable forms of energy such as wind and
4 Joppke, M obilizing Against Nuclear Energy, 39.
5 “German Nuclear Legislation.” Nuclear Energy Agency. A ccessed September 14, 2013, http://www.oecdnea.org/law/legislation/gerraanv.html.
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solar. Contributing to this decision to grant nuclear reactors a longer life was the official
ratification o f the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, which committed Germany to pursuing clean
energy sources to reduce their C 0 2 emissions. In order to pursue the goals o f the Kyoto
Protocol, Germany knew it would have to begin moving away from coal (their largest
naturally occurring energy resource) and moving toward more natural gas and renewable
energy sources. Once it was clear that move would mean importing more energy sources,
particularly natural gas, it was quickly apparent that the largest supplier in Europe was
Russia. Fearing an inconsistent supply bought at high real and political prices, nuclear
energy slowly began a comeback in Germany in the form o f the 2010 amendment. Der
Spiegel, one o f Germany’s most widely-read news outlets, addressed this nuclear
comeback on July 2008 cover o f its magazine with a headline that read: “Atomkraft: Das
Unheimliche Comeback” (“Nuclear Energy: Its Eerie Comeback”). The article outlined
how factors such as the increasing urgency to limit C 0 2 emissions, the rising costs of
fossil fuels, and the political instability o f fossil fuel exporters such as Libya and Russia
were combining to revitalize a widely unpopular industry that once again appeared to be
the “lesser of evils” for energy production.6
Fukushima in 2011
The nuclear comeback was short-lived. Following the disaster at Fukushima in
March o f 2011, by late May Chancellor Merkel had announced that Germany would
again begin a phase out of nuclear energy that would run through 2022. The oldest
reactors that had been shut down for maintenance before Fukushima were not brought
back online and the others would all be subsequently decommissioned before the 2022
deadline. Now, Germany is pursuing what has been called a policy o f “energiewende,” or
6 Michael Sauga, “Comeback der Reaktoren: Aufbruch ins neue Atomzietaler,” July, 2008, D er Spiegel.
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energy turn, from conventional energy sources to more renewable sources such as wind,
solar, and hydropower, an initiative that so far has been financed largely by private
German electrical customers who are paying the highest energy rates in the European
Union aside from the Dutch.
This brief background on the development o f nuclear energy in Germany
illustrates three important factors beyond providing a historical framework for the
discussion that follows. First, it highlights the decentralized reactor approval and
licensing process that is characteristic to German nuclear energy, a factor which is
important when analyzing the efficacy o f public opinion and protest activity toward
nuclear energy within the Lander in Germany.
Secondly, dissimilarly to the US, this history demonstrates ebbs and flows of
pursuance o f nuclear energy. Whereas the US has pursued nuclear energy at consistent
levels since all operating reactors came online, the nuclear prerogatives o f decision
makers in Germany have been in a state o f flux since the late 1990s. This is most likely
explained by the different considerations in a Parliamentarian system o f government
compared to a Presidential one. The unique Parliamentarian nature o f the German
Bundestag means that while anti-nuclear Green Parties are often unlikely to win a
majority, even taking a small share o f the votes affords them representation in the
legislature and, as was the case in the 1998 elections, can also mean a coalition with other
parties to form policy-making majorities within Parliament. In Germany, unlike the
United Kingdom where a party must receive the majority o f votes in a constituency, there
is a combination o f majority and proportional systems, and the proportional aspect
dominates. Every party receiving more than 5 percent of national support gets
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parliamentary seats in proportion to its vote. This 5 percent threshold has been very
important. It was high enough to force unity on the various Green factions; without it,
Green groups and parties would have been fragmented. But it was low enough to allow
representation in Parliament at an early stage.7
In 1998, the Red Social Democrats joined with the Greens to bring the Greens
into the national government for the first time. Consequently, the late 1990s also marked
the initial phase-out of nuclear energy that would be reversed with a pro-nuclear
Christian Democratic Union win in 2005. In contrast, the U S’s two-party “winner-takeall” system requires a majority o f votes for representation in Congress or a Presidential
election. While there is a functioning Green Party in the US, the Green candidates only
drew a small percentage o f national votes in the 2012 Presidential election. What this
difference in legislative structures points to is that, in the US, the low probability o f a
Green Presidential or Congressional win means decisions and policies will not be
influenced by Green Party anti-nuclear objectives. In the German Bundestag, however,
even relatively small Green representations can form coalitions and exert influence over
energy policy.
Lastly, this history illustrates a point o f departure resulting from Fukushima in
2011 that was not present in the US. Following the Japanese disaster that made
international headlines, public opinion in the US barely shifted and the NRC approved
construction for the first new reactors since the late 1970s. In Germany, however, the
reaction was quite different. The following chapter will attempt to determine what factors
in addition to Fukushima could have had an impact on this decision to permanently turn
away from nuclear energy.
7 D etlaf Jahn, “Green Politics and Parties in Germany,” The P olitical Quarterly, 68:B (1997), 174-182.
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Nuclear Public Opinion in Germany
After WWII, an anti-militaristic, anti-proliferation doctrine was strictly enforced
in Western Germany. Very similarly to the US, there was little public protest against
nuclear energy throughout the 1950s and 1960s when reactors were initially being
designed and built in Western Germany (Soviet Eastern Germany was consistently pronuclear in its policies until its demise in 1990 and reunification with W estern Germany).
Though there was a strong anti-nuclear weapons peace movement in the 1950s and an
anti-NATO sentiment as well, many of the proponents and members remained
enthusiastic about the peaceful potential nuclear technology could offer for power
generation.

o

Even the anti-nuclear energy movement that was gaining ground in the

1960s was more concerned with environmental safety and waste issues than about the
development o f nuclear weaponry.
Some scholars try to explain the early lack o f clear public opposition to nuclear
energy by claiming that public dissent existed but was repressed during this time in a
post-Nazi shaming era which created a “culture o f consent.”9 Certainly, the image of
“Model Germany,” or what political economists have termed the depiction of post-war
Germany as an island of stability and strength in a crisis-ridden world economy, comes to
mind. Most analysts agree that the apparent success o f Model Germany can be attributed
to a persistent concern for monetary stability, an export-oriented economy, and an active
policy o f modernization, one pillar o f which was a greater energy independence that
could be obtained through nuclear power. A second explanation is that nuclear reactors
were not numerous enough until the 1970s to cause much alarm. It was not until the
8 Paul Hockenos, “Angst or Arithmetic?: Why Germans Are So Skeptical About Nuclear Energy,” Heinrich
Boll Stiftung, Series on Energy Transformation, 2012.
9 Hockenos, “Angst or Arithmetic,” 3.
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1970s oil price increases spurred motivation to build new reactors that people’s “not in
my backyard” reactions were triggered. This section will first determine the state of
current nuclear pursuance in Germany and then compare it currently and over time with
polling data to determine whether patterns or relationships exist between these two
measures.
Germany is currently the largest energy consumer is Europe. In early 2011,
Germany received the majority of its electrical energy from fossil fuels such as coal, oil,
and natural gas. By the end of 2011, nuclear energy production had dropped from 23
percent to 15 percent, while other renewable sources such as wind, solar and hydropower
grew to 15 percent. In 2011, Germany was the largest European producer o f non-hydro
renewable electricity, wind energy, solar energy, and biofuels.10 In 2012, the percentage
share o f renewable energy in the overall mix had grown to 22 percent. Figure 6 illustrates
this energy mix:

10 Germany Country Analysis, US Energy Information Administration, Last Updated May 30, 2013,
Accessed March 25, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=gm.
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Figure 6: Electricity Production by Source in G erm any, 2 0 1 1.11

Since the early 1990s, nuclear’s share o f total electricity generation hovered
between 30 percent and 35 percent, until it began declining slowly in the early 2000s as a
result of the phase-out policies of the Atomic Energy Act. In 2011, the nuclear share
dropped to 16 percent and then to 15 percent in 2012. Figure 7 demonstrates this trend:

11 D ata com piled by author from Germ an Energy Profile, Energy Inform ation A dm inistration.
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Figure 7: N uclear Percentage o f Net Electricity G eneration in G erm any, 1990-2012.12

Polling Results o f German Nuclear Opinion
In 2010, a Financial Times/Harris Poll found that 35 percent o f Germans strongly
opposed the building of new reactors; 29 percent opposed more than favored; 25 percent
favored more than opposed; and 12 percent strongly favored. The same poll, asking the
same question about building new reactors, found in 2010 that the number o f Germans
strongly opposed to the building of new reactors had increased to 43 percent; 34 percent
opposed more than favored; 16 percent favored more than opposed; and only 7 percent
strongly favored. This poll also discovered that Germans were strongly opposed to
government subsidies to finance research for nuclear power: 47 percent strongly opposed
a government subsidy; 35 percent opposed more than favored; 13 percent favored more
than opposed; and only 5 percent strongly favored.13 This data reveals that in 2010, well

12

Data compiled by author from World Nuclear Association.

13 “Large Majorities in US and Five Largest European Countries Favor More Wind Farms and Subsidies for
Biofuels, but Opinion is Split on Nuclear Power.” PRNewswire, October 13, 2010.
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before Fukushima, Germans were already opposed both to building new reactors and
financing research to increase nuclear power (77 percent against new reactors, 82 percent
against government subsidies). After Fukushima, in November o f 2011, Germans
responded to a Globescan survey asking whether they supported the building of new
reactors with a resounding no: 90 percent of Germans strongly opposed building new
reactors.14 The same poll found that 52 percent o f Germans was not only opposed to
building new reactors, but supported the Merkel policy to shut down all existing reactors.
In June o f 2011, 57 percent o f Germans responded that they thought the nuclear phase
out would be feasible.15
Since Fukushima in 2011, polling conducted in Germany tends to focus less on
the topic o f nuclear energy and more on support for the energy transition from fossil fuels
to more renewable energy sources that Germany is currently undergoing. For this project,
support for the energy transition, or energiewende, can be equated with support for
phasing-out nuclear energy, since the purpose o f the energy transition is to move away
from nuclear (but also coal and oil) to other renewable energy sources such as solar,
wind, and hydropower. The focus of much o f current German polling has to do with
willingness to pay energy prices since the transition from fossil fuels to renewables is
largely being financed by energy customers through two ways. First, Germans pay an
umlage charge on their monthly energy bills that amounts to roughly 14 percent of their
total energy cost. This cost is not necessarily new, though the four largest electrical
companies in Germany announced in 2012 that the umlage cost would increase to a rate
14 “Opposition to Nuclear Energy Grows.” Globescan, November 25, 2011, Accessed September 13, 2013.
http://www.globescan.com/commentarv-and-analvsis/Dress-releases/press-releases-2011/94-press-releases2011/127-opposition-to-nuclear-energy-grows-global-poll.html.
15 “What People Really Think About Nuclear Energy,” For Atom Project, 2012.
http://www.foratom.org/isnnallfib top/Publications/Opinion Poll.pdf.
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that amount to an approximate additional €59 on monthly bills per custom er.16 Second,
the overall cost o f energy is increasing as new electrical grids are built to support
renewable energy as well as to finance a feed-in tariff that is paid to anyone who installs
solar or wind technology and sells electrical energy to the grid.
A survey taken in mid-March 2013 found that Environmental M inister Peter
Altmaier’s proposal to dampen increasing energy prices (which essentially meant slowing
down the move to renewables) met with great popular resistance. 89 percent of those
polled who associated with the Green Party naturally thought “renewables should be
consistently expanded”; the Christian Democrats responded at 68 percent in favor of
continuing to pursue renewables; and 81 percent of Social Democrats said renewables
should continue to grow.17 Altmaier’s proposal has since been rejected in Parliament.
Similarly, a German Forsa poll found in October o f 2012 that 72 percent o f those
surveyed supported the switch-over, while only 24 percent opposed it.18
These responses o f support, however, are only in theory, and thus demonstrate a
short-coming o f polling data, for it is unclear whether those polled realized the practical
price-increase consequences o f expanding renewables or supporting the switch-over
when answering. When asked specifically about their willingness to finance the
transition, responses are less enthusiastic. An Emnid poll conducted in October o f 2012
found that two-thirds of those surveyed are not willing to pay more than €50 to finance

16 Lauren E. M cKee, “German’s Renewable Energiewende: Pioneering Path or Troubled Turn,” Journal o f
Energy Security, April 2013.
17 Craig Morris, “Energy Transition— Nuclear Power, Very Unpopular.” Renewables International,
Accessed September 11, 2013, http://www.renewablesintemational.net/nuclear-power-vervunpopular/150/537/62320/.
18 “Poll: Germans Support Abandoning Nuclear Power.” The Journal.IE, Accessed September 11, 2013,
http://www.theioumal.ie/poll-germanv-nuclear-power-644340-Qct2012/.
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the switch-over, far less than the impending price increases.19 Similarly, a 2013
Befragmich poll found that only 38 percent o f Germans surveyed were willing to accept a
consistent increase in their electricity bill.20 The Financial Times/Harris Poll found in
2010 that 43 percent o f Germans were not willing to pay more for energy if it was from a
renewable source opposed to a fossil fuel, and 65 percent responded that they were not
willing to pay more for energy to cut greenhouse gas emissions or finance renewables.21
In this respect, it seems that current nuclear energy pursuance policies correspond
to the majority o f nuclear public opinion in Germany. Despite questionable willingness to
finance the renewable switch-over, polls reveal that in 2013 Germans consistently
support moving away from nuclear energy, specifically to renewable energy sources.
Accordingly, German energy policy is doing just that— moving away from nuclear
energy by closing the oldest reactors and resolving to shut down others in operation by
2022. Both the public’s backlash to nuclear and the anti-nuclear policy shift have been
attributed to Fukushima, though earlier disasters had already influenced public opinion in
Germany. To gain a greater understanding o f this relationship between nuclear pursuance
and public opinion over time, the following section will examine public reactions to the
nuclear disasters at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima as well as offer a
qualitative examination o f nuclear protest culture in Germany and changes in nuclear
pursuance that may have been a result.

19 McKee, “Germany’s Renewable Energiewende.”
20 “Energy Policy and W illingness to Pay: 2013,” Befragmich. Accessed September 22, 2013.
www.befragmich.de.
21 “Large Majorities in US and Five Largest European Countries Favor More Wind Farms and Subsidies
for Biofuels, but Opinion is Split on Nuclear Power.” PRNewswire. http://www.pmewswire.com/newsreleases/large-maiorities-in-us-and-five-largest-european-countries-favor-more-wind-farms-and-subsidiesfor-bio-fuels-but-opinion-is-spli t-on-nuclear-power-104844169.html
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The 1970s and Three Mile Island
The anti-nuclear movement was already well underway by the time o f the 1979
accident at Three Mile Island, unfolding through a series o f sighting conflicts beginning
in the late 1960s. In 1971, the first notable citizen opposition occurred in response to a
reactor proposed for the small town of Wyhl, located in the southwest comer of
Germany. Local farmers, vintners, and environmentalists mobilized early on in protest to
issues such as reactor safety, water pollution, and ecological effects. By 1974, this local
opposition has gathered 90,000 protest signatures.22 The structure o f the German nuclear
license-approval process required a public hearing before the Lander government could
vote on reactor approval. As it turned out, in this case, the state government was partowner o f the utility company proposing the project, and thus had a vested interest in
seeing the license approved.

The opposition force which had grown to encompass most

o f the outlying region of Baden-Wtirttemburg, where the town o f Wyhl was located,
organized to show up at the public hearing and voice their opposition to the proposed
reactor.
What happened at the public hearings was both predictable and similar to such
hearings conducted in the US through the NRC. The impatient state government rushed
through the proceedings on the first day, barring the majority of those who showed up to
protest the reactor from speaking. The second day followed in much the same way,
though those who showed up to the hearing to support the reactor were allowed to speak
in favor o f the project. It became clear that the majority o f those opposed to the project
were agriculturally invested, resided in the region surrounding where the reactor would

22 Joppke, M obilizing Against Nuclear Energy, 98.
23 Ibid, 98.
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be placed, and feared damage to their livelihoods as farmers and vintners. Those who
supported the reactor were primarily working-class citizens living in the actual town of
Wyhl and saw the reactor as a source o f employment for hundreds o f people, cheap
electricity, and a magnet for further metropolitan investment. In fact, a narrow majority
o f the citizens voted for the reactor, thus removing the last institutional obstacle to reactor
construction.24 These same distinctions are apparent at public hearings in the US, where
the support and opposition are likewise divided among those who fear environmental
consequences and those who desire the local economic stimulation building a reactor
would bring. As is also the case in the US, reactor licenses are approved regardless of
concerns voiced in these public hearings.
The opposition movement saw direct action as their final resort and a spontaneous
site occupation turned into a ten-month siege in 1975 that forced Wyhl and the antinuclear movement into national public debate. There were reports o f police brutality as
magazines and television stations showed images o f farmers and their wives being
dragged away from the proposed nuclear site. At is largest, the protest had grown to
between 25,000 and 28,000 participants.25 This not only drew attention to local nuclear
opposition groups, but also to the questionable nature o f the state’s actions in rushing
through the reactor approval stage in spite o f large-scale opposition. In light o f this
negative publicity, the state government did agree to negotiations with local groups, but it
would ultimately be actions by another municipality that would shelve plans for the Wyhl
reactor. In 1977, the Administrative Court o f Frieburg, a town approximately 30

24 Joppke, M obilizing Against Nuclear Energy, 99.
25 Hatch, P olitics and Nuclear Power, 73.
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kilometers from Wyhl, terminally revoked the construction permit for Wyhl, citing
insufficient reactor contamination plans.
Several other critical protests followed, first at Brokdorf where a reactor had been
proposed. The anti-nuclear movement had gained momentum from the conflict at Whyl
and what had been a localized protest movement grew into nationalized mobilization at
Brokdorf with 70-80,000 people participating.26 Though it was reported that 75 percent of
the local population at Brokdorf opposed the nuclear reactor, the local municipal
government quickly moved through the public hearing process and, courted by promises
o f increase tax income and utility donations such as a local swimming pool, they
approved the license for a reactor at Brokdorf in 1975.27
What followed the Brokdorf license approval was the first instance in which the
German anti-nuclear movement would encounter hard push-back from the state. While
the anti-nuclear movement had been successful at Wyhl (though only after another
municipality had intervened in an official capacity) protestors found that the battle at
Brokdorf would be much harder fought. In 1976, local opposition groups announced that
they would peacefully protest and occupy the construction site at Brokdorf. They were
outraged when the utility company erected a tall steel barrier around the construction site
and suddenly began work under the cover of “nacht and nebel” or night and fog.

A

November 1976 protest escalated into what the media called a “civil war,” complete with
tear gas, police helicopters, the destruction o f a security fence, and, ultimately, the
severing o f communication between the state and local groups.28 An administrative court
agreed to postpone the construction o f the reactor, but in 1981 the construction permit
26 Joppke, M obilizing Against Nuclear Energy, 101.
27 Ibid, 101.
28 Ibid, 102.
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was reinstated and the Brokdorf reactor first began operation in 1986. It remains in
operation today.
Brokdorf was the first instance o f violent confrontation in the German antinuclear movement, though other similar confrontations would follow throughout the late
1970s and early 1980s. Many o f the same protestors who were involved at Brokdorf
moved immediately to the small village o f Ghronde where a reactor site had been under
construction for ten months. There protestors used blowtorches and electric chainsaws to
cut through the security fence, and eight hundred protestors and police were injured. The
“Grondhe Trials” in 1978 inflicted harsh prison sentences on many o f the protestors who
were arrested and criminally charged. Similarly to Brokdorf, the protests only
temporarily halted construction in 1977 due to unresolved issues concerning waste
disposal, and construction began again in 1979. The first power from Ghronde was
generated in 1984, and the reactor remains in operation today.
The final significant court case o f the time involved the reactor at Kalkar, where
an administrative court halted construction because o f questions regarding the
constitutionality o f the 1959 Energy Act, arguing that, having been written in 1959, it
could not have foreseen the long-term far-reaching consequences inherent in the
application o f fast-breeder technology.

Demonstrators attempted protest activity at

Kalkar, though by this time local police forces and officials were familiar with their
modes o f operation and blocked roads heading into Kalkar, thus keeping the majority of
protests away from the site. Though the Kalkar plant again began construction in the
early 1980s and was completed by 1985, it never came into operation. It was only after
29 “Brokdorf Nuclear Power Plant,” E.On, A ccessed September 25, 2013, http://www.eon.com/en/aboutus/stmcture/asset-finder/brokdorf.html
30 Hatch, Politics and Nuclear Power, 81.
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Chernobyl in 1986 that Social Democrat government on North Rhine-Westphalia refused
to license the reactor into operation. In fact, a Dutch developer bought the land and the
defunct reactor and turned them into an amusement park, complete with swing ride inside
the nuclear cooling tower.
So, by 1979 and Three Mile Island, a vibrant anti-nuclear movement was already
well established in Germany. From this early protest activity three major trends emerge in
relation to the efficacy o f public opinion in Germany. First, support and protest for
nuclear reactor expansion was often split, and though polls may suggest that most people
in a region did not support new reactors in their villages, there was always a faction of
people who did support the reactor, whether it was blue-collar workers who anticipated
employment or officials who anticipated tax dollars, industry and utility companyprovided perks. Figure 8, taken from data from Christian Joppke’s 1993 study o f antinuclear protests in Germany, demonstrates the trends in public opinion polling during the
1970s:
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Figure 8: Support for and Opposition to N ew N uclear R eactors in G erm any, 1976- A ugust 1986.

This polling information demonstrates that many Germans did, in fact, support
nuclear reactors, a fact that may not be apparent when only observing protest activity.
Secondly, it demonstrates that the most significant moment of change in public support
happened in 1986, not 1979, following Chernobyl rather than Three Mile Island.
Second, the evolution o f the anti-nuclear protests from non-violent at Whyl to
violent thereafter had both positive and negative effects on the movement itself. It is
unclear to what extent the anti-nuclear movement would have gained such national
attention without having gone to such extreme measures, for it was only after Wyhl and,
to a greater extent, Brokdorf that the movement gained national notoriety and increased
support. On the other hand, the escalation o f the violent protests also brought negative
attention, as the trials from Grondhe and the movement itself was increasingly associated
with criminality. This negative perception was not helped by the simultaneous Baader-
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Meinhof (Red Army Faction or RAF) attacks happening across Western Germany in late
1977 and the resulting “German Autumn” during which labor union representatives were
kidnapped and murdered. The result was that the anti-nuclear movement fractured in the
1980s, as various parties and groups chose to promote the anti-nuclear cause in varying
ways through different outlets.
Lastly, it is clear that by 1979 and Three Mile Island, the damage to the nuclear
industry had already been done. An industry which had previously been unrestrained
found itself engaging in costly skirmished with local populations and governments, often
with delays in construction that increased the overall prices of construction. No new
construction licenses were issues for nuclear power plants in Germany between 1977 and
July of 1982, during which time a moratorium was placed on licensing new reactors until
the approval process could be streamlined and made more efficient and less costly. Thus
no new nuclear construction began in Germany between 1978 and 1981.31 Immediately
following the end o f the moratorium in 1982, however, three new “convoy” permits were
issued for construction. The nuclear industry, federal government and state governments
had worked together to revamp the license process, limiting public input unit the late
stages o f licensing (when the plants were nearing completion). The new process also
implemented “standard reactor designs” that could be approved as a group in convoys
rather than individually.32
This demonstrates a rupture in nuclear energy pursuance between 1975 and 1980:
almost all projects begun before that time were completed, in most cases after long and
costly struggles; but only three projects would be started and fought through afterward.
31 Felix Kolb, Protest an d Opportunities: The P olitical Outcomes o f Social Movements, (Berlin: Campus
Verlag, 2007), 250.
32 Joppke , M obilizing Against Nuclear Energy, 164.
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Three Mile Island was a contained event: there was little damage to the surrounding
environment and no one died. Those in Germany who were already anti-nuclear remained
so after Three Mile Island, but the event had little effect on German public opinion
overall or on nuclear pursuance. Other external factors, such as increased oil prices
throughout the 1970s as a result of the global oil shocks, also played a role in positively
determining people’s reactions toward nuclear energy, and certainly influenced energy
policy at the time. Perhaps even more important, Three Mile Island happened far from
Germany in the US, though the reactor explosion at Chernobyl would be a different story
altogether.
The Early 1980s and Chernobyl
The early 1980s in Germany brought a decrease in anti-nuclear protests, perhaps
due to the decrease in new reactor licenses issued during the time, but also because o f the
anti-violence related backlash of the earlier protests from which the movement was still
recovering. There were fewer than five protests reported from 1982-1985, with an
increase to ten protests in early 1986. The increase from 1984-early 1986 is the result of
reactions to a nuclear processing plant proposed in Wackersdorf, Bavaria, which attracted
national attention and 80,000 participants less than a month before the explosion at
Chernobyl. However, in 1986, the number o f protests more than quadrupled to
"1

approximately fifty protests nation-wide.

The previous figure also demonstrates that

approval for new reactors dropped significantly from 50 percent o f respondents to 30
percent and then even further to 15 percent, while negative responses to new reactors
increased from 45 percent to 70 percent to 80 percent.

33 Koopm ans and Duyvendak, “The Political Construction o f the N uclear Energy Issue and its Im pact on
the M obilization o f A nti-N uclear M ovem ents in W estern E urope,” 240.
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In this way, the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl created a negative “shock” during
which public support for nuclear energy decreased dramatically. This reaction is
understandable, as the German (and European population in general) dealt with fears
about spreading radiation clouds, radiation-contaminated rain, and ground water
pollution. Compared to Three Mile Island, the Chernobyl incident resulted in two
immediate casualties o f plant workers and the deaths o f twenty-eight other workers from
radiation exposure in the next few months. Chernobyl’s impact was not only more
significant in scale, but the threat was closer and more immediate than in the case of
Three Mile Island. Immediately following this shock, however, protest frequency
returned to pre-1986 levels, from a high o f 50 protests in 1986 to 15 protests in 1987, to
10 protests in 1988, and eventually back to 0-2 protests in 1990.34 Even though public
opinion may not have quickly recovered from Chernobyl, protest activity decreased
quickly following the incident.
What did affect did shifts in public opinion resulting from Chernobyl have on the
practical pursuance o f nuclear energy in Germany at the time? As the reactors built in the
1970s and early 1980s became operable and started generating electricity, there was a
general increase in the nuclear share o f electrical energy during the 1980s to peak in
1990, demonstrated here in Figure 9:

34 K oopm ans and D uyvendak, “The Political Construction o f the N u clear Energy Issue and its Im pact on
the M obilization o f A nti-N uclear M ovem ents in W estern E urope,” 239.
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Figure 9: Germ an N uclear G eneration in Teraw att H ours, 1970-2010.35

However, no new construction projects for new reactors have occurred in West
Germany since the 1982 convoy licenses. Though Chernobyl did have a negative effect
on public opinion and temporarily increased protest activity, there is no clear relationship
between public opinion and nuclear policy implementation throughout the 1970s and
1980s. The 1970s saw intense and violent public reactions to nuclear energy, significant
enough to halt the licensing o f new reactors, but this was only a stop-gap measure until
the industry, federal and state governments could agree on changes in the licensing
process to actually make it easier to approve reactors with less public input. The 1980s
and Chernobyl brought about similar negative reactions, and while it is true that no new
reactors were constructed after 1982, there are numerous other intervening variables that
could explain the nuclear slow-down besides, or in addition to, public opinion.
For one, oil prices had stabilized in the 1980s following the shocks of the 1970s,
and nuclear was becoming a less cost-effective option compared to the new wash of

35 D ata com piled by author from BP Annual Statistical R eview o f W orld Energy, 2013.
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cheap oil and gas. Domestic coal prices had also risen and government interest and
subsidies began shifting to the coal industry. The neo-liberal economic policies o f the late
1980s also encouraged the privatization of utility companies with the result o f a price
increase in electricity as energy was opened up to market policies. Utility companies
were less willing to accept the risk of building a new reactor, especially considering the
capital required up-front, even though the reactors were relatively cheap to run once built.
But other contradictory forces were at work as well in Germany, namely, a new concern
over carbon emissions and environmental health. Since nuclear was known to be a lowcarbon emission energy source, it remained a viable option in energy policy. 1991 also
happens to be the time o f the first market creation and introduction o f the Electricity
Policy Feed-In Act, which regulated the purchase and price of electricity generated by
hydropower, wind energy, solar energy, and biomass/other gases.36 This act was meant to
encourage the development of a national base for renewable energies, with the promise of
connection to the grid and a Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff.
The 1980s and early 1990s brought a time of indecision over nuclear energy. On
one hand, other sources were becoming cheaper and the initial excitement over nuclear
technology was beginning to wane. Accordingly, there were fewer applications for
reactors in the mid-to-late 1980s than in the 1970s. On the other, nuclear energy still
provided a clean source of energy, and what would eventually count for over a quarter of
Germany’s electricity. Though it seemed the nuclear industry survived Chernobyl to
some extent, at least to continue operation o f existing reactors, the 1990s would not be
kind to the nuclear energy industry in Germany as the first Green party win signaled a

36 “30 Years o f Policies for Wind Energy: Lessons from 12 Markets,” International Renewable Energy
Agency, 2012, 68.
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policy-based move away from nuclear. Before examining the reactions to Fukushima, it
is important to examine the 1990s and 2000s and the back and forth policy movement on
nuclear that happened in the interim between Chernobyl and Fukushima, mainly to
demonstrate the importance that political parties and electoral systems play in the nuclear
question in Germany.
The 1990s and the Rise o f the Der Griinen Partei
Every reactor that would come online in Germany had already done so by 1990.
The last finished and approved reactor, Neckarwestheim, began operation in 1989. Figure
10 demonstrates the trends of reactor operation:

I
Figure 10: N um ber o f R eactors in O peration in G erm any, 1960-2011.37

37 D ata com piled by author from German Energy A gency DENA
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Since 1990, the number of reactors in operation in Germany has steadily
decreased due to a variety o f reasons. Several plants that opened in the 1960s closed in
the 1980s on schedule, but were replaced with other power generating stations that came
online in the same decade. In 1988, two reactors, Miilheim-Karlich and Hamm-Uentrop,
were closed after inspections revealed structural unsoundness and utility companies
determined the cost of correcting these were too high. During the period o f German
reunification in 1990, several East German nuclear stations were closed due to concerns
about inadequate Soviet designs and safety standards. The Wiirgassen reactor closed in
199438, followed by two other reactors in 2003 and 200539, but no other reactors would
close in Germany until 2011 after Fukushima. These trends reveal that the heyday o f
nuclear pursuance in terms o f building a greater reactor capacity peaked in the 1980s and
then steadily decreased throughout the 1990s. This is partly due to the scheduled closures
of old reactors brought online in the 1960s, but also to the wave o f Eastern German
closures as a result of reunification. Fewer and fewer reactors were replacing those that
closed in the 1990s, a trend that was compounded by anti-nuclear policy in the late
1990s.
The German Green Party, or Der Griinen, grew out o f the anti-nuclear movement
o f the 1970s and was formally founded in 1980 to give the movement political and
parliamentary representation. In addition to anti-nuclear goals, the party also supports
anti-pollution laws, environmental protection, reproduction and immigration rights, and
were strongly against NATO efforts to place Cold War weapons systems in Western

38 Though the utility operating company PreussenElektra cites economic reasons as the cause for the
shutdown, other sources report there was a flaw in the cooling system that was econom ically infeasible to
correct.
39 Scheduled closures
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Germany in the 1980s. Though the Greens had some success in state-level elections and
received large enough percentages o f votes to gain seats in the lower house of Parliament,
they would not enter the Federal Parliament until 1998, when they formed a Red/Green
coalition with the Social Democrats led by Gerard Schroder, an alignment that would last
for seven years until 2005. Once in Parliament, however, the Green Party’s anti-nuclear
agenda was challenged by the SDP, and negotiations between the Green-led
environmental ministry and the power companies dragged on for a year before a
compromise was reached to shut down all of Germany’s nuclear reactors by 2020.40
Though the nuclear phase-out was a policy gain for the Greens, this was hardly what antinuclear activists who had supported the party had envisioned after three decades of
protest. Many left the party in frustration, arguing that the compromise was weak and left
the door open for Conservatives to repeal it, which they formally did in 2010. Table 2
illustrates these voting trends:

40 Paul Hockenos, “Red-Green Germany: Joschka Fischer on the hurly-burly o f the Red-Green Years,”
German Council on Foreign Relations, Accessed October 10, 2013. https://ip-ioumal.dgap.org/en/ipioumal/topics/red-green-germanv.
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Year

Percentage

of #

of

Overall

Party List Vote

Seats Won

1980

1.5

0/497

1983

5.6

27/498

1987

8.3

42/497

1990

5.0

8/662

1994

7.3

49/672

1998

6.7

47/669

2002

8.6

55/603

2005

8.1

51/614

2009

10.7

68/662

Table 2: Percentage o f Votes for Germ an G reen Party, 1980-2009.41

Even if it can be concluded that anti-nuclear opinion grew in the 1980s and 1990s
(though not necessarily that it became the majority opinion) the effects o f that opinion on
policy are still debatable. The anti-nuclear agenda o f the Greens only received real policy
attention when they joined a Parliamentarian coalition, and even then the SPD left the
Green-led environmental ministry to fight its own battle with the utility companies
operating the nuclear power plants. Even when they were able to pass policy to phase-out
nuclear energy, it was a gradual phase-out over the course of decades and had little
staying power in the event o f an election loss to the Christian Democrats. Only two

41 Paul Hockenos, “Red-Green Germany: Joschka Fischer on the hurly-burly o f the Red-Green Years,”
German Council on Foreign Relations, A ccessed October 10, 2013. https://ip-ioumal.dgap.org/en/inioumal/topics/red-green-germanv.
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reactors closed between 1998 and 2005, and this was not a result o f policy but of
economic reasons related to flaws in reactor designs. Accordingly, as these reactors
closed in the 1990s and 2000s and no new reactors came online to replace them, nuclear
energy’s overall percentage share decreased. The relationship between this decrease and
negative public opinion, however, is weak. Old reactors closed because they were
scheduled to close or because it was not an economically sound decision to repair design
flaws or damages to infrastructure. New reactors were not constructed because other
energy sources were cheaper, and with the policy-phase out passed in the late 1990s,
utility companies were not looking to invest.
The strongest case that can be made about a correlation between public opinion
and nuclear pursuance concerns cost. In the case of the US, analysis reveals that public
protest against nuclear construction was successful when citizens could persuade states to
intervene on their behalf (which also worked in the case o f Wyhl) and when citizens
could pose enough o f a roadblock with delays, requests for additional environmental
reports, unfavorable media coverage, etc, to make the project too expensive to continue.
This also seems to be the case in Germany, where the capital required for construction
was similarly high. Reactors license applications were numerous throughout the 1960s
and 1970s, but would decrease in the 1980s as the costs o f nuclear construction increased
and the cost o f coal and gas decreased.
Angela Merkel, the CDU, and Fukushima
In the early 2000s, several events coalesced that would ultimately effect the
Christian Democratic Union’s nuclear policies after they regained the Parliamentary
majority in the 2005 elections. First, in 2002, Germany signed and ratified the Kyoto
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Protocol, which committed it to reducing emissions from greenhouse gases. Angela
Merkel, who would later become Chancellor, aided in negotiation terms o f the Protocol
as Minister for the Environment and Nuclear Safety. This predicated a move away from
using coal, Germany’s largest domestic energy resource but also dirtiest form o f energy,
and a move toward more renewable energy and nuclear, which produces less harmful
emissions than other non-renewable sources. However, a move away from coal also
signaled a move toward more natural gas, the largest supplier of which to the European
market was Russia. Fearing high gas prices, both in real terms and in political terms,
nuclear began its comeback through CDU policy in the late 2000s.
In 2007, Chancellor Merkel began laying the foundation for nuclear’s return at an
energy summit in Berlin where, despite criticism from industry, she insisted Germany
stick closely to its ambitious clean energy goals. Among the options she presented for
reaching these goals, one was extending the lives o f existing nuclear reactors beyond the
2020 deadline set by the Green/SPD coalition. In 2010, this reactor extension was made
policy when Merkel announced the existing reactors would continue operating into the
2030s, an average life extension of 14 years for older reactors. Around this same time, it
seemed Germans were somewhat split on the issue of the nuclear extension as a way to
pursue clean energy. In 2007, a TMS Enmid poll found that 48 percent of Germans
polled favored nuclear energy, compared to 43 percent of Germans who did not, a slim
majority. Additionally, the same poll found that 48 percent of Germans polled thought
the lives o f existing reactors should be extended while 44 percent opposed this move.42
Germans were split, but it seemed there was still substantial support for continuing
42 “Emnid Survey: Majority for Further Use o f Nuclear Power,” German Atomic Forum, June 27, 2006,
Accessed October 2 0 ,2 0 1 3 .http://www.kemenergie.de/kemenergieen/press/Dressemitteilungen/2007/200706-27 emnid umfrage.php.
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nuclear energy with the existing reactors well into the late 2000s. This would all change
in 2011.
In February o f 2011, five federal German states, lead by opposition parties, filed a
lawsuit against the extension in Germany’s federal court. The lawsuits would not have to
wait to go to court, however, when the Fukushima explosion on March 11 o f 2011
prompted the government to shut down its seven oldest nuclear reactors, declare a
moratorium on the nuclear extension plan, and launch a safety probe into the other
German reactors still in operation. Immediately following Fukushima, German citizens
congregated in Berlin and other major cities to protest nuclear power and the reactor
extension, and activists formed a 27-mile chain around the Neckarwestheim power plant.
In the largest anti-nuclear demonstration in German history, people gathered across
Germany to protest under the slogan “Fukushima Reminds: Shut O ff All Nuclear Plants.”
Polling at the time reflected a growing anti-nuclear sentiment as well. In early 2011, a
Globescan survey found that opposition to building new nuclear reactors in Germany had
grown from 73 percent to 90 percent.43
Initially, it seemed the Merkel government was unclear in how to respond to the
Fukushima disaster. The event had breathed new life into the pre-existing anti-nuclear
movement that was fighting the nuclear extension plans o f the previous year. It had also
galvanized much o f the remaining half o f German citizens who seemed divided on
nuclear energy into a solid anti-nuclear stance. But German nuclear pursuance had
survived public criticism before— throughout the

1970s and

1980s, even post-

Chemobyl— and Merkel’s CDU had won a majority in 2005 running on a pro-nuclear
43 “Opposition to Nuclear Energy Grows: Global Poll,” Globescan, November 25, 2011, A ccessed October
21, 2013, http://www.globescan.com/news-and-analvsis/Dress-releases/press-releases-2011/94-pressreleases-2011/127-opposition-to-nuclear-energy-grows-global-poll.html.
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reactor extension platform. Immediately announcing a nuclear shut-down, however,
would bring its own problems, as Merkel’s government well knew, among these, finding
other energy sources to compensate for nuclear’s generation share, increased energy
dependence on neighbors, and unavoidable lawsuits from the utility operators such as
Swedish-owned Vattenfall demanding compensation for early shutdowns o f their
facilities. The 3-month moratorium was only ever a temporary measure, but it was never
clear immediately following Fukushima that a nuclear phase-out was inevitable.
The deciding blow to Merkel’s nuclear pursuance policy was a historic CDU loss
on March 27 in Baden-Wiirttemberg, a state that had been a stronghold for the party for
58 years, to the Green Party. The Greens won 24.2 percent of the vote in that election,
and the SPD 23.1 percent of the vote, thus giving their coalition 47.3 percent majority
over the CDU/FDP’s 44.3 percent and securing the Green Party a state premier spot for
the first time.44 On the same day in the state o f Rhineland-Palatinate, the election results
were similar as the Greens managed to attract 15.4 percent of the vote whereas in the
previous election they failed to even break the 5 percent threshold for representation. It
became clear that voters considered the moratorium a weak response to the Fukushima
disaster: a Forsa poll reported that 71 percent o f Germans surveyed considered the
moratorium a measure implemented for pure election engineering.45 The same poll found
that a majority o f CDU supporters also found the abrupt nuclear policy shift unacceptable
and considered Merkel “untrustworthy.”46

44 “CDU Suffers Historic Loss in Baden-Wurttemberg,” The Local, March 28,2011, A ccessed 4 October
2013, http://www.thelocal.de/politics/20110327-34003.html.
45 “Poll: Voters Push Union From Nuclear Course,” Der Spiegel, March 23, 2011, A ccessed October 15,
2013, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/umfrage-waehler-strafen-union-fuer-atomkurs-ab-a752631.html.
46 Ibid.
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At the end o f the three month moratorium, in May o f 2011, the German
government announced plans to shut down all o f the nuclear reactors in the country by
2022 and expand the use o f renewable resources to compensate for the energy lost from
nuclear. The disaster at Fukushima pushed a policy o f nuclear abandonment that neither
Chernobyl nor Three Mile Island had been able to. In questioning this line o f causality,
however, we have to wonder if it was a governmental response to the disaster itself—that
is, the German government genuinely felt Fukushima had effectively demonstrated
nuclear energy was unsafe— or if the nuclear turn-around was a response to the turning
tide of public opinion that nuclear energy was unsafe? W ould Merkel’s CDU and the rest
o f the government have chosen the same anti-nuclear path had the shift in public opinion
not carried real electoral consequences? It is difficult to say with certainty, especially
considering Merkel’s past position as a minister for nuclear safety.
There are multiple ways to analyze the relationship between public opinion,
nuclear disasters and nuclear pursuance in Germany. First, it is clear that Three Mile
Island had little effect on either public opinion or nuclear pursuance. There was already
an anti-nuclear movement in Germany underway, and this nuclear incident in the United
States was relatively small. Those who did not support nuclear energy continued to not
do so, but polling revels the effects on population in general were negligible. By 1979
there were multiple reactors already in operation and more were being built. Chernobyl
increased both protest intensity in the months following the explosion in former-USSR
Ukraine as well as increased German resistance to building new reactors, though slim
majorities o f the population continued to support using the reactors already in existence.
To a small extent, there seems to be a correlation between opinion and pursuance—
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support for and continued operation o f existing reactors, but opposition to and reticence
to build new reactors after Chernobyl. However, when considering other externalities, a
clear correlation between nuclear pursuance and public opinion is impossible as a variety
o f other variables could also explains a decline in new reactor applications— cheap oil,
expensive coal, market privatization, etc.
The first actual policy shift in nuclear energy did not come until the late 1990s. If
it can be assumed that the voting behavior is a tangible outcome o f public opinion, then
this election signals the first practical impact o f growing anti-nuclear sentiment for the
anti-nuclear Green Party. Still, it is unclear whether this policy shift reflected an opinion
majority as the shares won by the Greens were relatively small, and even members o f the
Green Party felt the 2020 phase-out was a weak compromise. Eventually, even this
decision was overturned by the Merkel-led CDU because extending the lives o f existing
reactors satisfied other demands on German energy and environmental goals. Real
change to nuclear energy policy did not happen until 2011 after Fukushima when nuclear
support clearly plummeted in Germany. It still remains unclear, however, whether the
same nuclear phase-out would have happened had the Green Party been unable to
capitalize and ultimately squeeze an electoral win from the nuclear frenzy. Also unclear
is to what extent the decision to phase out nuclear energy was in response to actual fears
about nuclear safety or public opinion in general. Polling shows that most Germans
believe the decision to be a carefully calculated political move on the part o f Merkel and
the CDU in response to a Green Party win in a CDU state stronghold and fears o f larger
Green wins throughout Germany. Though a case can be made for a correlation between
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public opinion and nuclear policy after Fukushima, the case is still somewhat weak, as
distinct lines o f causality difficult to distinguish.
Access to Other Resources
Whereas the previous section sought to determine to what degree public and
nuclear disasters influence pursuance o f nuclear energy, this section will examine supply
o f other electricity-producing resources with the hypothesis that the greater the
percentage o f overall energy consumption that comes from other electricity-producing
resources, particularly coal and gas, the less a country will pursue nuclear energy. In
concurrence with the previous hypotheses tested in the US, the hypotheses to be tested in
this section are that the greater extent that coal makes up an overall energy supply, the
less likely a country will be to pursue nuclear; likewise, the greater the supply of natural
gas, the less likely a country will be to pursue nuclear. In the case o f Germany, petroleum
makes up such a small percentage of electricity production that it will not be considered
here.
The most recent data on Germany’s electrical energy mix reveals that, in 2011,
Germany’s main energy resource was coal, which alone accounted for 43.5 percent of
German electrical production in 2011; Renewable sources (including biomass, solar,
wind, hydropower and domestic waste) made up 19.9 percent; nuclear, 18 percent; and
natural gas, 13.7 percent. In terms of domestic energy resources, Germany has the second
largest coal reserves in Europe and Eurasia, second only to Russia.47 Germany’s natural
gas reserves are trapped in shale, and they have no naturally occurring oil reserves, but it
does produce far more energy from biofuels than any other Eurasian country and

47 “BP Statistical Review o f World Energy, June 2103,” British Petroleum, A ccessed Novem ber 2, 2013,
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistieal-review/statistical review o f world energy 2013.pdf.
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produces 12 percent of all wind and 35.8 percent of all solar energy generated in the
world.48
These numbers reveal interesting trends in German energy. First, that it relies
heavily on coal for electricity, yet since the early 1980s, it imports most o f its coal, a
move rationalized by the US coal market’s consistently cheaper price than that of
European coal markets.49 Second, almost ironically, that in addition to using the least
“clean” energy source, Germany leads Europe in clean, renewable energy production
through the solar, wind, and biofuel industries. Perhaps one reason Germany felt more
confident phasing out nuclear is because of this previously well-established foothold in
renewable energy, greater than any other regional country, to be sure. The problem o f
dirty coal consumption, however, remains.
German coal exports decreased in the 1990s. In 2013, however, German coal
began to make a comeback in the wake o f the turn from nuclear. First, German electricity
exports actually increased in the first quarter o f 2013, an event explainable only by
increased production from coal-fired plants.50 Second, two o f the largest German utility
companies, RWE AG and EON SE both reported increased coal imports o f up to 25
percent in the same quarter.51 By this token, Germany is both importing more coal to
create energy, and then exporting the energy created by the imported coal. O f course, the
government has faced harsh criticism for this choice that will produce more greenhouse

48 Ibid.
49 “BP Statistical Review o f World Energy, June 2103,” British Petroleum, Accessed Novem ber 2, 2013,
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bD/pdf/statistical-review/statistical review o f world energy 2013.pdf.
50 Paul Hockenos, “German Export o f Coal Power Way U p,” German Council on Foreign Relations,
August 21, 2013, Accessed October 1, 2013, https://ip-ioumal.dgap.org/en/blog/going-renewable/germanexport-coal-power-wav.
51 Stefan Nicola, “Merkel’s Green Shift Backfires as German Pollution Jumps,” Businessweek, July 29,
2013, Accessed October 3 0 ,2 0 1 3 , http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-Q7-28/merkel-s-green-shiftbackfires-as-german-pollution-iumps-energy.
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gas emissions than in previous years, especially considering she is a former
environmental minister who helped negotiate the carbon emission standards o f the Kyoto
Protocol.
This section hypothesized that the greater extent coal made up overall energy
consumption, the less likely a country would be to pursue nuclear energy. Coal
consumption decreased in the 1980s and 1990s as the reactors built in the 1970s came
online in the 1980s, though the decrease in coal consumption would level o ff in the early
1990s until the recent increase in 2013. Though coal consumption decreased, it still
consistently made up the majority of energy production in Germany from the 1990s until
present time. Both natural gas and nuclear consumption increased in the same time
periods, accounting for the decreased coal consumption. Similarly, as nuclear production
began decreasing in 2011 and will continue to decrease indefinitely, coal production and
imports have both increased. Germany has natural gas reserves of its own, but the gas is
trapped in shale and the state has currently placed a moratorium on developing the shale
fracturing technologies needed to extract the resources. Germany has, however, been
linked to plentiful Russian gas by the Nord-Stream Pipeline, which moves gas from
Vyborg in Russia to Griefswald in Germany, since 2011 when 60 percent o f its gas
imports came from Russia.52
When Germany announced in May o f 2011 that it would shut down all o f its
nuclear reactors by 2022, there was much speculation as to how it would make up the
roughly 20 percent share of electricity that nuclear power provided. There were
predictions that Germany would resort to importing nuclear energy from France, a move

52 “Germany Marches East, Russia M oves West: Energy Diplomacy,” Natural Gas Europe, March 13,
2012, Accessed November 3, 2013, http://www.naturalgaseurope.coin/germanv-russia-energv-diplomacv.
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that would not only seem hypocritical but would also increase their energy reliance on
their neighbors. Others spoke of energy blackouts and brownouts from unreliable
renewable energy supplies. So far, neither of these scenarios has been realized, and in the
cold winter o f February 2012, Germany actually exported energy to France when heating
energy ran low. Granted, this energy came from a coal-fired plant, a sticking-point that
has not gone unnoticed as running counter to Germany’s clean energy goals and Kyoto
Protocol obligations. Normative judgments aside, the nuclear turn-around announcement
came as a surprise to many, though considering Germany’s numerous energy options, it
should not have.
First, Germany has long lead Europe in renewable energy technologies. In 2011,
renewable energy sources accounted for roughly equal amounts o f energy production as
nuclear. O f course, there is little practicality in the assumption that Germany could turn
off all of its nuclear reactors tomorrow and immediately substitute that loss with
renewable sources. The grid system has to be converted to become compatible with
renewable feed-ins, and all renewable sources have to be expanded to compensate for the
nuclear gap. However, if government funding were to move from nuclear technology to
renewable technology, this expansion could be possible. The decision to move away from
nuclear had to have been influenced by the knowledge that renewables were already
viable in Germany and that expansion was an option. In fact, in 2010, Germany amended
its Atomic Energy Act to align with an “energy concept” where nuclear power would
serve a “bridging function” until the infrastructure for renewable technologies were in
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place.53 While this amendment did not set a specific time-line for the nuclear phase out, it
does indicate that moving away from nuclear energy toward renewable sources was a
well-established part o f the Germany’ future energy plan as early as 2010.
Second, though it runs counter to clean energy goals, the increased use o f coal is
also a viable nuclear substitution option for Germany. Coal is Germ any’s biggest
domestic resource, and even if it continues to import coal, those imports will consistently
be priced cheaply. A consequence of increased American gas production and
consumption has been low coal prices and increased exports to European markets. Even
if coal is only a temporary solution to a long-term problem, it can buy Germany time to
expand the renewable sector without increasing the price of energy to consumers.
In addition to coal, natural gas is also a viable option, and not just in the short
term. The Nord-Stream Pipeline was criticized for many for increasing German
dependence on Russian gas. As do many Eastern European countries, Germany is almost
solely reliant on Russian gas exports to make up its natural gas needs. This does not
necessarily have to be a problem, though. While Germany is dependent on Russian gas,
Russia is also dependent on the German gas market and the revenue it will bring. Rather
than see this relations as one of dependence, it can be viewed as an interdependent
relationship which may create cooperation rather than conflict. Moreover, Russia is not
the only gas supplier in the market. In June of 2013, German EON announced that it
would begin tapering its dependence on Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas company,
and instead develop ties to the Canadian company Pieridae Energy. Pieridae says it will
build Canada’s first Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) export terminal in Nova Scotia by 2020
53 “Countries’ Regulatory Bodies Have Made Changes in Response to the Fukushima Daiichi Accident,”
United States Government Accountability Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate. March 2014.
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now that they have secured reliable shipping client in Europe. Similar developments are
also happening the US, as the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission continues to
approve ports across the US and Mexico for shipments of LNG. Even if dependence on
Russian gas becomes problematic, the price o f gas will remain stable with the presence of
multiple suppliers and as Canada and the US continue developing the infrastructure to
ship to a European market, gas consumers have supply options. Since natural gas is
cleaner than coal, it may also present a long-term option for German energy in addition to
renewable expansion.
Chapter Conclusions
As is the case in the US, it is difficult to draw clear conclusions as the genuine
relationship between public opinion and nuclear pursuance. The moratorium on nuclear
licensing from 1979-1982 to create a system where public input was less valued in the
licensing process seems to point to a lack of concern on the part of government and the
industry. Green Party electoral gains could also be interpreted as an indicator o f public
opinion efficacy, but their overall electoral percentages remained quite low in comparison
to other parties. Reactor approval and construction continued throughout the 1970s and
even into the 1980 until the last reactor came online in 1989 though, granted, reactor
approvals slowed significantly in the 1980s. This slowing could be a result of anti-nuclear
opinion (though it still difficult to determine that anti-nuclear opinion was the majority
opinion of the time) but could also be linked to other factors such as low coal and oil
prices, rising capital costs, and the privatization of energy markets. Ultimately, it is
impossible to draw clear lines of causality between public opinion and nuclear pursuance
in Germany, at least until 2011 and Fukushima.
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Though Three Mile Island had little effect on public opinion or nuclear pursuance
in Germany, Chernobyl did cause a clear shift in opinion that lasted into the 1990s and
contributed significantly to the growing popularity of the Green Party, which was able to
form a Parliamentarian coalition in 1998 and make real moves toward anti-nuclear
policy. The policy was weak, however, and was eventually overturned. Anti-nuclear
protest movements are most successful when states or municipalities become involved on
behalf o f citizens. Though organizations cannot be involved in the official public input
mechanism, the decentralized nature o f the German state-based licensing approval
process makes it possible for cities or states to refuse to grant site licenses for reactors. It
is still unclear, however, what specifically motivates these actors to do so. At times, cities
are swayed by the promise o f industry, employment, and utility company perks; other
times, the state may own part o f the utility company and have a vested interest in
licensing approval (though this does not happen now since the privatization of the
market). But sometimes, as was the case with the Wyhl plant, Administrative Courts can
intervene to deny construction permits. This makes the Germany system fundamentally
different from the federally centralized NRC approval system, and creates conditions in
which intervention to stop reactor construction m ay be easier.
The only clear relationship between public opinion and nuclear pursuance
involves cost. Reactors are expensive to initially build, and if citizen groups can make the
process longer by creating roadblocks like physical confrontation, media coverage,
damage to facilities, etc., then utility companies are less likely to finish reactor
construction or apply to construct new reactors.
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Fukushima does seem to present a turning point in German energy policy, more
so than any other event that preceded it. Similar nuclear phase out policies have been
passed and have failed before, but they were conceived by a weak coalition that was
replaced shortly after the policy shift. We currently lack the hindsight to know if the
current nuclear phase out policy will stick, but the current Merkel government plan will
remain policy at least for the foreseeable future, considering the recent German federal
elections in September 2013 that solidly returned a CDU majority. At this point,
Germany has also created such a strong, normative narrative around moving away from
nuclear energy that returning to nuclear would be seen as a weak political move. The
question o f why Fukushima was different from Chernobyl has to be asked and answered,
especially considering Chernobyl was so geographically close to Germany and
Fukushima happened on the other side o f the world.
Part o f the explanation for the impact o f Fukushima can be found with an already
weakened nuclear energy sector. The mid-1980s was the peak operating time for nuclear
reactors in Germany. In 2011, however, the circumstances surrounding nuclear were
much different. In 2010, the Merkel government passed legislation that allowed for a 14
year life extension o f existing reactors. Barring another life extension, those reactors
would be only be safe for operation for another thirty years, meaning they would be
scheduled for decommission beginning in 2040. Without new reactors to replace the
aging ones (and a new reactors has not been approved in Germany since 1982) nuclear
energy was never really a long, long-term energy option. The same legislation also
increased energy company payments to fund renewable energy technology. By
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Fukushima in 2011, it was clear that nuclear energy was only a stop-gap measure on the
way to greater renewable capacity, anyway.
Other Fukushima explanatory power lies in the momentary revitalization it added
to the anti-nuclear movement and subsequent Green Party electoral gains, especially in
the historically CDU dominated area o f Baden-Wurttemberg. The Green party has been
more effective at influencing nuclear policy in Germany than in the US, even with low
representation numbers, not just because it has stronger voter support but because it
operates in a system o f Parliamentarian proportional representation.
However, it remains unknown whether the impact of Fukushima truly had
anything to do with genuine safety concerns. Surely this is what spurred citizens to
disapprove o f nuclear energy in record numbers, but to what extent that same concern
was a factor influencing policy is unclear. Would the Merkel government have made the
same decision about nuclear energy if it made up 50 percent of their electrical energy
needs rather than just 25 percent? Or if there was not an already established renewable
sector? Or if the CDU had won in Baden-Wurttemberg rather than the Greens? O f course,
these “what-ifs” are impossible to answer, but important to consider. Again, the
relationship between the post-Fukushima nuclear phase out and public opinion is unclear.
What is clear is that German has well-established and affordable energy options,
and this may be the most important explanatory variable for its nuclear phase out. With a
well-established renewable sector already in operation and access to cheap coal and
natural gas, the move away from nuclear was not as drastic as many interpreted.
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CHAPTER 5
NUCLEAR ENERGY IN JAPAN

Objective
Following the structure o f the preceding chapters, this case study will first offer a
brief history on the development o f nuclear energy policy in Japan before turning to an
examination o f public opinion, past disasters and access to other energy resources.
“Nuclear energy pursuance” is again operationalized as the overall percentage nuclear
provides to the electrical energy supply and public opinion is measured by using polling
data from both before and after 2011. Quantitative polling data will be supplemented with
a brief qualitative discussion of nuclear energy protest activity in Japan, which is
supplemented by a discussion o f the limitations placed on protests by traditional Japanese
political culture. The hypothesis is that in countries where nuclear approval is low,
nuclear pursuance will be low as well. Next, this chapter will analyze data over time that
helps examine to what extent public opinion and nuclear energy pursuance have changed
in response to the nuclear disasters at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima. This
chapter will also include a discussion o f nuclear incidents in the 1990s and 2000s that
were specific to Japan and the impact these had on public perceptions and nuclear
pursuance. Lastly, this chapter will examine the share nuclear power currently makes up
o f total Japanese energy consumption with the hypothesis that if Japan has greater access
to other affordable energy resources, its pursuance of nuclear will decrease. The chapter
will end with conclusions based on these findings.
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Before the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, Japan was the second largest
nuclear energy generating country in the world behind France. Figure 11 illustrates
Japan’s overall electrical energy sources in 2011, before Fukushima, when nuclear still
provided a large share of overall electricity generation with 54 reactors:

Japan's Electrical Energy Sources, 2011
■ Hydroelectric and Other
R enew ables
Oil

■ Nuclear

■ Coal

■ Liquid Natural Gas

Figure 11: Japan's Electrical Energy Sources, 2011.'

Before March of 2011, Japan had a varied mix o f electrical energy sources,
depending on no one source for more than 30 percent o f its energy needs. Coal, liquid
natural gas (LNG), and nuclear each made up roughly 25 percent o f the electrical energy
needs (though some estimates place nuclear with a 30 percent share in 2011) with oil,
hydroelectric and other renewables such as solar, wind and biomass comprising around
18 percent combined. When the Japanese government shut down the majority o f the

1 D ata com piled by author from Japan Profile, U S Energy Inform ation Adm inistration.
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country’s nuclear energy generating plants after the Fukushima disaster in 2011,
nuclear’s percent share generation was primarily compensated for with LNG and oil.
Japan’s Ministry o f Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) reports that in 2012, LNG and
oil’s shares rose to 48 percent and 16 percent, respectively, as nuclear’s power share fell
to 2 percent. Japan’s coal consumption only increased from 25 percent to roughly 28
percent. By May o f 2012, Japan had no nuclear generation for the first time in over 40
years, though current Prime Minister Shinzo A be’s plan for economic recovery includes
reintroducing nuclear energy to meet at least 15 percent o f generating capacity over the
next decade. Japan is extremely resource poor, importing 80 percent o f its primary energy
requirements. Before Fukushima, the target was to increase nuclear generation from 30
percent to 41 percent by 2017 and 50 percent by 2030 with the construction o f additional
reactors.
Development o f Early Energy Policy in Japan
Japan has been impacted by nuclear technology more than any other country in
the world. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 that ended World
War II and obliterated these two cities set Japan on a staunch course o f nuclear arms non
proliferation coupled with a desire to use nuclear technology for peaceful energygenerating purposes. A decade after these bombings, Japan would pass the first piece of
legislation that would eventually make it one o f the biggest consumers o f nuclear energy
in the world, an act which perhaps signifies remarkable tolerance o f nuclear disasters.
With few natural resources o f its own and import dependence coming at both real and

2 “Country Profile: Japan,” Energy Information Administration, Last Updated October 29, 2013, Accessed
December 13, 2013, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=JA.
3 Toshihiko Nakata. “Nuclear Energy Development in Japan,” N uclear Energy D evelopm ent in Asia:
Problems and Prospects, Ed Xu Yi-Chong, (N ew York: Palgrave McMillan, 2011), 98.
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security-related costs, Japan’s plan for rebuilding and recovery after WWII was built
around using nuclear power for peaceful energy.
Japanese nuclear energy policy began, ironically enough, with a trip to the US.
Japanese Diet member Yasuhiro Nakasone first introduced the budget for nuclear energy
research and development after visiting nuclear facilities in the US in 1953 and receiving
advice from Dr. Ryokichi Sagane o f Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in
California. Dr. Sagane advised Nakasone to introduce nuclear energy to Japan with a
three-pronged approach: establish a national long-term strategy for nuclear energy; back
up nuclear research and development (R&D) with a liberal budget and enshrine the
energy initiative in law; encourage the nation’s top engineers and scientists to join the
nuclear industry.4 This advice would come to shape the development o f early energy
policy and initiatives in Japan when Nakasone, then head o f the executive board members
of the House o f Representatives Budget Committee, returned to Japan and swiftly had the
budget for nuclear R&D enacted through the Diet. Nakasone would later join the Kishi
Cabinet as Minister o f Science and Technology, and acted as the first chairman o f the
Atomic Energy Commission o f Japan in 1956, eventually rising to become Japan’s Prime
Minister in 1982. With support from Nakasone, a member of the Liberal Democratic
Party who would become increasingly influential in Japanese politics, nuclear energy had
a viable start in Japan even in the midst of skepticism from a public who had not
forgotten the dark side of nuclear technology. Even very early on, there is clearly a strong
relationship between the LDP-controlled government and the bureaucracy machine that
would make nuclear energy viable.

4 Nakata, “N uclear Energy D evelopm ent in Japan,” 99.
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Atomic Energy Basic Law o f 1955
In 1955, the Japanese Diet passed the Atomic Energy Basic Law, which was
established to “contribute to enhancing the welfare of human society and improving the
standard o f living by promoting the research and development and utilization o f atomic
energy.”5 The 1955 Atomic Energy Basic Law also created the legislative bodies that
would oversee regulation and safety standards, the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission
and the Nuclear Safety Commission as well as the Japan Atomic Energy Research
Institute. The law promoted a three-part mission statement for the development o f nuclear
energy: democratic methods, independent management, and transparency.6 The first test
reactor in Japan was commissioned in 1963, and the first commercial reactor to generate
electricity began operating in 1966. The early nature o f reactor construction was marked
by a unique system o f horizontal integration by private utility companies which would
purchase designs from American vendors and then contract other Japanese companies
like Mitsubishi and Hitachi to build the reactors in Japan. Later, these same companies
would develop the capability to design and then construct reactors themselves, and by the
end o f the 1970s, there was a thriving nuclear construction industry in Japan that supplied
the majority o f domestic nuclear construction as well as exported reactors and reactor
designs to other East Asian countries and even the UK.7 8 Exporting nuclear energy
technology continues to be an important part o f Japan’s economy, and one that current
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is keen to promote.
5 “Legal System for Nuclear Safety Regulation in Japan,” Japanese Ministry o f Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology, Accessed January 15, 2014, www.M EXT.go.jp.
6 “Nuclear Power in Japan.” World Nuclear Association, A ccessed December 5, 2013, http://www.worldnuclear.org/info/Countrv-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Japan/.
7 Ibid.
g
From 2011-2013, Japan did not export any nuclear reactors, though they will supply Turkey with one
reactor and Vietnam has recently ordered two reactors. These will be the first reactor exports since the
Fukushima disaster.
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Japan was one of a handful o f countries following this horizontally integrated
business model at the time, when most publicly-owned utility companies followed a more
vertically integrated model that allowed the same company to supply chain the reactor
construction from start to finish. At a time when the bureaucrat-led economic model
favored anything “made in Japan,” this system worked well in avoiding tighter
regulations or restrictions from the regulatory bodies overseeing approval and
construction. This further illustrates the early involvement o f the government in Japan’s
nuclear energy development. It was very clear that a strong relationship existed not just
between bureaucrats and regulatory bodies, but also between the government, nuclear
construction industries and utility companies. The manufacturing industry received
advice from the Ministry o f International Trade and Industry (MITI, which would later
become the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry [METI] that would oversee
nuclear energy); transportation advice from the Ministry of Transportation; financial
advice and subsidies from the Ministry o f Finance, and so on9. This very close integration
o f governmental bodies and the nuclear industry was beneficial during the early years of
nuclear development, but would later come to be seen as an aspect o f the industry that
violated the pillar o f Transparency set forth in the original 1955 Atomic Energy Basic
Law.
The Oil Crises and Economic Growth
In the mid-1970s, Japan generated 66 percent o f its electricity from oil.10 Like
many oil-consuming nations o f the world, the adverse effects of the oil embargo in 1973
and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 caused Japan to reconsider its dependence on oil,
9 Nakata, “Nuclear Energy Development in Japan,” 99.
10 Steve Austin, “Japan Seeks Resilient Energy Policy,” Oil-Price.net. Accessed December 10, 2013,
http://www.oil-price.net/en/articles/iapan-seeks-resilient-energy-poliev.php.
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particularly from the Middle East. The government began taking new measures to deal
with oil rising oil prices, such as dimming the lights on Tokyo Tower or prohibiting late
night television shows across the country to save electricity.11 Japan also continued
aggressively pursuing nuclear energy by approving and bringing new reactors into
operation throughout the 1970s and 1980s, though pursuing nuclear energy was part o f
Japan’s national development strategy well before the oil shocks o f the 1970s. From
1970-1979, 20 reactors became operational in Japan, the majority o f which were applied
for and approved for construction in the 1960s, well before oil prices rose in the 1970s. If
anything, Japan continued an already aggressive nuclear policy by bringing another 15
reactors online in the 1980s and 15 more in the 1990s.12
Japan’s reasons for this aggressive pursuance beginning in the 1960s had much to
do with its need to industrialize quickly. Economically devastated and occupied after
defeat in WWII, Japan was playing “catch-up” to the rest o f the modernizing world. After
WWII, the country began a period of rapid industrialization, with growth especially
heavy in industries like steel, chemicals and machinery, and advanced technology. This
rapid period o f growth raised the per capita income, increased standards of living, and
worked to reestablish Japan’s place in the international community, but it came at a high
price. Pollution was rampant, and the first cases o f mercury poisoning surfaced in
Minamata and Niigata in the 1950s. In Toyama prefecture, another debilitating disease
that affects the nervous system and is associated with cadmium waste was discovered.
The locals named it “itai-itai byo” or “it hurts-it hurts sickness”.13 Both instances are long

11 Nakata, “Nuclear Energy Development in Japan,” 100.
12 “Nuclear Reactors in Japan.” Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center. Accessed Decem ber 8, 2013.
http://www.cnic.jp/english/data/nucreactors.html.
13 Schreurs. Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany and the U nited States, 36.
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and sordid stories involving a corporate cover-up that was aided and abetted by
government officials who made it possible to prolong the chemical dumping, even as the
number o f victims increased.14 It would not be until the 1970s that those affected by itaiitai byo would begin filing lawsuits that trickled through the court systems and even later
in the 2000s when the Japanese government would officially acknowledge these
industrial pollution-related poisonings

and

offer the

victims

limited

monetary

compensation.
Another primary cost of this rapid economic development was increases in
electricity and energy use in general, a phenomenon which, for Japan, a country with
limited natural resources, meant increased energy imports and dependence. At the peak of
Japan’s development between 1960 and 1974, the average annual growth rate of
electricity consumption per capita exceeded 10 percent, which was much higher than that
o f many European and North American countries at the time.15 For this reason,
aggressively pursuing nuclear energy after WWII became intrinsically linked to
economic development. In addition, the government was also able to create an effective
narrative that linked economic development to restoring national pride, an attitude which
would persist throughout the 1970s and 1980s as Japan continued to grow, eventually
becoming the world’s second largest economy from 1978-2010. The 1970s and 1980s
were the decades when nuclear energy gained full “citizenship rights” to secure Japan’s
energy supply and fuel their economic growth, but without significant input from the
public or debate about the environmental impacts of nuclear power.16 When the demand

14Kingston, Contem porary Japan, 188.
15 Yi-Chong Xu, “Nuclear Energy in Asia: An Overview,” N uclear Energy Developm ent in Asia: Problem s
a n d Prospects, Ed Yi-Chong Xu, (New York: Palgrave M cM illan, 2011), 5.
16 Ibid, 100.
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for public and private electricity decreased with the economic downturn in the 1990s, so
would the demand for new nuclear reactors.
Energy Policy o f the 2000s
The cornerstones o f Japan’s energy efficiency policies include the Basic Act on
Energy Policy o f 2002, the New National Energy Strategy (NNES) in 2006 and the Basic
Energy Plan (BEP) in 2010. These directives together set the general direction for Japan’s
energy policy. They specifically identify securing stable supply, environmental
sustainability, and the utilization of market mechanisms as key policy directions.17 A key
point o f this energy plan is the increased attention paid to energy efficient measures in the
commercial, resident and transport sectors. Japan also adopted a front-runner plan that set
forth specific measures for achieving its goal of improving energy consumption
efficiency by at least 30 percent by 2030 compared to 2003.18 Nuclear energy became a
natural part o f the strategy to pursue these energy priorities of stable supply, energy
conservation and environmental goals.
Development o f the “Nuclear Village”
Any discussion o f nuclear energy in Japan would have to include reference to the
“nuclear village,” or “genshiryoku-mura,” which is the term commonly used in Japan to
refer to the institutional and individual pro-nuclear advocates who comprise the utilities,
nuclear vendors, Japanese Diet, bureaucracy, financial sector, media and academia. This
“village” is bound by a shared solidarity to promote nuclear energy, which it has
successfully done since the 1950s. The village significantly overlaps with the “Iron
Triangle” of big business, bureaucracy, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which
l7“Energy Policies on IEA Countries, Japan: 2008,” International Energy Agency, A ccessed December 1,
2013, http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Japan2008.pdf.
18 Ibid.
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has been in power almost consistently since the 1950s except for brief periods between
1993 and 1996 and 2009 and 2012. This interdependence of government, industry and
bureaucracy created “Japan Inc.” during the period o f economic growth following the
1950s. Though the practices o f Japan Inc. are now largely discredited (primarily by the
economic recession o f the 1990s and 2000s) these same practices were the accepted
status quo from the 1950s through the 1980s, practices that allowed nuclear energy to
grow unfettered by variables like public opinion or environmental im pacts.19
Over the years, as Japan’s nuclear energy sector grew, so did the influence o f the
nuclear village and the benefits associated with being a member. Vested interests in
nuclear power development ranged from construction companies to lenders and investors
in energy firms, extending down to grant-seeking academics and even journalists.
Though there are disagreements on policy within the nuclear community, they are the
“squabbles o f a gated community where cooperation and reciprocity prevail.”20 While
exclusion from the community has been the stick o f cooperation, access to vast resources
and power have been the carrots. Those who don’t support the Village consensus on the
need for, safety, and economic logic o f nuclear power are denied access to grants and are
passed over for promotions. Similarly, journalists who criticize nuclear power are denied
access to press junkets or politicians seeking re-election on an anti-nuclear platform
suddenly lack campaign contributions. Media outlets eager for a portion o f the utility
companies’ massive advertising budgets adjust their reporting accordingly. Just as
crossing the nuclear village carries severe consequences, support for their pro-nuclear
agenda also carries perks. The chairman o f the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO,
19 Jeff Kingston, “Nuclear Village” The Asia-Pacific Journal. Accessed December 15, 2013,
http ://www. iapanfocus.org/-Jeff-Kingston/3 82 2 .
20 Ibid.
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the utility company responsible for the operation o f the Fukushima nuclear plant) first
heard o f the Fukushima crisis while in China treating favored members o f Japan’s largest
media organization to a luxury junket.21 Though Japan Inc. is defunct, the nuclear village
lives on as a short-hand description o f a powerful interest group with a very specific
agenda.
Regulatory Capture and the Practice o f Amakudari
Understanding the nature of the nuclear village in Japan at least partly explains
the phenomenon o f regulatory capture that has historically been so prevalent in the
Japanese nuclear industry. Regulatory capture is a form o f political corruption that occurs
when a regulatory agency tasked with acting in the public interest instead advances the
commercial or special concerns of interest groups that dominate the industry or sector the
body is charged with regulating. The institutions created to regulate the nuclear industry
in Japan were housed within the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), a
sprawling organization that is responsible for promoting nuclear energy as it was deemed
critical to Japan’s economic development. In the context of the Iron Triangle, the
cooperative ties between the industry and the regulators were standard operating
procedure. In short, nuclear regulators have long been regulating in the interests o f the
regulated, meaning that policies and regulatory implementation were carried out in ways
that supported utility interests.22 This culture o f regulatory capture nurtures practices that
promote solidarity and group-think and marginalizes dissenting opinions.

21 Jeff Kingston, “Nuclear V illage” The Asia-Pacific Journal. A ccessed December 15, 2013,
http://www.iapanfocus.org/-Jeff-Kingston/3822.
22 Mark J. Ramseyer, “Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case o f Japan,”
Theoretical Inquiries in Law. 13:2, (2012), 459.
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This practice is, of course, not limited only to Japan. Frank von Hippel, a nuclear
physicist and expert on nuclear energy policy at Princeton University, said in 2011 that
the process o f regulatory capture has long been at the heart o f US nuclear energy, as first
introduced in this study within the US case study.23 This revolving-door employment and
regulatory capture practice is intensified in Japan through and culturally reinforced by the
practice of amakudari (descent from heaven), in which senior government officials secure
post-retirement, well-paying jobs at companies they previously supervised in carrying out
their official duties.24 This conflict o f interest has long raised suspicions that officials
exercise their oversight authority and discretionary powers with an eye toward landing a
lucrative job at companies they regulated in an official capacity. Jeff Kingston claims that
“amakudari is a notorious hotbed of corruption that costs taxpayers considerable sums in
subsidies and inflated government contracts.”25
This brief history of the development o f the nuclear energy sector in Japan
illustrates, above all, that pursuing nuclear energy has primarily been a decision made by
the Japanese state, codified into law by the Diet, protected by bureaucracy, and enshrined
into a national policy of greater energy independence. Since the beginning o f the Meiji
Restoration period in 1868, the “public good” came to equal the “official good” or the
national interest.

Equating nuclear energy with economic growth and then promoting

the two as the path to a restoration o f national pride allowed nuclear energy to develop
relatively free o f public input. The Japanese people have historically refrained from

23 Frank von Hippel, “It Could Happen Here T oo,” New York Times, March 23, 2011, A ccessed December
14, 2013, http://www.nvtimes.com/201 l/03/24/opinion/24Von-Hippel.html?pagewanted=all& r=0.
24 Kingston, Contem porary Japan, 31.
25 Ibid, 31.
26 Mindy L. Kotler and Ian T. Hillman. “Japanese Nuclear Energy Policy and Public Opinion.” The
Institute for Public Policy at Rice University Japan A ccess Information Project (M ay 2000), 3.
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challenging authority, instead expecting Japan’s central governments and bureaucrats to
protect and advance the national interest as a matter of course. Pursuing nuclear energy at
all costs has been made easier by the processes o f regulatory capture and amakudari, both
practices working to strengthen the ties between the nuclear industry, the Nuclear and
Industrial Safety Agency (now the Nuclear Regulatory Agency, renamed and reorganized
and housed in the Ministry o f Environment since Fukushima) and the LDP.
The oil crises o f the 1970s gave full citizenship rights to nuclear energy to secure
a reliable and affordable energy source for Japan to fuel its post-WWII period o f rapid
economic growth, though the country was already pursuing an aggressive nuclear energy
strategy well before the 1970s. It seems the advice Dr. Ryokichi Sagane gave to Yasuhiro
Nakasone in 1953 would prove successful, though a series of nuclear accidents in the
1990s (resulting from lax safety standards and regulatory oversight) began to erode
public trust and fuel public skepticism of nuclear energy. Incestuous business and
government relationships that are openly questioned as unethical in other places in Japan
were defended as sound and efficient governance, at least until Fukushima uncovered the
industry’s dirty secrets to a global audience in 2011.
Public Opinion in Japan
Traditionally, public opinion has played a smaller role in policy formation in
Japan than in other democratic societies, especially in the immediate decades after WWII,
when many Japanese generally refrained from challenging authority. Though a post-war
shaming era is thought to have created at least a temporary culture o f consent in
Germany, Japan’s culture of “haji,” or shame, has its roots well before WWII. Haji
restricts many actions including the expression of emotions, especially when those
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emotions run counter to the official line o f “what is best for the country”. People fear
being embarrassed or being shamed in public by choosing to do something that is
different from the mainstream and may turn out to be “wrong,” so many find comfort and
safety in conformity as it limits their exposure to shame. Social harmony, or “wa,” is the
societal norm, and those who disturb that harmony are punished socially. Similarly, civil
society organizations such as non-profits have few opportunities to participate in policymaking at the national level.
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Labor restrictions and a serious shortage o f funds create an

environment where few people want to work for these types of organizations. The result
is that most political activity, such as protests, was initially restricted to the local level
throughout the 1950s and 1960s and even then seemed to have little impact on policy
decisions.
Operating in tandem with this cultural emphasis on conformity and harmony was
the long-standing belief that government officials knew what best for the country. Since
the establishment of a modem government system in 1868 with the Meiji Restoration, the
public good equaled the official good or national interests. Officials were to be looked up
to with the attitude o f kanson mimpi (officials honored, public despised).28 Well into the
20th century and even after WWII, many Japanese continued to equate the national
interest, which was based on pursuing nuclear to advance economic development, with
the public good. O f course, this worked well for politicians, who were able to pursue their
own agendas free from public scrutiny or criticism inherent in most democratic societies.
However, political scandals, mismanagement and the quick resignations o f a handful of

27 Kawata Yuto, Robert Pekkanen and Tsujinaka Yutaka. “Civil Society and the Triple Disasters: Revealed
Strengths and W eaknesses,” In Natural D isaster and N uclear Crisis in Japan. Ed Jeff Kingston, (N ew
York: Routledge, 2012), 80.
2SKotler and Hillman, “Japanese Nuclear Energy Policy and Public Opinion,” 4-5.
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prime ministers in the early 1990s began eroding an already shaky trust in modem
government. Polls conducted by the World Values Survey reveal that, in 2005, at least
half o f those surveyed did not trust the government “very much at all” and fourteen
percent did not trust the government “at all”.29 To what extent this erosion o f public trust
affected decision-making power is unclear, especially in regard to decisions about nuclear
energy, which have historically been made separate from public input. Bureaucrats hold
decision-making authority but accountability for their decisions has not been rigorous or
transparent. Professionalism and expertise overrode the need for transparency, citizen
input or discussion of local concerns.30
Though the Japanese model of nuclear regulation and industry was closely
modeled on the American market-based system, Japan departed from this model early in
the development of its site approval process. Rather than allowing private utility
companies to handle the issues o f siting and public acceptance on their own, the Japanese
government developed an “...extensive array o f policy instruments and soft social control
techniques designed to bring public opinion in line with national energy goals.”31 Some
examples include pep talks and rallies for new reactors in communities from the central
government, the development of pro-nuclear science curricula for school-aged children,
Nuclear Power Day, and an annual fair where local farmers and fishermen could sell their
products so they would not feel a nuclear plant was taking away their livelihoods. The
government would additionally provide information to help utility companies locate

29 World Values Survey 1981-2008, Official Aggregate v. 20090901, 2009. World Values Survey
Association, Accessed December 20, 2013, www.worldvaluesurvev.org. Aggregate File Producer:
ASEP/JDS, Madrid.
30 Kotler and Hillman, “Japanese Nuclear Energy Policy and Public Opinion,” 2.
31 Daniel P. Aldrich, “Post-Crisis Japanese Nuclear Policy: From Top-Down Directives to Bottom-Up
Activism,” Asia Pacific Issues, Analysis from the East-West Center (January 2012), 3.
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possible sites with the necessary logistical elements for a reactor, such as access to
cooling water and existing electrical power grids. The government would also provide
information that helped utility companies map the social characteristics o f local
communities in order to determine locations that would be most likely to be approved for
reactors. Internal documents from the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (JIFA) show that
planners o f the late 1960s and 1970s were well aware o f the dangers posed by wellorganized and motivated local opposition groups, especially fishermen’s cooperatives. To
avoid these groups, planners placed projects in rural communities which were less
coordinated and more fragmented and hence less likely to mount anti-nuclear
campaigns.32 To overcome any remaining opposition, the government often offered jobs
and financial assistance to local fishermen so the nuclear plant would not be seen as
causing financial damage to individuals.
The 1970s, however, brought about a period in which many previously ineffective
local opposition groups would organize into national movements. Yasumasa Kuroda
wrote in 1972 that the nationalization o f many local groups during that decade would
represent the second phase o f growing democracy in Japan, spurred by two previous
decades o f economic growth and what Kuroda calls “the people’s awakening,” or the
->•5

development of an active political

culture.

As several anti-nuclear umbrella

organizations began to mobilize nationally, the government responded with increased
pressure to gain approval for new reactors. As a result o f this new push, the system that
developed to allocate benefits to potential nuclear host communities became so complex
that the central government had to create a new agency, the Agency for Natural

32 Aldrich, “Post-Crisis Japanese Nuclear Policy: From Top-Down Directives to Bottom-Up Activism ,” 5.
33 Yasumasa Kuroda, “Protest Movements in Japan: A N ew Politics,” Asian Survey, 12:1 (N ov 1972), 949.
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Resources and Energy, to manage it. The central government also organized workshops
for local officials to educate them on what had worked or not worked in other places in
terms of getting approval from the public for nuclear plants. Eventually, the government
would provide up to $20 million per year to communities to accept nuclear power in what
became a tremendously well-funded policy instrument that funneled hidden taxes on
electricity into a pooled account that bureaucrats would then divide among communities
in rural and coastal Japan.
The Three Power Source Development Laws, also known as the Dengen Sanpo,
provide enormous subsidies for communities that agree to host nuclear power plants. By
2002, a community agreeing to host a 1.35 million kilowatt reactor could expect to
receive up to 450 billion yen from the government.34 This obviously represents an
enormous sum and an enticing offer for local cities that regularly struggle with deficits.
This system, however, has only been partly successful. O f the total amount o f money
collected for the Three Power Source Development Laws through an invisible tax levied
on all power consumption, the government has only been able to spend a small amount.
In 2001, for example, despite budgeting 2.5 billion yen for nuclear power plant siting, the
government only spent 1.5 billion.35
The very existence of this system of exploitation and manipulation seems to
suggest that government officials eager to have new reactors approved did fear the
possible adverse effects o f pushback from the public, a fear that motivated them to pay
local residents off in exchange for their silent consent. Perhaps maintaining the fa?ade of
harmony that is so fundamental to Japanese society was well worth the price o f creating
34 Daniel P. Aldrich, “Japan’s Nuclear Power Plant Siting: Quelling Resistance,” The A sia-Pacific Journal,
Accessed February 6, 2014. http://www.iapanfocus.org/-Daniel P -Aldrich/2047.
35 Aldrich, “Japan’s Nuclear Power Plant Siting: Quelling Resistance”.
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the illusion that people were happy having reactors in their communities when, in reality,
they were likely far more happy with the subsidies and perks that came with those
reactors. As negative public opinion against nuclear energy increased in the 1980s, so did
the money funneled to keep people happy. However, decreases in the 1990s in the actual
money the government would be able to spend on siting incentives coupled with an
increase in the time it takes to get reactors approved suggests that citizens may be
becoming increasingly immune to these techniques. According to Danile Aldrich, the
lead times necessary for negotiation and construction o f new power plants in a greenfield
situation has tripled over the past three decades.36
Japan does have formal procedures for licensing nuclear reactors that allow for
public involvement, but, as in many other countries, the proceedings seem to be a routine
part o f procedure with little actual value. Before the official approval o f a reactor
establishment license, there are two public hearings at which concerned citizens can
request more information or voice their dissent. For the purpose o f public involvement,
the most important step comes when the operating utility company has to first obtain a
local agreement to begin the process of reactor approval from the mayor o f the local
municipality, the governor o f the prefecture and from the municipal and prefectural
assemblies. The sooner in the approval process citizens can voice their opposition, the
more likely they are to halt reactor approval. However, it is precisely in these preliminary
stages that access to information about the proposed nuclear plant in question is limited,
especially if the local authorities are keen to receive subsidies from utility companies for
hosting a nuclear plant or to bring reactor construction and operating employment to their
towns and prefectures. The only publicly available information is simple explanatory
36 Aldrich, “Japan’s Nuclear Power Plant Siting: Quelling Resistance”.
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material provided by the power company, but power companies sometimes prepare
detailed documents for members o f the local council and influential people in the local
community. There are a few instances in which local residents have exerted considerable
power over the reactor approval process, such as with the abandoned Ashihama site in
2000 or the cancelled project in Miyama in 2001, but these cases have tended to be the
exceptions rather than the rules. Residents o f neighboring towns are also without
opportunity for input into the approval process, nor do they receive any incentive
subsidies from the utility company while shouldering equal risk should the reactor
malfunction. Public hearings and public commencements tend to be proforma in nature
and if residents are not successful in blocking the initial agreement between the local and
prefectural authorities and the utility company, the approval process gains momentum
that is difficult to stop.37
The government discovered early on that the best way to circumvent any possible
challenges to siting would be to manipulate public compliance through many of the
techniques previously mentioned. While effective, these soft policy tools did not
guarantee success when it came to siting approval. O f the 95 attempts to site nuclear
power plants in Japan over the postwar period, only 54 were actually completed.38 That
represents only a 57 percent success rate. Well organized and informed anti-nuclear
groups fought citing approval in many well-publicized battles, and it seems the
conclusion is that even the best soft policy incentive techniques cannot assure siting
success in an era of increasingly active and concerned citizenry. Despite ongoing
opposition, the combined force of the government, bureaucracy, and utility companies
37 “Public Involvement in Japan’s Nuclear Licensing System ,” Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center,
Accessed January 3, 2014, http://www.cnic.ip/english/newsletter/nitl 35/nit 135articles/licensing.html.
38 Aldrich, “Japan’s Nuclear Power Plant Siting: Quelling Resistance”.
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continued moving nuclear power forward in Japan well into the 1990s when 15 new
reactors were approved. A string of domestic nuclear accidents in the 1990s, however,
would contribute to altering nuclear power’s future viability in Japan.
Current Opinion Polling
In 2006, approval o f nuclear energy at 40 percent o f those surveyed outweighed
disapproval at 35 percent for the first time in Japan since 1986.39 In 2009, a poll carried
out by the Prime Minister’s Office revealed that roughly 60 percent o f respondents
approved o f increasing the country’s number o f reactors.40 This modest trend continued
until 2011 when approval o f nuclear energy slowly began to decrease after the
Fukushima incident. Polling in late 2013 indicated that the majority o f people in Japan no
longer support turning the country’s reactors back on. Though it would seem that the
decision to turn off all nuclear reactors after Fukushima for inspection, evaluation and
maintenance correlates with a rise in public opposition to nuclear energy, this relationship
is actually quite unclear. In September of 2012, the Japanese government under the
leadership o f PM Yoshihiko Noda and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) released the
“Revolutionary Energy and Environment Strategy” which called for a complete nuclear
phase out by 2040. This nuclear phase-out plan satisfied few people. In a reaction that
echoes those heard in response to Germany’s first proposed nuclear phase-out in the late
1990s, anti-nuclear proponents said the strategy did too little in allowing reactors to
operate another thirty years while the business and industry lobby were unhappy to lose

39 “Public Attitudes to Nuclear Power,” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developm ent, Report,
2010, NEA no. 6859.
40 Daniel P. Aldrich. “Post-Fukushima Nuclear Politics in Japan, Part 3: Empowering Anti-Nuclear
Sentiment.” The Monkey Cage. Accessed January 31, 2014, http://themonkevcage.org/2013/04/Q3/postfukushima-nuclear-politics-in-iapan-part-3-empowered-anti-nuclear-sentiment/.
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money on their nuclear investments.41 This plan would prove to be short-lived, however,
when the DPJ was defeated by the LDP party in December of 2012 and Shinzo Abe, a
pro-nuclear advocate, was again appointed PM. The policy shifts that followed were a
part o f Abe’s plan to jumpstart the Japanese economy with nuclear technology exports
and increasing nuclear energy reliance to limit foreign dependence on imported energy.
The current plan is to restart the country’s commercial reactors when they have cleared
the new safety standards implemented after Fukushima. Construction is also on-going at
many sites that were approved for new reactors before 2011, in Shimane Prefecture, for
example, where citizens have collected thousands o f signatures to present to the
prefectural assembly to challenge the reactor.
Overall, it is difficult to determine whether current plans to restart nuclear
reactors and continue pursuing nuclear energy are in line with public opinion or not. In
Germany, Angela Merkel and her CDU-lead government was prompted by Green Party
wins to announce a phase-out o f nuclear power that correlated to high levels o f public
opposition to nuclear post-Fukushima. The CDU was rewarded with popular wins in the
next general election. In Japan, however, the DPJ decision to phase out nuclear resulted
in a DPJ majority loss in the Diet and a return to majority for the pro-nuclear LDP. It is
impossible to know for sure, however, whether voters put the LDP back into power or
just ensured the DPJ stayed out of majority power, considering there was rampant public
criticism over PMs Naoto Kan and then Yoshihiko Noda’s handling o f Fukushima. On
one hand, polls indicate that the majority o f Japanese polled want to move away nuclear
energy; on the other, voters returned the pro-nuclear LDP to office in 2012.
41 Hiriko Tabuchi, “Japan Sets Policy to Phase Out Nuclear Power Plants by 2040,” N ew York Times.
September 14, 2011, Accessed February 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/Q9/15/world/asia/iapanwill-trv-to-halt-nuclear-power-bv-the-end-of-the-2030s.html? r=0.
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Response to Disasters
This section will examine to what extent past nuclear disasters impacted the
decision to pursue nuclear energy as well as the impact these disasters had on public
approval for nuclear energy. In addition to examining the cases o f Three Mile Island,
Chernobyl and Fukushima, I will also include an analysis o f a series o f nuclear accidents
in Japan during the 1990s that revealed serious lapses in security measures and cover-ups
undertaken by the nuclear industry.
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl
Opposition to nuclear energy did exist in the 1970s and 1980s, but it was
localized rather than national in a NIMBY response, and was usually temporary and lead
by left-wing groups or local trade associations.42 Local protests often gained immediate
attention but rarely had any long-term effects on policy-makers’ decision to pursue
nuclear energy. Little legitimacy was given to the public concerns over nuclear safety.
Public officials were unrelenting in their assertion that they knew what was best for the
nation. In addition, opinion polls throughout the 1980s and 1990s showed that the
majority o f Japanese found nuclear plants to be “safe” or “somewhat safe” (which is not
necessarily to say they supported building more reactors) and that the majority o f people
who supported nuclear energy did so because they viewed it as the only way to escape
from the dependence on oil and coal.43 In the end, central authority almost always
overruled local opposition.
The events nuclear incidents at Three M ile Island and Chernobyl did not affect
the nuclear industry in Japan as greatly as in other countries. This is evident in the

42 Kotler and Hillman, “Japanese Nuclear Energy Policy and Public Opinion,” 4.
43 Ibid. 5.
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increase of nuclear energy production beginning in the

1980s that continued

uninterrupted through the 2000s. Figure 12 demonstrates Japanese electricity production
from nuclear power from 1980-2005:
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Figure 12: Percentage Share o f N uclear Energy G eneration in Japan, Terrawatt H ours, 1980-2005.44

For a side-by-side comparison, the Figure 13 demonstrates public opinion on
nuclear energy during the same period:

4444 D ata com piled by author from International Energy A gency.
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Figure 13: A pproval for and O pposition to N uclear Energy in Japan, 1975-2010.

These graphs demonstrate two things. First, that neither the Three Mile Island
incident in 1979 nor the Chernobyl incident in 1986 had any measurable effect on nuclear
energy pursuance as defined as power coming from existing reactors in terawatt hours,
which increased after each of these disasters. Nor did Three Mile Island or Chernobyl
have any discernible effect on nuclear pursuance as defined by number of reactors
approved in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, in the 1980s, 15 new reactors were approved
for construction and an additional 15 more in the 1990s. Second, these graphs
demonstrate that despite a marked increase in disapproval o f nuclear energy in the late
1980s, there are no correlating changes in nuclear energy pursuance. The lone indicator
that would suggest effective push-back from citizens is the lead time necessary for
reactor approval and construction that tripled from the 1970s to the 1990s as citizen
groups were able to at least delay approval if not outright halt it.
45 “Public A ttitudes to N uclear Energy, OECD, 2010.
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Domestic Nuclear Incidents, 1990-2011
Often referred to as the “Lost Decade,” 1990-2000 was the time after the asset
bubble burst and the Japanese economy slumped. GDP growth slowed and deflation
increased as people began saving their money thereby creating a liquidity trap that
reinforced the economic slump. Officials surely thought that the recession was temporary
and growth would return. In preparation, 15 reactors were approved during this period,
though a series o f highly publicized and badly managed nuclear incidents would create a
backlash that would carry into the 2000s.
Tokai-mura Crideality Accident, 1999
The criticality accident at Tokaimura occurred at a uranium processing facility
operated by JCO, formerly the Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Company. The accident
occurred as technicians were preparing a batch o f fuel for the reactor when the solution in
the tank, reaching past the fill line, created a self-sustaining reaction that began emitting
gamma and neutron radiation. The three technicians immediately became sick and two
would eventually die, but the workers were able to contain the reaction once the fuel had
cooled the next morning. In the meantime, almost 200 people were evacuated from their
homes in a 350 meter radius around the plant and people in a 10 kilometer radius were
advised to stay indoors. Dozens of workers and residents were hospitalized for radiation
exposure well above what is considered safe. The following investigation by the
International Atomic Energy Agency concluded that the cause of the accident was human
error and serious breach o f safety principles, considering the technicians preparing the
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fuel for the reactors seemed to not have had any specific training for their tasks and were
unfamiliar with safety protocol in the event of an accident.46
Shika Nuclear Power Plant Cover-Up, Monju Cover-Up, 1995
During a 1999 inspection o f the Shika reactors, due to improper rod inspection
techniques, one reactor was in a state o f criticality for 15 minutes. This, in itself, would
not have been sensational. The Hokuriku Electric Power Company cover-up o f the
incident, however, was quite sensational when the news of the incident was leaked to the
public in 2007. The chairman o f the Japan Nuclear Safety Commission inspected the rod
housings in the reactor and determined that the incident was due to cutting comers and
unnecessary pressure on reactor operators. A lower court had ordered the entire plant to
be shut down, but a higher Nagoya court overturned that ruling and the unit returned to
operation in May o f 2009.47
In 1995, molten sodium leaked from the cooling circuit o f the Monju reactor,
resulting in a fire that made headlines across the country. Following the fire, officials at
the government-owned Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation
downplayed the extent of the damage and the seriousness o f the fire at the Monju reactor.
They also denied the existence o f a videotape showing the sodium spill, and the reactor
was closed in 1995 for maintenance. Ten years later, in 2005, that same video would
come hack to haunt them when it was leaked to the public following an announcement
the Monju reactor would be restarted. This video showed men in “space-suits” walking

46 Nathalie Cavasin, “Citizen Activism and the Nuclear Industry in Japan,” Local Environmental
Movements: A Comparison o f the US and Japan, Eds Pradyumna P. Karan and Unryu Suganuma,
(Lexington, KY: The University Press o f Kentucky, 2008), 65.
47 Cavasin, “Citizen Activism and the Nuclear Industry in Japan,” 66.
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around as sodium crystals hung from above, in a scene straight from a post-apocalyptic
movie. The Monju reactor would eventually come online again in late 2000s.48
Mihama, 2004
The Mihama steam explosion of 2004 occurred when a broken pipe could not
contain the hot water and steam emitted in a building at the plant used for housing
cooling turbines. The steam killed 4 workers and resulted in the injury o f 7 others, though
the accident was found to have not released any hazardous radioactive contaminants into
the environment. The accident had been called the worst nuclear accident in Japan until
the Fukushima disaster in 2011. After this highly publicized string o f nuclear incidents,
citizen trust was further eroded as the safety culture in Japan’s nuclear industry came into
question.

49

Fukushima, 2011
By the time o f the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the most extensive in Japan’s
history and certainly the most expensive since Chernobyl, the Japanese public had
already seen a decade o f mistakes, mishandlings, and cover-ups. Leading up to 2011,
polling reports showed that a large percentage o f the population, or 87 percent o f those
polled, knew about the Tokia-mura incident from ten years previous and 68 percent o f
respondents feared another nuclear accident would happen.50 Figure __ further
demonstrates that public support for nuclear power had declined to below 40 percent for
the first time since the mid-1980s. Opinion polls conducted by the Asahi Shimbun
following March of 2011 show that disapproval for nuclear power was immediately slow
48 Cavasin, “Citizen Activism and the Nuclear Industry in Japan,” 67.
49 Ibid, 68.
50 “Ten Years Since the Criticality Accident at Tokai-mura: Fear Lingers,” NHK Broadcasting Culture
Research Institute, January 2010, Accessed October 10, 2012.
httn:/7www.nhk.or.in/bunken/enulish/renorts-''summarv/2 0 1001 /02.htm l.
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to respond to the Fukushima disaster. Figure 14 illustrates approval ratings for nuclear
energy, as reported by the Asahi Shimbun, from April of 2011-October of 2012:
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Figure 14: N uclear O pinion Polling in Japan Follow ing Fukushim a,
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Many possible explanations exist for the public’s slow response to Fukushima
inside Japan. Large numbers o f people were directly affected by the earthquake or
tsunami in ways not related to the nuclear disaster, and so many were preoccupied with
their own problems of structural damage or flooding. Though the international press was
reporting constantly on the nuclear disaster, with comparisons to Chernobyl and dooms
day scenarios the most popular headlines, the nature o f the reporting inside Japan was
more controlled. The Nihon Hoso Kyokai (NHK), Japan’s national broadcasting
corporation, has faced serious allegation in 2014 that it deliberately controlled the flow of

51 D ata com piled by author from Asahi Shim bun W eekly O pinion Polls, 2011-2012.
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information to the public following Fukushima in accordance with what the then-current
Democratic Party o f Japan (DPJ) government allowed. For example, rumors have
circulated since 2011 that the NHK complied with government efforts to conceal the
extent o f the radiation release.52 In December of 2013, the chairman o f the NHK,
Masayuki Matsumoto, announced he would be stepping down from his position, claiming
he had been driven out by Abe administration criticism that he had allowed current NHK
nuclear coverage to become too critical. There are further allegations that A be’s LDP is
stocking the NHK’s governing board with political appointees that will stifle the N H K ’s
criticism o f the conservative party, which supports a policy of nuclear reactor restarts.
Though an official investigation is yet to take place, a explanations for the public’s
sluggish immediate concerns about safety following Fukushima are likely tied to a lack
o f information about what was precisely going on in Fukushima Prefecture.
It became increasingly difficult to hide the evacuation o f residents from
Fukushima or to conceal the reasons for displacing so many people. Though many
residents in the immediate vicinity o f the Fukushima reactors were evacuated
immediately, the radius o f evacuations continued widening until September o f 2011 when
residents within fifty miles o f the reactors were ordered to move out o f the radiation zone,
totaling, at one point, approximately 100,000 people. The misplacement o f 100,000
people is difficult not to notice, and it seems as time wore on after Fukushima, and as
people were able to access more information on the status o f the Fukushima reactors and
the damage they had caused to property and in terms o f safety to residents, approval for
nuclear power dropped with disapproval peaking in 2012 at 70 percent o f respondents.

52 “Widespread Public Distrust o f NHK Over Fukushima Radiation Cover-Up,” EnergyNews, A ccessed
March 28, 2014.
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All plants were shut down immediately following Fukushima for regular safety
inspections until June of 2011 when the Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO)
utility was allowed to restart its reactor at Oi, a move that was controversial among the
public. In June of 2012, 46 percent o f respondents claimed they were against restarting
this reactor while 37 percent opposed the move. However, in July o f 2012, opinion was
split when 41 percent responded that they thought it was right to restart the reactor and 42
percent opposed the restart, though only 35 percent o f people approved o f restarting
reactors other than Oi. In August o f 2012, the support for restarting reactors other than Oi
dropped to 31 percent. In October o f 2012, construction resumed at the Ooma nuclear
power plant in Aomori Prefecture. 25 percent o f respondents agreed with this, while 55
disapproved.
While respondents seemed to be split regarding the restart the Oi plant, it seems
most respondents do not want new nuclear power plants in Japan and do not want to
restart most o f the existing reactors. By June of 2012, energy prices had increased nearly
30 percent throughout the country, a result o f increased imports of coal and natural gas to
compensate for losses in nuclear.53 The public may have thought that restarting Oi would
alleviate some o f this energy price increase, especially heading into a warm Japanese
summer. In fact, in March of 2012, 75 percent o f respondents reported that they were
either very concerned (20 percent) or moderately concerned (55 percent) about how the
suspension o f nuclear energy would impact the economy. In December o f 2012, voters
would return the pro-nuclear LDP back to a majority in the Diet, a move away from the
DPJ that has been seen as largely reflective of concerns about the economy. In 2014, the

53 “Japan Halts Last Reactor at Ohi,” BBC News, September 15, 2013, Accessed January 4, 2014,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24099022.
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Tokyo Governor’s race became heated between candidates running on pro and antinuclear platforms. Though anti-nuclear former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi tried to
turn the election into a referendum on nuclear power, a Yomiuri poll found that most
respondents (84 percent) thought medical and welfare policies were the most important
issue of the election and disaster preparedness and unemployment as second most
important.54 In the end, voters elected the pro-nuclear LDP candidate to the gubernatorial
position as weak anti-nuclear candidates split the opposition vote.
In a country long seen as lacking a political culture of protest, it seems the
Fukushima incident pushed citizens to a point o f criticality. Immediately following
Fukushima, hundreds of thousands of people would amass in Tokyo’s political district
every Friday to protest nuclear power and the government’s decision to restart nuclear
reactors. Though there were also mass demonstrations in the 1960s over the US-Japan
Security Treaty, the participants were primarily college students and the activity ended
after approximately two months. The anti-nuclear demonstrations’ demographics now
seem to represent many different cross-sections o f society, from young people to senior
citizens, men, women, professionals and working-class citizens. In a 2012 interview, Eiji
Oguma, professor at Keio University, says he believes this is a result o f a growing
distrust o f the government resulting from 20 years o f economic stagnation. Further, he
says that the reasons demonstrations in Japan have been limited in the past are related to
decades o f stability in people’s lives and jobs as well as a lack o f knowledge or
experience with protests. Now, however, people are worried about the economy and
globalization has brought knowledge about other cultures of protests to Japan. For
54 E. Tammy Kim, “Tokyo Governor’s Race Puts Nuclear Power to Electoral Test,” A1 Jazeera, February
7, 2014, A ccessed February 28, 2014, http://america.aliazeera.com/articIes/2014/2/7/in-tokvoelectionreferendumonnuclearpowerandnationalpolicies.html.
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Oguma, this symbolizes a major political shift in Japan, away from a consenting and
comfortable public to one in which people will demand more o f a voice in their
government.55 As of yet, however, an organized, national opposition to nuclear energy
has yet to emerge in Japan, though that is not to say that local opposition is incapable of
blocking or stalling reactor restarts in the coming months.
Current Nuclear Politics in Japan: The New Basic Energy Plan
In 2012, the incumbent majority DPJ ran its Diet candidates on a promise that
they would make a nuclear phase-out into policy in Japan. In the December o f 2012
General election, voters returned the LDP party to a majority and the LDP returned
Shinzo Abe to the office o f Prime Minister. The LDP, long a supporter o f nuclear energy,
has announced plans to restart most, if not all, o f the now dormant reactors after they
have been tested and are found to pass new, stricter safety guidelines. Shinzo Abe has
publicly stated that continuing to rely on nuclear energy while also pursuing other forms
o f renewable energy are primary components o f his “Three Arrows” plan for economic
revitalization, a plan known popularly as “Abenomics.” In the Japanese electoral system
o f one-party dominance, the likelihood o f the LD P’s return to majority was always high,
and after the immediate mishandling o f so many elements o f the triple disaster in 2011,
the majority held by the usual opposition DPJ party became increasingly tenuous.
Considering the LDP’s vast array o f networks within business, the nuclear industry, and
bureaucracy, it is no wonder the party is pro-nuclear. Nor is their rise from defeat and
return to Parliamentarian majority a surprise.

55 “Anti-Nuclear Protests Show Japan is Becom ing an Ordinary Nation, Scholar Says,” A sahi Shimbun,
July 19, 2012, Accessed March 1, 2014,
http://ai w.asahi.coin/article/0311 disaster/opinion/AJ201207190080.
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In February o f 2014, the Abe administration released a draft o f the New Basic
Energy Plan that outline Japan’s energy plans for the next 20 years and include keeping
nuclear power at the core o f baseload56 power production along with coal-fired and
hydroelectric plants.57 The draft plan is cautious about providing an estimated energy
mix, it does allow room for both restarting existing reactors and building new reactors.
The most recent approval ratings for Abe and his administration are, for the first time in
Diet history, higher now than when he took office in 20 12.58 Abe’s approval ratings are
likely linked more to forward progress in the Japanese economy, however, than to his
policies on nuclear energy, though, in Japan, it is often difficult to separate one issue
from the other.
Access to Other Resources
Whereas the previous section sought to determine to what degree public and
nuclear disasters influence pursuance o f nuclear energy, this section will examine Japan’s
energy options by examining its access to other electricity-producing resources, either
through natural endowments or through reliable and affordable trading options. In
concurrence with the previous hypotheses tested in the US and German case studies, the
hypotheses to be tested in this section are that the greater the endowment o f coal, oil or
natural gas, the less likely a country will be to pursue nuclear; likewise, the greater the
access to resources through trading options, the less likely a country will be to pursue
nuclear. In the case o f Japan, petroleum makes up such a large enough percentage of
56 A baseload power source is one that can produce energy at a constant rate and lower cost than the
alternatives.
57 Mari Iawata, “Japan Sees Key Role for Nuclear Power,” Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2014,
Accessed February 15, 2014,
http:///online.wsi-com/news/articles/SB 10001424052702304610404579403741256563088?mod=:dist smart
brief.
58 “Asahi Poll: Abe Cabinet Breaks Trend, Increases Support Rate to 62% ,” Asahi Shimbun, February 18,
2013, Accessed February 24, 2014, http://aiw.asahi.eom/article/behind news/politics/AJ201302180099.
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overall electricity generation (16 percent) that it will also be tested with the hypothesis
that the greater the supply of or access to oil, the less likely a country will be to pursue
nuclear as a power source.
In 2013, Japan was the second-largest net importer of energy resources, second
only to China.59 In 2013, the electrical energy mix in Japan included a significant reliance
on LNG at 48 percent of overall consumption, with coal making up approximately 28
percent, oil an increased 15 percent, and other renewables contributing roughly 10
percent of overall electricity generation. Japan ended its own domestic coal production
program in 2002 and has since steadily increased its coal imports, primarily from
Australia. In fact, Japan takes 40 percent of Australia’s black coal exports, comprising
Australia’s largest share going to a single country in 2013.60 Unlike Germany, Japan has
been able to compensate for nuclear without significantly increasing coal imports, a move
likely linked to its clean energy and reduced carbon emission goals and an abundant
regional supply o f LNG.
Rather than relying on coal, the Japanese government has declared its preference
for LNG as a short-term substitute for nuclear energy. About a third o f Japan’s LNG
imports come from regional suppliers, though the country’s overall portfolio is
reasonably balanced with no one provider supplying more than 20 percent o f overall
LNG. Australia surpassed Indonesia and Malaysia to become Japan’s largest LNG
exporter in 2012 and, in 2013, Shinzo Abe began talks with the United Arab Emirates
that were continued in Tokyo in February of 2014. The 2014 bilateral agreement reached
59 “Japan is the Second Largest Net Importer o f Fossil Fuels in the W orld,” Energy Information
Administration, November 7, 2013, Accessed January 31, 2014,
http://www. eia.gov/todavinenergv/detail.cfm?id= 13711.
60 “Exports,” Australian Coal Association,” Accessed February 18, 2014,
http://www.australiancoal.com.au/exports.html.
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between the two countries will enhance cooperation on energy development in the two
countries, giving Japan the chance to renew its interests in the UAE’s oil and gas fields.
In return, Japan will export nuclear technology to the UAE to aid the country in
developing its own civilian nuclear energy program. Currently, Qatar, Australia and
Malaysia are Japan’s most significant suppliers o f LNG, though additional future supplies
could come from projects in Papua New Guinea or from US LNG exports once the
American terminals are approved for exports.61
Though Japan’s supply of LNG is relatively steady and reliable, the most
significant problem the past few years has primarily been associated with cost.
Historically, natural gas prices have been tied to oil prices, and after oil prices rose in
2008, the demand for natural gas rose as well, resulting in an overall higher LNG price.
One prong o f Abe’s economic stimulus plan has been to engage in quantitative easing to
increase the monetary base and depreciate the value o f the yen to fight deflation and
make Japanese exports more competitive. While this plan has begun working to reverse
deflation, it has also meant paying more for energy imports, particularly natural gas.
Higher global demand for LNG has resulted in an increased gas price for Asian buyers,
an increase from $9/MMBtu in early 2008 to $16/MMBtu in 2012. Japan and other LNG
importers have been in the process of negotiating contracts for lower LNG prices that are
tied to US gas market prices rather than international crude oil prices. Kansai Electric,
for example, reached an agreement on a long-term contract with BP in 2012 that links
LNG prices with the lower US Henry Hub spot price that, in 2014, hovered around

61 “Japan is the Second Largest Net Importer o f Fossil Fuels in the World,” Energy Information
Administration, November 7, 2013, Accessed January 31, 2014,
http://www.eia.gov/todavinenergy/detail.cfm?id=l 3711.
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$4/MMBtu.62 These advances are merely reactionary, however, may not take effect
immediately, and cannot compensate for high prices of LNG from 2011 to the present.
Even with some o f the lowest electricity demand growth rates in the developed
world and a high level o f energy efficiency (electrical energy demand actually decreased
8 percent after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, no doubt partly due to higher than normal
energy prices63), importing almost all of its natural resources since 2011 has taken a
financial toll on a Japanese economy that has been limping along since he 1990s. A be’s
plan to depreciate the Yen to make Japanese exports more competitive has only
marginally been effective. According to the World Bank, the export o f goods and
services as a percentage o f GDP rose in Japan from 13 percent in 2009 to only 15 percent
in 2013.64 A successful plan to increase exports with currency devaluation would also be
balanced with a strategy to control increases in imports, but imports to Japan actually
increased 25 percent from 2012 to January o f 2014, reaching an all-time imports high of
8044.06 JPY billion.65 34 percent of those imports are mineral fuels, which include coal,
natural gas and petroleum. This increase in imports without a correlating increase in
exports is further fueling a Japanese debt-to-GDP ratio that is already the highest in the
world at 230 percent.
For years, nuclear energy formed the cornerstone o f Japan’s energy plan, a power
source that was abundant, domestically-produced, and created the opportunity for Japan
to export nuclear technology. Without nuclear, Japan must continue to import LNG and
62 “Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price,” Energy Information Administration, Last Updated March 26, 2014,
Accessed March 27, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/mgwhhdm.htm.
63 “FY2012: Energy Supply and Demand Report,” Japanese Ministry o f Economy, Trade and Industry,
October 2, 2013, Accessed February 6, 2014, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2013/1002_01 .html.
64 “Exports o f Goods and Services as a Percentage o f GDP,” The World Bank, A ccessed March 7, 2014,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS.
65 “Japanese Imports,” Trading Economics, Accessed March 10, 2014,
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/japan/imports.
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coal, which, even at lowered negotiated prices, will stall the economic revitalization the
country needs to fight its debt-to-GDP ratio. The lone bright spot in this energy scenario
is a significant increase in renewable energy investment. Japan saw investment in
renewable renewable energy (excluding research and technology) increase 73 percent to
$16 billion in 2013, thanks to a surge in small-scale photovoltaic investment on the back
of a new feed-in tariff subsidy for PV installation.66 With the new subsidy, developers are
now finding that they can get a reasonable return on PV investment as prices continue to
all for PV and wind resources. Even more impressively, utility-scale investment in
renewable energy sources jumped 230 percent in Japan between 2011 and 2014 as the
feed-in tariff for large-scale projects likewise makes investment attractive. The general
hope is that eventually the market will reduce the cost and increase the return on
renewable energy investment to the point that the government will no longer need to
provide subsidies which, while they encourage beginning investment, will only continue
to increase government budgetary expenditures and the staggering overall debt. A
practically challenge will be pursuing a PV and wind renewable policy that is aggressive
enough to compensate for nuclear energy, especially considering these energy sources
require space for installation and Japan is a country that is not land-abundant.
Hydroelectric power, which made up barely 7 percent o f Japanese electrical energy
portfolio in 2011, has reached its maximum output as the locations that are appropriate
for such installations have all been utilized.

66 “Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment, 2013,” Frankfurt School o f Finance and Management,
2013.
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Chapter Conclusions
One o f the hypotheses tested in this section was that the greater the public
opposition to nuclear energy, the less likely a country would be to pursue it as an energy
source. If this study only compares opinion for and against nuclear energy with levels of
nuclear energy generated or number o f reactors approved, then the conclusion is that
there is an unclear relationship between public opinion and nuclear energy pursuance.
There has always been public opposition to nuclear energy in Japan which was reflected
in polling throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Public support for nuclear energy vacillated in
the 1990s and 2000s, as people were unsure whether the reported incidents happening
across Japan at various nuclear plants such as Tokai-mura were more important than the
economic stagnation that was gripping a country quite proud of their previous decades of
“miraculous” economic growth. It is also unclear whether Three Mile Island in 1979 or
Chernobyl in 1986 had any significant, lasting impact on public opinion in Japan, though,
by some reports, support for nuclear energy reached an all-time low in 1990. If that is a
response to Chernobyl in 1986, it is a delayed response.
Similarly, measuring protest activity and intensity in Japan may be a misleading
methodological tool considering the heavy cultural emphasis placed on social harmony
which may hinder marching in the streets. It is a far more likely scenario that, even if and
when people do not approve o f nuclear energy, they will not participate in a protest and
may even be reticent to voice their dissenting opinion in polls. Fukushima may have
changed these social norms to a certain extent, especially among younger generations, but
it still too soon to determine the extent or duration of any impact on political culture in
Japan.
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However, if this study measures public efficacy toward stopping nuclear energy in
terms o f reactors that were not approved, constructed or brought into operation over the
decades of nuclear investment, then the issue becomes even murkier. Previous studies
have shown that despite the use of flexible and adaptive institutions and incentives in the
siting approval process, even the best designed techniques could never guarantee siting
success, a reality that is especially poignant in an era of increasingly active and
concerned citizenry within Japan. Citizens have been able to mobilize in organized and
effective ways to stop nuclear reactor construction in their communities, but these cases
tend to be the exception rather than the rule. The Iron Triangle and nuclear village have
always had resources to offer that incentivized siting approval, and a pro-nuclear LDP in
majority office and a pro-nuclear utility and construction industry are difficult opponents
to fight. In the end, as with any issue and any place or time, citizens are most effective in
stopping nuclear construction when they can dis-incentivize the investment by making
the approval process longer or the construction more costly. To what extent opposition
groups will be able to do this in the future is unclear, as is whether the majority of
citizens even want to stop nuclear power from expanding in Japan. On one hand, opinion
polls show that people are opposed to restating dormant reactor and to building new ones;
on the other, the pro-nuclear LDP enjoyed a majority win in 2012, returning a Prime
Minister and Diet to office that has since created a future Basic Energy Plan based
heavily on utilizing nuclear power.
The clearest conclusion is that neither public opposition nor Three Mile
Island/Chernobyl dampened the Japanese government’s enthusiasm for nuclear energy.
Ever since Nakasone travelled to the US in the 1950s and received advice about how to
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institutionalize nuclear energy in Japan, the government has consistently insisted that
nuclear power is an imperative ingredient in the recipe for Japanese independence from
energy imports and economic success. The LDP and the DPJ both encouraged nuclear
investment and reliance until 2011, and even though the DPJ in majority at the time o f
Fukushima approved a plan to phase out nuclear, the LDP has since been returned to
office and is enjoying high approval ratings while promoting a pro-nuclear economic
plan.
It is perhaps on this point that the clearest explanations behind nuclear pursuance
in Japan can be found. From early on, nuclear energy was efficiently linked to economic
growth in Japan, and especially after the destruction o f WWII, economy recovery and
growth were also linked to the restoration o f Japan’s place at the table o f the international
community. The early establishment o f the nuclear village created and then perpetuated
this narrative, rewarding those who climbed aboard the nuclear platform and punishing
those who spoke out against nuclear energy. The close integration o f business, the LDP
and the bureaucratic structure it created, and the utility and construction industries
(known broadly as the Iron Triangle) has allowed the state to effectively pursue nuclear
energy by channeling incentivizing subsidies from utility slush funds to proposed reactor
sites, while bureaucracy simultaneously created policies that were beneficial to the
approval, construction and safety regulation processes (a process reinforced by the
practice of amakudari). All o f these mechanisms working together created a system in
which nuclear opposition, either from the public or from interest groups, found it
difficult, if not impossible, to gain a foothold in stopping the advance o f nuclear power in
Japan leading up to the 2011 disaster at Fukushima.
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In the context of Japan’s current post-Fukushima landscape, it is doubtful that the
same opposition, though now perhaps larger and marginally stronger, will be able to gain
that elusive foothold to stop the comeback of nuclear energy. Japan can do nothing to
change its lack of domestic energy sources, and, as always, will be forced to import
energy from other countries. Even with an abundance o f trading partners and negotiations
to lower energy prices, this reliance on other countries leaves Japan vulnerable to
international price fluctuations, changing security relationships, and infrastructural
demands. This dependence places Japan in the unique position that requires it prioritize
nuclear energy far more heavily than other energy resources. Even with the memory of
Fukushima only 3 years old, the Japanese public has responded to higher electrical bills
and economic depression in ways that seem to convey a tolerance for returning to nuclear
energy. Though opinion polling support for nuclear energy remains relatively low, pronuclear candidates are returning to office and garnering high approval ratings for their
economic recovery plans. One could conclude that people in Japan seem to be more
concerned with economic recovery as it is linked to unemployment, deflation, and
decreasing social benefits, and since the economy has historically been positively linked
with nuclear energy, the logical conclusion is that the public realizes it will have to accept
nuclear energy, even at the price o f the possibility of future disasters. And while trust in
the government has steadily decreased in Japan, perhaps official assurances o f new safety
regulations and structural adjustments will be enough to convince the public that nuclear
energy is safe, even in a country located on massive earthquake fault lines. In the end,
with or without public approval and left with few energy options, it is likely that Japan
will continue their path o f nuclear pursuance into the future.
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CHAPTER 6
CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

Objective
This chapter will integrate the three previous case studies on the United States,
Germany and Japan with comprehensive analysis and then draw conclusions based on the
original hypotheses of this study. Each variable will be discussed, beginning with public
opinion, protest activity, and voting patterns; continuing with responses to the disasters at
Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima; and concluding with a section on access to
other energy resources either through endowments or affordable and reliable trading
options. Findings are divided into primary and secondary categories. Primary findings are
conclusions drawn in direct response to the original hypotheses o f the study for each
variable. Secondary conclusions are findings discovered in the process o f research that do
not directly relate to an original proposed variable or hypothesis but are nonetheless
significant in explaining nuclear energy pursuance.
Public Opinion: Polling
The original hypothesis o f this study was that nuclear energy pursuance would be
higher in countries where public approval for nuclear energy is also higher and that
nuclear energy pursuance would be lower in countries where public approval for nuclear
energy is lower. Current opinion polling in each case study reveals that, in the US,
approval for nuclear energy tends to be higher than approval in Germany or Japan;
according to one Gallup poll, 57 percent of respondents approved o f using nuclear energy
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as one way to generate electricity while 40 percent were opposed.1 These numbers alone
would indicate that most Americans approve o f nuclear energy, a sentiment reflected in
the US’s consistent pursuit of nuclear energy since the first commercial reactor came
online in Illinois in 1960. However, when asked specifically about support for increasing
the number o f nuclear power plants in the US, respondents’ support decreased from 57
percent to 46 percent and opposition increased from 40 percent to 48 percent, resulting in
an almost even split in favor and opposed.2 Even with the decreases in support for new
reactors, American citizens seem to generally approve o f nuclear energy more than
citizens in Germany or Japan.
If the proposed hypothesis were true, one would expect the US to have the highest
percentage o f electrical generation from nuclear power o f the three countries. At the
current rate o f 20 percent o f overall electrical generation, the US does, in fact, rely more
heavily on nuclear energy than Germany (currently at 18 percent, down from 25 in early
2011 and expected to decrease to 0 percent3) and Japan (currently at 0 percent with no
operable reactors, but expected to increase to 15 percent within the next year4), especially
considering the approval o f the first new reactor since 1978 is meant to increase nuclear
energy’s overall share o f electricity generation. In this respect, it does seem that current
nuclear energy pursuance is more or less in line with the prevailing approval o f nuclear

1 “Americans Still Favor Nuclear Power a Year After Fukushima,” Gallup, March 26, 2012, A ccessed July
1, 2012, http://www.eallup.com/polFl 53452/Americans-Favor-Nuclear-Power-Year-Fukushima.aspx.
2 “Americans Still Favor Nuclear Power a Year After Fukushima,” Gallup, March 26, 2012, A ccessed July
1, 2012, http://www.eallup.com/poll/153452/Americans-Favor-Nuclear-Power-Year-Fukushima.aspx.
3 “Nuclear Power in Germany,” World Nuclear Association, Last Updated March 13, 2014, A ccessed
March 29, 2014, http://www.world-nuclear.ore/info/countrv-profiles/countries-e-n/eermanv/.
4 “Nuclear Power in Japan.” World Nuclear Association. Last Updated March 25, 2014. A ccessed
December 5, 2013. http://www.world-nuclear.ore/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Japan/.
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energy, though whether that approval extends to the building of new reactors is difficult
to discern.
Examination of the relationship between approval for nuclear energy and nuclear
pursuance over time, however, suggests a different story. According to polls conducted
by Cambridge National Samples between 1974 and 1990, approval for building new
nuclear power plants has varied considerably over time in the US. This report suggests
that approval for new plants decreased to less than 30 percent of respondents in 1982 and
never recovered. Though the last reactor approved in the US was prior to this public
opinion downturn, reactors approved before 1978 were under continued construction
throughout the 1980s and 1990s until the last reactor came online in Tennessee in 1996.
Consequently, nuclear pursuance (as defined by the percentage o f overall electricity
generation that comes from nuclear energy) steadily increased throughout the 1970s, 80s
and 90s as these new reactors came into operation until reaching the current 20 percent
share.

When viewed across time, the data on nuclear pursuance and public opinion

shows less of a correlation considering the periods of wide variance in public approval
for new power plants and consistently steady increases in nuclear energy production.
With this steady increase in nuclear production, we would expect to see steady approval
for nuclear energy, which is not clear from the polling results; while Gallup does report
high numbers o f approval for nuclear energy since 1994, other studies show less
enthusiasm for building new power plants.
There has been a strong anti-nuclear sentiment in Germany since the 1960s, when
nuclear energy began taking off as an electricity-generating resource. In 2010, even
before Fukushima, 64 percent of Germans surveyed reported being either opposed or
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strongly opposed to building new nuclear power plants.5 After Fukushima, 90 percent of
Germans responding to a Globescan survey reported they strongly opposed building new
reactors and 52 percent surveyed supported the policy o f shutting down all existing
reactors.6 By again looking at this data alone, it seems there is indeed a correlation
between public approval and nuclear energy pursuance. The only country o f the three to
commit to a complete nuclear phase-out, Germany is also the country with the highest
numbers o f citizen opposition to nuclear energy, especially since 2011. As with the US,
however, data gathered over time suggests less o f a clear relationship. Polling data from
the 1970s and 1980s suggests that there was approval for nuclear energy in Germany
until 1986 when the disaster at Chernobyl reversed approval and opposition, with
opposition to nuclear energy peaking at just over 80 percent of respondents in June of
n

1986. Also similarly to the US, nuclear energy’s percentage of the overall energy share
of electricity generation steadily increased during the same time period until a peak in
2000. Though current high opposition to nuclear energy is simultaneous with a vow to
abandon nuclear energy altogether, there are likely intervening variables that explain
Germany’s nuclear energy-180, especially considering high levels o f public opposition to
nuclear energy have not seemed to matter much in the past.
Prior to the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, public opinion on nuclear energy
was a difficult variable to capture. Some reports say that in 2006, 40 percent of
respondents favored nuclear energy, while a 2009 survey conducted by the Prime
Minister’s Office reported 60 percent o f respondents favor nuclear energy (though the
5 “Large Majorities in US and Five Largest European Countries Favor More Wind Farms and Subsidies for
Biofuels, but Opinion is Split on Nuclear Power.” PRNewswire. October 13, 2010.
6 “Poll: Germans Support Abandoning Nuclear Power.” The Journal.IE. Accessed September 11, 2013.
http://www.theioumal.ie/poll-germanv-nuclear-power-644340-Qct2012/.
7 Joppke, M obilizing Against Nuclear Energy, 147.

PM survey may have skewed the results in favor o f nuclear energy for its own purposes).
A survey by the OECD conflictingly reports that approval for nuclear energy has not
been above 45 percent since 1975. The most recent polling data collected from the Asahi
Shimbun reported that opposition to nuclear energy peaked in 2012 at 70 percent, but has
steadily declined since then. A 2014 Fuji TV Network poll found that 53 percent of
respondents were opposed to restarting the country’s reactors.8 Even with conservative
estimates, at least half o f respondents seem to be against nuclear energy, though Japan
has publicly vowed to restart most o f its reactors and pursue safer nuclear technology.
Similarly, despite questionable public approval for nuclear energy in the decades
following World War II (and the atomic devastation of two Japanese cities) nuclear
energy production steadily increased as new reactors were approved throughout the
1980s, 1990s, and even into the 2000s.
Based on data from these three case studies comparing patterns o f public approval
and opposition to nuclear power with nuclear energy pursuance as a percentage o f total
energy generation, the first primary finding of this study is that there seems to be no clear
correlation between the two variables. In each country, regardless o f variances in public
approval, nuclear energy generation increased steadily throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s as more reactors were approved, constructed and then began operation. However,
polling data alone may not capture the full story of citizen participation in the nuclear
energy issue. It seems that results can vary dramatically based on what organization or
institution is conducting the opinion poll and in response to the way specific questions are
phrased. Many o f the institutions conducting polling on nuclear energy opinion prior to

8 Mari Iwata, “Japan Sees Key Role for Nuclear Power.” Wall Street Journal. February 25, 2014.
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Fukushima were contracted to do so on behalf o f a government, utility company or pronuclear organization, each with incentives to produce results in favor o f nuclear energy.
Historically, the pro-nuclear lobby has been generally better funded than the anti-nuclear
lobby, and were thus better capable of creating a layer of insulation comprised o f
scientists, technicians, academics, and other supportive “expert” figures around nuclear
energy. For this reason, studying other variables that portray citizen participation (rather
than just opinion) may be a more fruitful method to capture an accurate picture o f the
relationship between state decisions to pursue nuclear energy and the society on behalf o f
whom those decisions are being made. Therefore, this project proceeded to include a
qualitative analysis of protest activity and voting patterns in each country, two actions
that are representative of public approval or opposition, with the idea that because these
two methods o f participation are direct and confrontational, they may have a greater
impact on state decisions to pursue nuclear energy.
Public Opinion: Nuclear Protest
Similar to the national/local split in public opinion on nuclear energy and building
more reactors, protest activity in the US has also seemed to have separate focuses at the
national and local levels. Large-scale demonstrations in New York City and Washington
D.C. in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which ranged from 200,000 people to 1 million
people, were organized around the theme o f nuclear disarmament rather than solely
nuclear energy. Twenty-plus years later, in May o f 2005, 40,000 demonstrators marched
past the United Nations building in New York City. Though this demonstration took
place in the year o f the 60th anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings,
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the content o f the demonstration was decidedly anti-war rather than anti-nuclear, a direct
response to the 2003 American invasion and subsequent presence in Iraq.
Rather than look for effective anti-nuclear citizen demonstrations at the national
level in the US, this study focuses on protests at the local level in communities where
reactors have been proposed for construction. The body tasked with regulating the
nuclear industry and approving new reactors, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
includes a formal mechanism for public input during the reactor application review
process. Though concerned citizens consistently attend these input meetings to share their
concerns and often contradictory scientific research9, the NRC has consistently approved
each reactor application. In fact, the NRC has never not approved a reactor application
that successfully completed the application procedure; that is, reactors are always
approved by the NRC given the utility company does not cancel the application during
the approval process. Therefore, in the US, lobbying the nuclear industry’s regulatory
body through the formal process of citizen input during the reactor approval process has
been an ineffectual way to for citizens to exert influence over nuclear energy pursuance.
Rather than work from within the formal system, the anti-nuclear movement in
the US has been more successful at stopping nuclear plant construction when it can create
costly barriers for utility companies to finish construction and begin operation. These
barriers include traditional acts of citizen dissent (protests, sit-ins, even more radical
actions like destroying property at proposed nuclear sites),

legal

contestation,

involvement in civil society organizations, and referendum voting. For example, the first
nuclear plant was originally proposed at Bodega Bay in California, but through the

9 To be fair, pro-nuclear citizens and civil society organizations also consistently attend these public input
meetings.
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organized involvement o f the Sierra Club and the Northern Californian Association to
Preserve Bodega Bay, both o f which submitted approval appeals to federal and state
bodies, the Bodega plant plans were cancelled before substantial money could be spent
on construction. The proposed Black Fox Plant in Oklahoma was cancelled after
extended protests and the utility company was overwhelmed by legal action, the cost of
which to fight in lengthy court battles would have increased the cost o f construction. The
anti-nuclear group Clamshell Alliance occupied the construction site at the approved
Montague plant; after $29 million was spent on construction, the Montague plant was
cancelled 7 years after approval without operation. The Rancho Seco plant in California
was closed as a result of negative community referendum voting.
In a few instances, citizens have also been successful at closing nuclear plants
even after they have been built or started operation. The Trojan Plan in Oregon was in
operation for 16 years before it was closed for good in 1993. Local referendums to close
the facility had been voted on in 1986, 1990, and 1992, but were defeated each time. This
defeat came at a cost to Portland General Electric (PGE), which spent $4.5 million on
positive public relations for the plant during this period.10 In 1992, the plant closed
because o f safety concerns. PGE inspections later revealed that the utility company
would have to replace the steam generators in the reactors, a costly and lengthy
replacement process. The plant never reopened and, in this instance, it remains unclear
whether it was citizen action that closed the plant or basic economic infeasibility that
motivated PGE to decommission the plant. In more recent similar instances, Yankee
Rowe closed early in 1992; the San Onofre reactors 2 and 3 in 2013; Crystal River 3 in

10 “Anti-Nuclear Movement,” The Oregon Encyclopedia o f Portland State University, A ccessed March 30,
2014, http://www.oregonencyclopedia.org/entrv/view/anti nuclear movement/.
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2013; and Kewaunee in 2013 all closed early because the combined pressure o f decreases
in electrical demand and falling energy prices made continued operation too expensive
and unprofitable.
Though citizens have had some luck with protests, civil society organizations and
legal action, they have been most effective when states intervene in the approval process.
For example, the Shoreham plant in Long Island was completely built by 1984, but never
came into operation. After Three Mile Island in 1979, the NRC began enforcing stricter
guidelines for evacuation plans on utility companies which required the utility company
to work together with local and state officials to create sound evacuation measures in case
of an emergency. In the case o f the Shoreham plant, local officials concluded that there
was no sound way to evacuate citizens from the area surrounding the nuclear plant, and
then New York governor Mario Cuomo ordered state officials not to approve any
evacuation plan proposed by the operating utility company. In 1989, the utility company
agreed to sign over the plant to the state for decommissioning, which would be paid off
through resident rate hikes in the amount of $6 billion. The more current example o f the
Indian Point facility, which is facing an NRC relicensing intervention by both the states
o f New York and Connecticut, demonstrates that citizen action is more effective when
coupled with the involvement o f states exerting pressure on the NRC.
In addition to these instances o f successful nuclear pursuance reversal, there are
equal numbers o f unsuccessful citizen lobbying efforts. The same sorts of lobbying,
demonstrating, and organizational involvement took place at the Seabrook plant and
Diablo Canyon plant in the 1980s and 1990s, and both o f those plants are currently in
operation. Ultimately, between 1953 and 2008, o f the 253 nuclear reactors ordered, 48
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percent were cancelled and 11 percent have shut down prematurely.11 However, it is
difficult to say how many o f these blocked plants or early shut-downs are the direct result
of citizen dissent and how many are the result of economic factors that made nuclear
investment unattractive to utility companies, though, at times, it was the citizen groups
who created these economic obstacles themselves. Decreased electrical demand and low
natural gas prices, however, have also likely been strong deterrents to nuclear investment.
Because the structure o f the Japanese federal regulatory and licensing system is
similar to that o f the US (a structure that reflects the U S’s early input into the Japanese
nuclear industry and the US-led governmental restructuring after WWII), the story o f
Japanese citizen involvement will sound familiar. Anti-nuclear protests in Japan have
been somewhat limited compared to the US and Germany, though Fukushima in 2011
galvanized many citizens in previously unseen numbers. Though the regulatory system in
Japan is similar to that o f the US, there are additional forces operating in Japan that
further limit citizen input into the nuclear debate. The combination o f the nuclear village
and the Iron Triangle o f the LDP (back in Parliamentarian majority power), Bureaucracy
and Industry have created an almost iron-clad system in which nuclear energy has been
able to grow. Local communities where nuclear plants are proposed, chosen by utility
companies specifically for their weak civil society organizations and relative poverty, are
incentivized by subsidies provided by the government, which are really just funds
channeled through utility companies made from the profit of electricity rates, to buy
consent. Local protests, when they occurred prior to 2011, were often led by left-wing
trade associations and, while they may have gained temporary attention, rarely had any
impact on policy decisions about nuclear energy in Japan. Exceptions to this general rule
11 A1 Gore, Our Choice, (NY: Bloomsbury, 2009).
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include the abandoned Ashihama site in 2000, the cancelled Miyama plant in 2001 and
the Suzu and Maki plants in 2003. Anti-nuclear civil society organizations have
historically been under-funded and under-staffed. Legal action has also been ultimately
unsuccessful. Since the late 1970s, small groups of local residents with support from
lawyers and scientists filed 14 major lawsuits against the state or power companies. Many
o f these lawsuits sought to shut down operating nuclear power plants by demonstrating
new research on fault lines, earthquakes, or safety inadequacies. The plaintiffs have not
won in any o f these 14 cases, and even when 2 lower courts ruled in favor o f the
plaintiffs, a higher court overturned those rulings.12
Over the post-war period, the nuclear industry in Japan had a 57 percent success
rate with siting approval, though, again, it remains unclear how many o f those cancelled
plants were the result o f citizen intervention or other economic factors.13 In a centralized
system of regulation and approval where collaboration between the nuclear industry,
bureaucracy and government is solidly entrenched, there exist few opportunity points
through which citizens can hope to influence energy policy.
This point about regulating structure leads to two important secondary findings of
this research, the first o f which is that the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear movement may
prove to be more successful than previous groups at reversing Shinzo Abe and the LD P’s
plan to restart existing reactors and continue constructing new plants, perhaps by utilizing
the techniques that have proven successful to the American anti-nuclear movement. The
approval period for new reactors in Japan tripled from 1970 to 1990, a phenomenon

12 Yuko, et al, “’’Civil Society and the Triple Disasters,” 82.
13 Daniel Aldrich. “Post-Fukushima Nuclear Politics in Japan, Part 3: Empowering Anti-Nuclear
Sentiment.” Accessed January 31, 2013, The Monkey Cage, http://themonkeycage.org/2013/04/03/postfiikushima-nuclear-politics-in-japan-part-3-empowered-anti-nucIear-sentiment/.
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which indicates increasing difficulties for utilities to gain site approval. This approval
period before official licensing and construction takes place is the ideal time for citizens
to reverse the nuclear course, that is, before the utility company has invested so much
capital that their economic incentive to operate the plant is too high. Though legal
roadblocks have proven ineffective and anti-nuclear civil society organizations have been
weak (but are strengthening in membership and funding since 2011) Japanese citizens
could focus on imposing costly barriers to plant construction. Opposition groups could
also attempt to solicit local governmental or prefectural intervention on their behalf,
though this option may be limited if these offices are staffed with LDP politicians and
bureaucrats who are hesitant to go against pro-nuclear party goals.
The second finding is that centralized nuclear regulation and approval systems
such as those found in the US and in Japan are more susceptible to the problem of
regulatory capture while a de-centralized approval and regulation system such as that of
Germany seems to offer more opportunities for citizen influence. The resemblances
between the US and Japanese systems should come as no surprise, considering Yasuhiro
Nakasone’s early visit to the US created the framework for nuclear energy in Japan.
Initially, both the Atomic Energy Commission in the US and the Nuclear and Industrial
Safety Agency (NISA) under the Ministry o f Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in
Japan were dually tasked with regulating and promoting nuclear energy. This dual
function created conditions where the line between creating an environment where
nuclear energy would be safe and where nuclear energy would be attractive to investors
often became blurry.
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The 1974 US Energy Reorganization separated these two functions between the
NRC and the Department o f Energy, but by that time, a system and network had already
formed between regulators and the nuclear industry that reinforced regulatory capture. By
the time o f the development o f the NRC in the mid-1970s, however, most of the reactors
in operation in the US had already been approved. Though the NRC is independent from
the responsibility o f nuclear energy promotion, it still receives 90 percent o f its funding
from industry fees, which compromises its independence.14 This confirms earlier findings
o f James M. Jasper in his work Nuclear Politics: Energy and the State in the United
States, France and Sweden when he claims that the pro-nuclear movement had far more
access to resources and political structures such as government agencies and politicians
than did the anti-nuclear movement and, as a result, anti-nuclear movements had little
effect o f nuclear energy policies in any country.
Furthermore, nearly half of all NRC employees surveyed in 2002 said they feared
raising safety concerns might undermine their career.15 There have also been isolated
cases o f NRC regulators accepting gifts from or making decisions in favor o f future
employers prior to leaving the NRC for the private sector.16 Beyond the NRC, the nuclear
sector is also connected to the legislative process through lobbying efforts and campaign
contributions. In 2010, the nuclear sector spent $54 million to lobby Congress and
employed 12 former members of Congress as lobbyists. Some o f the top legislative
supporters of nuclear energy, such as the Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman

14 Daniel Kaufmann and Veronica Penciakova, “Preventing Nuclear Meltdown: A ssessing Regulatory
Failure in Japan and the United States,” Brookings Institute Brief, April 1, 2014.
15 K aufm ann and Panciakova, “Preventing N uclear M eltdow n.”
16 Ibid.
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and the House Minority Whip, were the largest recipients o f campaign contributions from
Exelon, one o f the U S’s largest nuclear operating companies.
In Japan, NISA was not an independent regulator and was thus even more
susceptible to outside influence than the NRC. This has, to some extent, been
acknowledged and an attempt made at correcting this conflict of interest with the creation
of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority in 2012 under the Ministry o f the Environment.
Prior to 2012, however, M ETI’s close connections to the nuclear industry were well
known, and they have been charged with allegations o f distorting information to public
officials on nuclear energy and orchestrating the defeat o f alternative energy legislation.17
Regulatory capture is further perpetuated in Japan by the revolving-door cultural practice
of amakudari. It is not uncommon for the same individuals to participate in the licensing,
rulemaking and inspections process at different times. In 2010, for example, Torn Ishida
left his post as the former Director General of METI to be hired by the Tokyo Electric
Power Company (TEPCO) just 4 months later. 18 The problem o f regulatory capture is
compounded in Japan with lax regulatory standards based on outdated risk-assessment
methodologies as well as a reluctance to punish private sector deception.
In Germany, however, the processes of approval and regulation are divided at
three levels: the state (Lander) level, the national level, and through the independent
regulatory process of the European Nuclear Safety Regulation Group established in 2007.
The licensing authorities are the Lander (usually competent State ministries) where the
plant is planned to be installed. There are therefore different geographical regulators

17 Kaufmann and Panciakova, “Preventing Nuclear M eltdown.”
18 Kevin Krolicki and Ross Kerber. “Special Report: Fuel Storage, Safety Issues Vexed Japan Plant,”
Reuters, March 22, 2011, Accessed March 20, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/22/us-japannuclear-idUSTRE72L2E820110322.
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which are integrated into various federal states. Safety regulations were issued by the
federal government until 1986 when the Ministry for the Environment, Nature
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (MENCSF) was established to take over this purpose.
In the most recent system, both the Lander and the MENCSF had equal veto power in
any siting decision. At all times, safety regulations have been executed by the individual
Lander, and reactor approvals were decided on a case-by-case basis according to the
specifics of each location. The Lander had full control over water use and the German
system was notorious for conducting extensive consultations with environmental experts,
technical engineers, and labor authorities before approving a site for a nuclear plant.19
These differing systems o f approval and regulation were institutionalized early on
in the development o f nuclear energy in both the US and Japan. When then LDP Diet
member Nakasone visited the US and was advised to liberally fund nuclear research and
development, enshrine the nuclear initiative in law and encourage top scientists and
engineers to promote nuclear energy, he returned to Japan and set out to do just that. The
veil o f national security allowed nuclear energy to develop in relative secrecy in the US
for decades following WWII, and by the time of the 1974 Reorganization Act, the
reinforcing system o f regulation, legislation and industry was already in place and most
o f the reactors that would come into operation in the coming decades were already
approved. This centralized approval and regulation structure allows few opportunities for
citizens to challenge the approval or extension o f nuclear plants through most forms of
citizen participation, whether anti-nuclear protests, organizational opposition or legal
challenges.
19 Alexandre Bredimas and William J. Nuttall, “A Comparison o f International Regulatory Organizations
and Licensing Procedures for N ew Nuclear Power Plants,” Judge Business School, University o f
Cambridge, EPRG Working Paper.
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The German system, in contrast, has been more open to local societal input and
generally offers more opportunity points of access for citizen participation in the
licensing process. One may expect just the opposite to be true, that an independent
regulatory body would be more open, fair and responsive to citizen action and less
corruptible by power politics. However, it seems that a govemment-led, de-centralized
system of approval and regulating is generally more sensitive to outside influences on
initial plant approval decisions. For instance, the plant proposed at Wyhl was protested
and occupied so intensively by individuals and organizations that the state government
did agree to negotiations with local opposition groups, though it was ultimately the
intervention o f the Frieburg Administrative Court that shelved the plans for good.
Similarly, the administrative court o f the state o f North Rhine-Westphalia halted
construction o f the plant at Kalkar in 1986 in response to the state’s anti-nuclear protests.
While an independent approval and regulating body sounds good in theory, in practice, a
system where approval rests in the hands of local governments seems to inspire more o f a
response to citizen opposition, given the government officials could theoretically be
voted out of their jobs come the next election cycle for approving an unpopular nuclear
plant.
This difference in reactor approval systems explains why German citizens have
historically been more successful at stopping new reactors or plants at the approval stage.
While there have been some successes in the US and Japan in terms o f stopping new
reactors from construction or halting existing reactors, citizen groups alone have been
largely unsuccessful at stopping the NRC or NISA from approving new reactors and
plants. The sooner these plants can be halted or delayed, before utility companies invest
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critical sums of money, the better chance citizens have in stopping the plant from
construction altogether. Without a significant restructuring of this approval process,
citizens in the US and in Japan will continue to be less likely to halt new nuclear
construction at the early, critical stages o f the process.
Public Opinion: Voting
This open system of site approval and safety regulation in Germany is further
enforced by a democratic system of parliamentarian proportional representation and a
variety o f viable political parties, particularly, a strong anti-nuclear Green Party. The first
nuclear phase-out was legislated in the 1990s when, following Chernobyl in 1986, the
German Green Party gained popularity. The Greens were then able to translate that
growing support into electoral votes and ultimately form a majority coalition with the
Social Democrats in the German Parliament in 1998, a coalition majority that would
create the first nuclear phase-out policy. This Red/Green coalition lasted until 2005 when
the Christian Democrats retuned to majority and reversed the nuclear phase-out policy. In
2011, during the months immediately following Fukushima, the German CDU/Angela
Merkel-led government made no mention o f a nuclear phase-out in response to
Fukushima, only placing a moratorium on nuclear energy until further investigations
could be made. In fact, it was just a year earlier in 2010 that Parliament had voted to
actually extend the lives of existing reactors. In March o f 2011, however, the CDU
suffered a historic loss at the hands o f the Green Party in their historic stronghold of
Badem-Wurtttemberg, giving the Greens their first state premiership. In other state and
local elections in Germany, the Greens made similar (though not as symbolic)
representational gains as nuclear energy became an important electoral issue and post-
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Fukushima anti-nuclear sentiment continued to grow. In May, Merkel announced the
nuclear phase-out policy which garnered high numbers o f public support.
There are a few key characteristics o f the democratic Germany system of
representation that distinguish it from both the US and Japan. First, it is a Parliamentarian
style o f government with proportional representation rather than a Presidential one,
distinguishing it from the U S’s winner-take-all system. This difference is significant for
Green Parties, which may be unable to best a dominant party with a majority o f votes but
may be able to at least reach the threshold for representation in Parliament where it could
possibly form a coalition, such as the Red/Green coalition formed in the 1990s. The
American Green Party has not yet achieved even 1 percent o f overall votes in a national
election, which means it is highly unlikely the party will be able to achieve the majority
numbers required for a Congressional seat or Presidential Office in the near (or even
perhaps distant) future. Since the US system is not based on proportional representation,
electoral majorities are the only chance the Greens have o f national representation.
Second, the German system offers a number of viable parties running for any
given office, at least one o f which is anti-nuclear. This means the Green Party has options
for forming coalitions with even relatively like-minded parties reasonably close to them
in the political spectrum. Perhaps more importantly, it means that anti-nuclear voters
have an incentive to cast their vote for an anti-nuclear “third” party like the Greens
because there is the legitimate possibility the Green Party could receive enough votes to
gamer parliamentary representation and subsequently influence nuclear policy. In the
US’s two-party system, voting for a third party anti-nuclear candidate is not incentivized
because there is little chance that candidate will achieve the required electoral majority.
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Third-party voters are told they are “throwing away their votes.” Furthermore, within this
American two-party system, there is no viable anti-nuclear party. In the 2012 presidential
election, both the Republican and Democratic candidates were pro-nuclear as a part of
their “all o f the above” strategy to energy. In the end, American voters are left without
options for using the democratic process o f voting to influence nuclear energy policy.
The Japanese system does resemble the German parliamentarian system in most
key respects as a hybrid style of proportional and direct representation in the Diet;
however, Japan’s democratic process has long been hampered by a pattern o f one-party
dominance since the pro-nuclear LDP’s founding after WWII. In fact, the conservative
LDP has consistently been in power in Japan since 1955, except for a brief 11-month stint
in between 1993 and 1994 and for three years before 2009 and 2012, when it was
returned to power in the most recent general election. There is no lack o f opposition
parties, such as the Democratic Party o f Japan (DPJ), which gave the LDP its longest run
as Diet opposition party between 2009-2012; the Social Democratic Party (SDP); the
neoliberal Your Party (YP); the Japan Communist Party (JCP), the oldest functioning
party in Japan; or the New Komeito Party, with which the LDP is currently in a coalition.
Even given the presence o f these multiple parties on ballots, the political machinery of
the LDP ensures it is a consistent winner. Japanese voters did not even have an antinuclear Green Party voting option until the Green Wind Party was formed in 2012 in a
direct response to Fukushima. That is not to say that other parties have not taken an antnuclear stance since Fukushima, even though opposition to nuclear energy is not a
consistent part o f their party’s doctrine. The recent 2014 Tokyo gubernatorial election
saw two candidates run on anti-nuclear platforms, one from the DPJ (interestingly
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enough, backed by a former LDP Prime Minster) and one backed by a JCP/SDP
cooperation.20 The media slated the election as a referendum on nuclear energy. In the
end, the pro-nuclear LDP candidate won in a land-slide victory that the LDP hoped
would signal to opposition parties that a Japanese nuclear phase-out is just not going to
happen.
So, while Japan has a parliamentarian, proportionally representative style of
government (like Germany) it has historically been dominated by one pro-nuclear party,
the LDP, which has a strong connection to and interests in the nuclear industry. W ithout
viable anti-nuclear voting options, citizen participation in nuclear policy through the
direct election o f legislators continues to be limited in Japan. Similarly, the U S’s winnertake-all presidential system of two-party pro-nuclear dominance also leaves voters with
few options for electing anti-nuclear representation and subsequently influencing nuclear
energy policy. Based on this analysis, the third secondary finding o f this research is that
citizens are more capable of influencing nuclear energy policy in a parliamentarian
system of proportional representation where there are a variety of parties and at least one
viable anti-nuclear candidate. This type of system is found in Germany, where a Green
Party parliamentarian coalition in the 1990s legislated the first nuclear phase-out and
Green Party gains in 2011 state and local elections likely created concern among the
ruling CDU and precipitated a post-Fukushima nuclear phase-out.
Based on the previous discussion, an additional secondary finding can be
presented in this section. This research on the relationship between public approval or
opposition to nuclear energy seems to indicate a generally weak relationship between

20 Strategically speaking, having 2 anti-nuclear candidates in the election was a flawed plan since it split the
anti-nuclear vote.
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society and state decisions to pursue or not pursue nuclear energy, especially in the US
and Japan where citizen opportunity structures are limited. Even in Germany, where the
relationship is strongest and citizens have the best opportunities for input, nuclear policy
has not always been aligned with public opinion. This observation may initially lead one
to the realist, state-centric conclusion that states tend to do what they want to preserve
their own power and pursue their national goals despite domestic constraints. Even the
CDU’s post-Fukushima nuclear phase-out could just as legitimately be viewed as a move
to preserve its own power as to respond to its public. However, this research also seems
to point to a constructivist argument that would explain why the American, German and
Japanese publics feel differently toward nuclear energy and are therefore either more or
less accepting o f state initiatives to pursue it. The way in which the issue o f nuclear
energy is constructed within a state matters, at least to the extent that states find it easier
to gain public acceptance o f nuclear energy and then actively pursue that energy when it
is constructed as an imperative or, at the very least, not constructed negatively.
In the US, this “nuclear narrative” is largely absent, though nuclear energy has
been historically insulated from negative construction, at least at the state level.
Beginning with President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech in 1953, nuclear energy
has been largely (though not completely) decoupled from the separate issue o f nuclear
weapons. 10 years later, in 1963, President John F. Kennedy would also speak out in
favor of nuclear energy in what became known as his “Best of the Above” speech. A
string o f subsequent pro-nuclear presidents further contributed to the positive image of
nuclear energy. The lone anti-nuclear exception, President Jimmy Carter, had the bad
luck to be in office during the 1970s energy crises and following the Three Mile Island
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incident in 1979. President Ronald Reagan, in office for Chernobyl in 1986, used the
nuclear incident as an opportunity to generate Cold War rhetoric aimed at the Soviet
Union’s poor handling o f the disaster and what he perceived to be its unwillingness to be
forthright about the extent o f the damage. No public statement was ever issued that linked
what happened at Chernobyl with American nuclear energy safety. Though some polling
reports indicate that public approval for nuclear energy declined precipitously in 1982 in
response to the Cold War arms build-up, Americans may have been more risk-tolerant of
nuclear safety issues (weapons or energy) perhaps because o f the Cold W ar and the U S ’s
perceived role as the “leader o f the free world” and counterbalance to what lay behind the
Iron Curtain.
The following Bush, Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations have likewise all
been pro-nuclear. The official narrative coming from Washington has largely been about
the employment and economic benefits associated with nuclear energy, while the official
line coming from the Department o f Energy has played to nuclear energy’s clean,
environmentally friendly electricity production. I would ultimately argue, however, that
the nuclear narrative is absent in the US because there have never been any serious
nuclear accidents comparable to Chernobyl or Fukushima that directly impacted US
citizens; because most Americans who would be actively anti-nuclear are currently more
concerned with the environmental impacts o f hydraulic fracturing technology and the
controversial Keystone Pipeline; because the prevailing narrative in the US right now is
about the economic recovery; because nuclear energy seems like a topic one has to be
“qualified” to talk about; and, finally, because o f comparative demographic constraints.
The US covers almost 4 million square miles with 314 million people. The vast majority
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o f reactors in operation are concentrated in the electricity demand-heavy Eastern coast
and in some southern and mid-western states. People in Montana, Idaho, or Colorado,
however, may not live within hundreds o f miles of a nuclear reactor and are therefore
likely to be ambivalent about nuclear energy. When compared with a German population
o f 82 million people within 138,000 square miles and a Japanese population o f 127
million people within 146,000 square miles, the location o f nuclear reactors is important
to everyone because, effectively, they are in everyone’s back yards. Nuclear energy is
just not an issue that has been commonly discussed in the US, for whatever reason. To
offer a personal anecdote, I recently asked my 400-level political science class at Old
Dominion University if they knew how many nuclear reactors were in operation in the
US. Guesses ranged from 2 reactors to 300 reactors, indicating to me that they had no
idea that the number is closer to 100 or that there is a nuclear reactor in the neighboring
community o f Chesapeake. This prevailing national apathy toward nuclear energy is the
reason a countervailing “nuclear narrative” has never really had to emerge. As far as the
US as a state that wants to pursue nuclear energy has been concerned, maintaining this
status quo by marginalizing references to nuclear energy has been effective enough. In
other words, if ain’t broke, don’t fix it.
In contrast, nuclear weapons and nuclear energy have always been closely linked
in Germany, a country that found itself negotiating and adapting to a new self-identity
after WWII. Following the Second World War, W estern Germany was forbidden by the
Treaty o f Brussels from developing nuclear weapons, yet it was allowed to develop
nuclear technology for civilian purposes. Even though Western Germany was a non
nuclear power, as the Cold War progressed, nuclear weapons were deployed in Western
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Germany by the United States and other NATO powers under NATO’s “nuclear sharing
policy” and in Eastern Germany by the Soviet Union. When NATO powers began honing
their short-range missile systems, Western Germany came to the realization that it would
serve as a likely battlefield where East meets West should the Cold W ar reach a point of
criticality. After the establishment o f the 1957 European Atomic Energy Community,
Western Germany expressed a desire to develop a weapons program in tandem with
France and Italy. In 1958, however, Charles de Gaulle became president o f France and
both Italy and Western Germany were quickly excluded from the nuclear weapons
project. Therefore, throughout the years o f the Cold W ar and the nuclear arms race,
Western Germany found itself in the uncomfortable position of being denied access to
“self-defense weapons,” and instead relying on NATO forces for protection from its
USSR neighbor, all with the knowledge that if the nuclear detente between West and East
deteriorated, its geographic location would on the border between the two powers would
be a likely spot for militarized action. Essentially, Western Germany was rearmed during
the Cold War, but not with weapons over which it had much decisive control.
Beyond the national security goals of the state, domestically speaking, there was a
strong citizen anti-proliferation sentiment developing from the demilitarization campaign.
As German citizens dealt with the lasting psychological impact o f WWII and the
Holocaust, this sentiment grew and civil society groups consistently campaigned for a
nuclear-free Germany. The two opposing forces o f demilitarization/anti proliferation and
Cold War weapons concerns created an environment where an effective anti-nuclear
Green party could grow and further shaped the negative narrative about nuclear weapons
and nuclear energy that had begun with the peace movement. W hen the Chernobyl
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nuclear disaster transpired in 1986 just 800 miles from Berlin, many o f the worst aspects
o f nuclear technology were confirmed. When the Red/Green coalition in the 1990s
moved to legislate a nuclear phase-out, it seemed the state now agreed that nuclear
technology was unsafe. All of these factors— geopolitical location, Cold W ar tensions,
the

psychological

legacy

o f WWII,

demilitarization,

NATO

nuclear

sharing,

nonproliferation goals, and Chernobyl— contributed to the creation o f the prevailing
“negative nuclear narrative” in Germany.
The example o f Germany shows that while states may not necessarily participate
in the creation o f the nuclear narrative (it may be caused by historical, geopolitical or
international forces) they do have to operate within and are constrained by them. In the
US, the absence o f a strong nuclear narrative works in the favor o f the state, while in
Germany, the negative nuclear narrative made the post-Fukushima nuclear phase-out
more feasible, especially given the cost sharing that would fall to rate payers.
In Japan, however, the state actively worked to create a positive nuclear narrative
among citizens toward nuclear energy separate from that of nuclear weapons. Japan is the
only country in the world to directly experience the devastation wrought by atomic
weapons. In this context, it is not difficult to understand citizens’ initial reluctance toward
accepting nuclear technology o f any kind, even if it was for peaceful purposes. Part o f
nuclear power’s success in Japan is owed to Yasuhiro Nakasone, who was as a sailor in
the Imperial Japanese Navy during WWII and later began his political career as the Diet
member who visited the US in 1953 and learned about the potential o f peaceful nuclear
technology. In 1954, at Nakasone’s urging, the government granted the equivalent o f $14
million dollars to the Agency for Industrial Science and Technology for early-stage
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nuclear research. Nakasone would later rise in the ranks through different positions, most
notably the Minister o f Science in 1959, Minister o f International Trade and Industry in
1972, and finally, Prime Minister from November 1982 to November 1987. Throughout
his rise, Nakasone was continually promoting nuclear energy at every legislative level,
citing a lack o f natural resources as the most critical issue Japan faced after W W II.21 He
was a member o f the first budget committees to specifically allocate money to nuclear
energy, had a large hand in writing the first Atomic Energy Laws in Japan, and he created
supra-partisinal nuclear committee dedicated to nuclear energy promotion. Even in late
March o f 2011, after Fukushima, he said in an interview that he still believes nuclear
energy is the future o f power generation.22 Without the early willingness o f Nakasone to
visit and leam from the U S’s peaceful nuclear program and then work within the
Japanese legislative and financial process to institutionalize energy pursuance, nuclear
energy may not have been as successful in Japan’s post-war nuclear reluctant society.
Nakasone’s enthusiasm also spurred government initiatives to actively work to
create a positive nuclear narrative. As mentioned earlier in the case study on Japan,
nuclear energy was promoted through community festivals, propaganda literature,
popular culture such as the widely read manga series Astro Boy23, an annual celebration
o f Nuclear Power Day, and even pro-nuclear science curricula built into the primary and
secondary educational system. Most importantly, the government effectively linked
nuclear power with economic recovery after WWII and portrayed nuclear energy as
imperative for Japan’s energy security and independence. This official message was
2iTakafumi Yoshida, “Interview with Yasuhiro Nakasone: Leam Lessons From Fukushima and Continue to
Promote Nuclear Energy,” Asahi Shimbun, May 23, 2011, A ccessed March 30, 2014,
http://aiw.asahi.com/article/0311 disaster/opinion/AJ201105232599.
22 Takafumi, “Interview with Yasuhiro Nakasone.”
23 Astro Boy is about a young protagonist named Atom who lives in a nuclear powered “wonder world”.
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promoted relentlessly by the government and the utility companies, and throughout the
1970s and 1980s, they had the country’s exponential (and, according to some accounts,
“miraculous”) economic growth to reinforce their message. W ithout this economic
growth (and the reactor community subsidies that came with, perhaps) it is unlikely their
positive portrayal of nuclear energy would have been as accepted as it was, considering it
was only marginally accepted in the first place and created generally ambiguous feelings
about nuclear energy among a citizenry that tolerated nuclear technology because it felt it
was left with little choice.24
Despite early lingering reluctance from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings
and recent reluctance and public opposition to nuclear energy as a result o f the
Fukushima disaster, the government has again been able to revive this pro-nuclear
rhetoric to begin recreating the positive image o f nuclear energy in Japan. Following the
DPJ majority’s post-Fukushima decision to close the country’s reactors and phase out
nuclear energy, voters returned the pro-nuclear LDP party to a majority in the 2012
general election. Similarly, in the recent Tokyo gubernatorial elections (which were
slated by close followers as a referendum on nuclear energy since it would essentially
decide control o f one of the largest utility companies in Japan, TEPCO, the utility
company also responsible for operating the Fukushima Daiichi reactor) voters chose the
LDP candidate in a land-slide victory.
Can these electoral victories be accepted as general approval for nuclear energy?
The answer is not so simple. Throughout the tenuous DPJ Diet majority period from
2009-2012, most people assumed that it would only be a matter o f time before the LDP

24 The French government was successful at a similar campaign, promoting the slogan, “no coal, no oil, no
gas, no choice.”
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flexed its political-machine muscle and regained control o f the Upper and Lower Houses
of the Diet, which they did in December of 2012. This was no small-scale victory, either.
The LDP took 114 o f the 242 House o f Councillors seats and 294 o f the 480 House of
Representatives seats, sealing a solid majority win. After the bungled DPJ response to
Fukushima and 3 new DPJ Prime Ministers in as many years, the LD P’s victory was
almost expected; however, this victory cannot be linked solely to the issue o f nuclear
energy. The LDP has always been a party known for strong economic performance. It
was the LDP, after all, that led Japan through two decades of unprecedented growth in
the 1960s and 70s. When LDP party leader Shinzo Abe used his economic plan that came
to known as “Abenomics” as a general platform for the 2012 election, the likely scenario
is that the hope o f an economic upswing trumped voter concerns over nuclear energy,
which Abe again promoted as part of a solid economic recovery and energy
independence plan. Abe furthermore linked nuclear energy to energy independence from
imports, a theme which resonated with voters who were paying triple the regular utility
rates since 2011. As luck would have it for Abe and the LDP, and in a situation eerily
similar to the one in which the same party found itself promoting nuclear energy after
WWII, Abenomics seemed to initially work when, in February o f 2013, deflation
reversed and the Nikkei stock exchange grew for the first time in decades. If economic
improvement trends continue, it is likely that the LDP will also continue to enjoy
unchallenged majorities and will proceed with its nuclear restart plan.
By again returning to the positive narrative o f nuclear energy’s pivotal role in
economic growth and energy independence, the LDP has again been able to persuade a
society that is reluctant (at best) about nuclear energy to return them to majority power
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with full cognizance o f the return to nuclear that electoral decision would bring. Rather
than assume that the Japanese society is openly accepting o f nuclear energy, it is more
likely the LDP was able to rely on and re-galvanize a well-established “positive nuclear
narrative” that positively linked the economy (an issue most voters care deeply about)
with nuclear energy (an issue most voters are skeptical, ambivalent or increasingly
negative about). In this case, the state actively participated in the formation o f a nuclear
narrative that ran directly counter to the one that would have likely developed naturally
after the atomic bombings in WWII. The state also used Japan’s unfortunate geopolitical
lack o f resources to further establish nuclear energy as an imperative part o f security.
Lastly, by successfully linking nuclear energy with economic growth and then delivering
on promised growth, the state established and then used this positive nuclear narrative to
pursue the nuclear policy initiatives it wanted to pursue all along.
To summarize, the primary finding o f this section in relation to the study’s
original hypothesis is that the relationship between public opinion and nuclear pursuance
seems to be weak. However, solely comparing opinion polling information and nuclear
pursuance does not tell the entire story o f citizen participation in nuclear energy
pursuance. Further analysis of protest activity and voting patterns is a better way to leam
to what extent citizens are willing to act on anti- or pro nuclear sentiments and to what
extent those actions are effective. This analysis revealed four secondary findings, the first
o f which is that anti-nuclear citizen involvement is most successful when it can pose
costly or legal barriers to early nuclear constmction or it can involve the intervention of
states on its behalf. Second, citizens are best able to pose these barriers in de-centralized,
govemment-led reactor approval and safety regulation systems, like in Germany.
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Conversely, citizens are least likely to be able to pose costly barriers to construction in a
centralized system where the reactor approval and safety regulation body is independent
(like in the US and Japan) and where the problem of regulatory capture developed early
within regulating bodies that were dually tasked with regulation and promotion. Third,
citizens are most likely to be able to influence nuclear pursuance through voting in a
system o f proportional representation where there are numerous viable parties, at least
one o f which is anti-nuclear. Lastly, while the realist argument seems to explain state
pursuance o f nuclear energy even when confronted with citizen opposition to nuclear
energy, a constructivist analysis reveals that states do have to work within prevailing
“nuclear narratives.” These narratives are created through a variety o f state and non-state
influences, but are most successful at gaining citizen acceptance (or tolerance) o f nuclear
energy if they effectively link nuclear energy with economic success and energy
independence.
The simple fact that states employ agencies that actively promote nuclear energy
seems to point to the importance o f public acceptance when crafting policies to pursue
nuclear energy. While one would expect this in a strong democracy, the degree to which
citizens have influence over the state varies widely among democratic nations. Even
within these 3 case studies, all o f which are classified as strong democracies, there is a
variance in citizen influence over nuclear energy pursuance. Some o f these factors are
difficult, if not impossible to change, such as the structure of approval and regulating
systems or the representative style of governments.

However, post-Fukushima

antinuclear movements will be most effective if they can create barriers to increase the
cost o f pursuing nuclear energy, especially compared to other available forms o f energy.
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Nuclear Disasters: Three Mile Island, 1979
By solely comparing nuclear output as a percentage o f electrical energy generated
before and after 1979, the clearest conclusion is that Three Mile Island had little effect on
nuclear pursuance in the US, Germany or Japan. All three countries increased nuclear
output throughout the 1980s as reactors approved in the 1960s and 1970s came online
and began generating energy. If nuclear pursuance is measured by new reactors approved,
then Three Mile Island had a negative effect only in the US, which approved no new
reactors after 1978 until 2012. Germany continued approving new reactors until 1982,
and actually revamped nuclear approval process in the late 1970s to limit opportunity for
public approval. It is difficult to draw a clear relationship between reactor approvals in
Germany after Three Mile Island, however, because the last group o f reactors were
approved in 1982 (after Three Mile Island) but before Chernobyl in 1986. Japan, a
relative latecomer to nuclear development compared to the US or Germany, approved
new reactors every decade into the 1990s. This reactionary decline in new reactors in the
US, however, is not likely explainable by safety concerns or by negative shifts in public
approval. Rather, utility companies were not applying for new reactor licenses due to the
increased costs o f operating a nuclear facility under tighter safety regulations.
The Three Mile Island incident did spur citizen action in the US and Germany.
The anti-nuclear American Green Party was founded in 1984, though this party has
ultimately had

little

influence

on

national

nuclear

energy policy

considering

representatives hold no national or state-level offices. In Germany, the incident at Three
Mile Island further galvanized an already significant anti-nuclear movement. The Green
Party o f Western Germany was founded in 1980 (and would later merge with the same
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party in Eastern Germany after reunification) and would grow throughout the 1980s and
1990s, eventually forming a majority coalition in Parliament and instituting anti-nuclear
policy. Similarly, the last group of reactors was approved in Germany in 1982. However,
it is difficult to say what direct influence Three Mile Island had on these party formations
or whether they would have formed anyway without the Three Mile Island incident.
Ultimately, the most significant impact of Three Mile Island was an increase the
operating cost o f nuclear plants resulting from tighter safety regulations, an increase
which few utility companies were motivated to pay in the US.
Chernobyl, 1986
O f the three case studies, the Chernobyl disaster appears to have had the greatest
impact on German nuclear energy pursuance, though the effects would not be
immediately noticeable by looking at nuclear output numbers of reactor approvals alone.
The number o f reactors in operation peaked in the 1980s and 1990s as new reactors came
online and older reactors approved in the 1960s were still in operation. Accordingly,
nuclear pursuance defined by nuclear energy output as a percentage o f electrical energy
total was also high in the 80s and 90s, though it would not peak until 2000. By 1990,
every reactor that would generate nuclear energy had already begun doing so with the last
reactor approval happening in 1982.
However, Chernobyl added weight to an increasingly significant anti-nuclear
movement in Germany in the late 1980s. The membership and support o f the anti-nuclear
Green Party increased, and the number o f seats won in local elections increased from 0 in
1980 to 42 in 1987 and propelled the party to its first year o f parliamentarian
representation in 1998. Chernobyl also unified a national movement against nuclear
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energy and, within the context o f the Cold War, further shaped the negative nuclear
narrative that was pervasive in Germany at the time. O f course, it is difficult to say
whether the nuclear phase-out of the 1990s would have occurred without Chernobyl,
though it may be accurate to say the Green Party would have been unlikely to reach the
electoral threshold and have the opportunity to form a coalition without the anti-nuclear
inspiration o f Chernobyl. In the long-term, however, the fervor of Chernobyl would seem
to be forgotten as the CDU reversed the nuclear phase-out policy in 2005.
In the US, the Chernobyl disaster was linked with the Cold W ar more than it was
with concerns over nuclear energy generation, which increased throughout the 1980s and,
even though no new reactors were approved and built, older reactors were relicensed for
continued operation. According to one set o f polling data, public opinion for nuclear
energy shifted in the US in 1982 rather than in 1986 as a result of the arms buildup rather
than Chernobyl. Japan continued approving new reactors throughout the 1980s and
1990s, thus steadily increasing its nuclear generation. It would not be until 25 years later
that the course of Japanese nuclear pursuance would see any interruption.
Fukushima, 2011
The 2011 Fukushima disaster had significant impacts in both Germany and Japan,
though these effects may only prove to be for the short-term in Japan. In 2012, the US
approved the first new reactor since 1978 and President Obama publicly stated that,
though the US sympathizes with the people of Japan, nuclear energy would remain a part
of the US electrical energy mix. In Germany, after a brief moratorium on nuclear energy,
Chancellor Angel Merkel announced Germany would again institute a nuclear phase-out
that would be completed by 2022 and begin a transition to renewable energy. It is unclear
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whether this policy was related to concerns about nuclear safety or to electoral worries
after significant Green Party wins in the immediate month following Fukushima. The
nuclear phase-out may most accurately be explained by Germany’s access to other
resources and its already well-established renewable energy sector. In fact, one may be
able to assume that a nuclear phase-out was likely inevitable in Germany, and the 2010
policy o f extending the lives o f existing reactors for an additional 10 years was merely a
stop-gap measure before allowing renewable sources to compensate for the electricity
from future decommissioned, aging reactors. Regardless of the motivation, the
Fukushima disaster provided the impetus for Germany to institute a long-term policy that
is unlikely to be reversed even if the CDU loses majority in future elections considering
the CDU is the least likely possible party to institute a nuclear phase-out in the first
place.25
In Japan, it is yet unclear if the effects o f Fukushima will only prove to be short
term in regard to nuclear energy pursuance. Though Japan would eventually shut down
all of its nuclear plants by 2012 for safety inspections, reactors under construction
continued after 2011 and the goal of the LDP-led Japanese government is to restart all
reactors that adhere to new safety guidelines. Given Japan’s lack o f natural resource
endowments and expensive trading options, it finds itself in a situation unlike that o f the
US or Germany. Even with increased operating costs related to required safety design
improvements, it may still prove to be less expensive for Japan to pursue nuclear energy.
Also, given the history of lax regulating standards and outdated risk-assessment
methodologies, it may be that safety-related costs do not significantly increase, though it

25 Consequently, Angela Merkel and the CDU had their best election results in the 2013 German Federal
Election since 1990.
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is unclear to what extent the newly formed Nuclear Regulation Authority will break from
the negligent patterns of its predecessor, NISA.
This study’s original hypothesis was that nuclear accidents would have a negative
impact on state decision to pursue nuclear energy. It appears the relationship between
disasters and state decisions to pursue nuclear energy is weak. Post-Fukushima nuclear
energy policy remained positive in the US. Immediate nuclear energy policy in Japan did
become negative as the country slowly shut down all o f its reactors, but that may only
prove to be a short-term response as there is a current campaign that shows all signs o f
success to restart those reactors and to build new ones. Germany presented the only
instance o f a negative post-Fukushima nuclear energy policy response, though it is
unclear to what extent Fukushima created that policy or if a nuclear phase-out was
inevitable and Fukushima only hastened its implementation.
The secondary findings of this section are that, first, domestic nuclear disasters
may only have short-term impacts on decisions to pursue nuclear energy. In the US, no
new reactors were approved after 1978, but increasing oil prices in the 2000s brought
rumors o f a “nuclear renaissance” in the US that may have begun with the first new
reactor approval and construction in 2012. Though the Chernobyl disaster did not occur
within Germany, Chernobyl was only 800 miles from Berlin, roughly the same distance
from Middletown, PA, to Atlanta, GA. Considering the close geographic proximity,
Western Germany would share in the consequences o f the Chernobyl disaster. Even
though Chernobyl mobilized voters to bring the Green Party to parliament and institute a
nuclear phase-out policy, that policy would later be reversed in 2005. Similarly, though
Japan immediately closed its existing reactors, the plan is for an eventual restart.
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Germany’s anti-nuclear response to Fukushima seems to be the outlying case in this
study, and may be explainable with the idea that an anti-nuclear policy was already
inevitable by 2011.
Secondly, nuclear disasters stimulate anti-nuclear movements by giving citizens
evidence that nuclear technology may be unsafe, though increased opposition may not
necessarily translate into policy change. The early development o f the Green Parties in
the US and Germany occurred after Three Mile Island, and the most recent Green Party
in Japan similarly developed after Fukushima. This party development is a natural,
democratic outgrowth o f anti-nuclear sentiments. To what extent those movements are
able to ultimately influence nuclear energy policy, however, is then either limited or
enabled by the systemic structures in which they are operating, as discussed in the
previous section. Even if nuclear disasters increase public opposition to nuclear energy,
there is no guarantee that opposition will result in policy change.
Access to Other Resources
O f all variables tested, consideration of a state’s access to other resources seems
to offer the clearest explanatory power for nuclear pursuance. Fully capturing this aspect
o f state decisions to pursue or not pursue nuclear energy requires analyzing both current
endowments o f natural resources and the potential for future access to those resources as
well as a country’s current trading relationships and projected trading relationships with
respect to energy resource price. The original hypothesis is that countries that possess
endowments o f natural resources will be less likely to pursue nuclear energy and
countries that lack natural resource endowments will be less likely to pursue nuclear
energy. Additionally, countries that are capable o f obtaining electrical energy generating
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resources from reliable trading partners at competitively affordable prices will be less
likely to pursue nuclear energy. This variable attempts to capture current decisions about
nuclear energy given other possible energy options as well as the projected future for
nuclear energy in each case given these options.
The first primary conclusion of this section is that if countries possess natural
endowments o f energy generating natural resources, they will be less likely to pursue
nuclear energy. O f the three cases, the US has the greatest endowment of natural
resources. The US has always possessed vast coal reserves, upon which it has historically
relied most heavily for electricity generation. It has only been in the past two years that
coal consumption for electricity has decreased to proportions almost equal to natural gas
used for electricity. New hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling technologies have
granted access to reserves o f oil and natural gas which were previously unreachable with
existing extraction methods. By utilizing these new technologies, the US is predicted to
be a natural gas net exporter by 2018. Already, natural gas imports from Canada have
decreased and exports to Mexico have increased. Oil production has also increased, but
the US uses relatively small amounts of oil to produce electricity. Such a large amount of
available natural gas has reduced the price o f natural gas in the US to the cheapest in the
21st century.
Previous analysis reveals that when natural gas prices decrease, so do applications
for new nuclear reactors. Even though this study has characterized the US as a nuclearpursuing country based on its first approved application for a new reactor in 2012 and
consistent nuclear energy generation, future projections reveal that, without significantly
more new reactors, nuclear energy generation will steadily decrease as aging reactors
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from the 1960s and 1970s reach their decommissioning point. Already, 70 plants have
applied for and been granted reactor life extensions, but those extensions will not
continue indefinitely. It is currently impossible to know for sure how long reactors can
operate safely since this generation constitutes the first wave o f reactor extensions.
Without new reactors to replace decommissioned ones, nuclear energy pursuance will
inevitable decrease. However, if historical trends are any indication, continued low
natural gas prices will discourage investment in nuclear energy since both the natural gas
will be inexpensive and natural gas electricity generation plants are cheaper to build than
nuclear or coal plants. The Energy Information Administration predicts that both nuclear
and coal reliance will decrease in the future as natural gas use increases 16 percent by
2017.26
The increased construction and operating costs o f nuclear plants and a natural
endowment o f inexpensive coal that can be used for electricity largely explains the lack
o f reactor applications in the US since 1978. Even without new reactors, the US has still
consistently relied on nuclear energy for 20 percent of its overall electricity generation, a
percentage share that places it among the biggest consumers of nuclear energy in the
world. These deterrent operating costs have not decreased, and when coupled with natural
gas abundance and historically low natural gas prices, nuclear reliance will continue to
decrease. This phenomenon is already observable in the early closures o f 4 fully
functional and legally approved nuclear plants in 2013. In the US, it seems the market has
largely made the decision about the future o f nuclear for the state. With access to an
abundance o f other, cheaper options, it will be difficult to attract investment in nuclear

26 “AEO 2014 Early Release O verview,” Energy Information Administration, Last Updated December 16,
2013, Accessed April 1, 2014. http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/early_elecgen.cfm.
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energy from utility companies, even if the state wanted to. Given these domestic options,
the state also has little incentive to subsidize nuclear energy when it could instead invest
in the country’s potentially profitable future as a natural gas exporter.
The US is also the most geographically fortunate o f these three cases. Both o f its
neighbors, Canada and Mexico, possess natural resources of their own and are both
engaged with the US in the North American Free Trade Agreement. Additionally, the
currently pending Keystone Pipeline would create further interdependence between the
US and Canada and increase the two’s energy cooperation.
Germany is not as fortunate, as natural gas prices are consistently higher in
European and Asian markets than the Henry Hub North American spot price. Given
Russia is the world’s largest natural gas exporter, it would seem that Germany would
have energy options; however, reliance on Russia, a country increasingly becoming a
political pariah, is problematic at best. Luckily, Norway is the fourth largest exporter of
natural gas in the world and German agreements with Canada (and talks underway with
the US) also seem to indicate that it will continue to have access to natural gas without
the politically problematic reliance on Russia, even if it is at higher prices. In a stroke of
foresight, Germany has long been working to counter this problem by developing the
world’s leading renewable energy resource sector.

The 2000 Renewable Energy Act

incentivized corporate and individual investment in renewable energy technology and
grid support. Now, Germany is among the leading countries in the world for solar, wind
and biomass resources. The rolling electrical blackouts that many predicted would come
after Germany began turning off their nuclear plants never materialized as the country
increased its reliance on these renewable resources. The likely scenario is that German
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leaders knew the infrastructure capability already existed to compensate for nuclear when
it announced the nuclear phase-out in 2011. Even with renewed citizen opposition to
nuclear energy, people would have likely been more upset about regular electrical
outages that could have come from closing nuclear plants. For this reason, the nuclear
phase-out is largely explainable by looking to German’s long-term plans to only use
nuclear as a bridging resource until renewable infrastructure was robust. Even though
Fukushima accelerated this plan, leaders had to know that phasing out nuclear energy
would have resulted in electrical shortages given the backlash widespread outages would
have caused. Ultimately, though Germany has few natural resources o f its own compared
to the US, it does have abundant current and future trading options, even if resources are
priced marginally higher than in the US. Additionally, Germany has created its own
abundance o f resources by developing the technology to harness renewable sources such
as sun and wind power. Given these options, continuing to rely on increasingly unpopular
nuclear energy would have been illogical for Merkel and the CDU, especially two years
out from a national election.
With no natural resource endowments to speak of, Japan imports roughly 85
percent o f its overall energy resources. Japan has many regional trading partners, but
most are located far from the Northeast Asian island nation and transportation increases
already elevated Asian market prices. Even though it is one of the most energy efficient
countries in the world, it is also the most energy reliant, and with a national debt that
currently tops 230 percent o f GDP, importing expensive energy resources is not an ideal
component o f Abe’s plan for economic growth. This explains Japan’s continued
pursuance o f nuclear energy since WWII as well as the country’s incentive to again
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return to nuclear energy, even after Fukushima. Even though the Fukushima disaster will
likely increase the operating cost of nuclear plants in Japan, nuclear energy is still a more
affordable option than continuing to import 85 percent of energy resources. A second
motivating factor for Japan is the desire to continue exporting nuclear reactor technology,
an industry in which it has long excelled but has seen decreased profits since Fukushima.
Their campaign to create “the world’s safest nuclear energy technology” is no doubt to
convince Japanese citizens as well as future buyers. Though this may only be a marginal
concern, increasing security tensions in the region between China and Japan may also be
a motivating factor for Japan to increase its energy independence.
To summarize the findings o f this study, it seems that few factors influence
decisions to pursue nuclear energy as directly as to what extent countries have other
energy options. Closed opportunity structures in the US and Japan have and will likely
continue to limit citizen participation in the process o f nuclear policy decision making.
Similarly, nuclear disasters have been shown to have little lasting, long-term impact on
state decisions about nuclear energy unless they result in added costs that make nuclear
investment more expensive than other energy options. The US will begin to very
gradually phase out nuclear energy, a move partly due to the increased availability of
natural gas and partly because of market considerations, though not necessarily as a
response to Fukushima. Germany will also continue their nuclear phase-out, though at a
much faster pace as it moves increasingly toward renewable energy sources. For the
Germans, Fukushima did not necessarily force a reversal of nuclear energy policy; rather,
it simply hastened a move away from nuclear that had already become inevitable. Lastly,
the future o f Japanese energy is as o f yet unclear, though a complete restart o f their
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nuclear sector would not surprise many. Given its limited resources, limited options, and
closed system o f citizen influence, a return to nuclear is even quite likely.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

This concluding chapter will first examine the energy outlooks for the United
States, Germany and Japan based on future projections o f electricity demand, available
supply and other geopolitical and economic factors. Second, this project will conclude by
widening the scope to other countries that are currently pursuing nuclear energy,
specifically, Russia, China and Ukraine. These three countries offer an opportunity to test
the conclusions o f this study in countries that do not possess all o f the control variables
found in the US, Germany and Japan; that is, they are not all democratic, Western,
economically developed countries, but they are actively pursuing nuclear energy agendas.
Lastly, this concluding chapter will end with final comments on what I consider this
project’s most significant findings and their broader applicability to the world o f energy
geopolitics.
Energy Outlooks: The United States, Germany and Japan
One o f the longest established trends in energy is the increasing role o f the power
sector.1 The most recent BP Energy Outlook predicts that, in 2012, 42 percent o f primary
energy was converted into electricity, up from 30 percent in 1965. In addition, by 2035,
that share will increase to 46 percent2. The power sector is the one place in the global
energy market that all resources compete. Therefore, as electrical energy demand
increases globally, the interplay o f availability and price o f a variety o f resources will

1 “BP Energy Outlook: 2035,” British Petroleum, Released January 2014.
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf7Energv-economies/EnergyOutlook/Energy Outlook 2035 booklet.pdf.
2 Ibid.
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dominate the energy conversation. Coal is projected to remain the primary energygenerating resource through 2035 when it is overtaken by natural gas. Projections also
anticipate that renewable sources outpace nuclear as a source of power generation by
2028 and show no sign o f approaching a limit to their market share.3
Overall electricity demand has decreased in the US since 2008, but is projected to
rise as the American economy recovers. By 2040, projections place natural gas at 35
percent o f total electrical generation in the US and coal at 32 percent.4 Legislation passed
at the beginning of 2013 to incentivize renewable energy investment is also expected to
increase the market share o f renewable resources such as solar and wind. Nuclear
generation is projected to decrease in the short term as many plants continue early
closures due to unprofitable economic conditions for nuclear energy when confronted
with low market prices o f natural gas. However, after 2025, natural gas prices will likely
increase as production stabilizes; as a result, nuclear generation is expected to again
increase through increased capacity generation at existing plants. By 2040, that output is
again anticipated to decrease with scheduled nuclear plant closures. As the US moves to
become a net energy exporter, the private sector will likely emphasize investment in
natural gas extraction and exporting capacity and the public sector will likely further
incentivize investment in natural gas rather than nuclear energy.
These projections supplied by British Petroleum and the US Energy Information
Administration are really just guesses, even though they are educated guesses.

3 Ibid.
4 “AEO2014 Early Release Overview.” Energy Information Administration. Last Updated December 16,
2013. Accessed March 23, 2014. http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/earlv production.cftn?src^Analvsisb3.
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Sometimes, if not most o f the time, however, energy forecasting goes wildly wrong.5
Even so, based on this research, it is plausible to assume that coal will continue to
provide a significant amount o f baseload electricity in the US considering the abundant
supply o f the resource and established infrastructure to generate coal into electrical
power. Furthermore, it is also likely that natural gas prices will remain low until demand
begins to approach supply, at which time natural gas prices will increase. This research
has also shown that applications for nuclear reactors and nuclear output are correlated
with the price of natural gas; that is, when prices are low, nuclear pursuance is also low,
but when prices are high, there is renewed interest in nuclear energy. If and when this
point is reached, the current existing reactors in the US may or may not still be operable
(not shut down due to previously unfavorable economic conditions) to make up the
difference in a market where the price o f natural gas is higher. Beyond this gas/nuclear
equilibrium point, which the US will likely reach in the next 10 years, it is difficult to say
whether nuclear pursuance will continue or will reverse course as other forms o f energy
become too inexpensive for nuclear to compete.
The energy outlook for the US appears secure, but one o f its biggest challenge
will be gaining acceptance of the controversial hydraulic fracturing process from citizen
populations where drilling is taking place. In a story very similar to that o f nuclear
construction plants, energy drilling companies stress the incentives o f employment
opportunities and general increases in local wealth that such industry brings, but many
citizens and environmental groups remain opposed. This opposition is evidenced, for
example, with the problematic constmction o f the Keystone Pipeline from Canada to the

5 Steve Yetiv and Lowell Field, “Why Energy Forecasting G oes W ildly Wrong,” Journal o f Energy
Security, October 2013.
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Gulf Coast, the current phase of which is still bound in legal wrangling and faces
opposition from multiple local governments, citizens and some US Congress members.
Germany is scheduled to have completed its nuclear phase-out that began in 2011
with the closure o f its 8 oldest plants and increased with legislation that incentivized
investment in renewable technology. A thriving German economy indicates that demand
for electrical power is unlikely to decrease in the future and may even increase with
renewed industrial production. New coal-fired power plants in Germany are predicted to
continue placing coal as a cornerstone of the German electrical power supply in the
medium-term while renewable infrastructure develops. New legislation has moved to
phase out subsidies for coal production but the recent wave of new coal plants represent
the biggest investment in coal energy sine the post-war reconstruction. These plants will
have an operating lifetime until 20506. The Nord Stream Pipeline has diversified
Germany’s already robust supply and storage infrastructure for natural gas. The current
system can support a certain amount o f future loss in nuclear-generated capacity, but the
energy transition has come at increasing costs to consumers. The cost o f transmission and
redistribution infrastructure as well as research and development in new renewable
technology has thus far been largely assumed by rate payers (though the industrial sector
is largely exempt from these costs) and has increased significantly in the past 3 years.
Increasing electrical bills and burdens on individual households have sparked a debate in
Germany about the overall cost of the energy transformation. While the short and

6 “Energy Policies o f IEA Countries, Germany: 2013,” International Energy A gency, Released January
2013.
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medium-term projection for increasing renewable energy reliance in Germany is positive,
the long-term outlook is still uncertain.7
Japan has been feeling the effects o f Fukushima since 2011 and will continue to
find dealing with its energy resources problematic. Electrical demand has been low in
Japan since the economic downturn in the 1990s, and even further decreased after
Fukushima in 2011. However, the promising economic recovery plan o f Shinzo Abe may
indicate an uptick in industrial electricity demand. Coal imports to the general Asian
market have doubled since 2000, mainly from Australia, China and India. The Asian
market for coal has generally expanded rapidly in the past decade and is now roughly 4
times the size o f the European market.8 Supply o f coal is still greater than demand, which
has maintained a stable price, but increasing coal usage will not further Japan’s clean
energy goals set forth in the Kyoto Protocol. Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) imports also
increased significantly into Japan after 2011, but with a stable variety o f regional supply
options, increasing reliance on LNG should not pose a problem. The plan to restart the
nuclear reactors in Japan gives all indications o f progression, but that restart is still only a
future possibility, not an inevitability. While importing almost all o f their energy
resources has been expensive in the short-term, Japan’s primary long-term challenge will
be balancing their need for resources with the needs o f a growing Asian market in
general. To deal with their domestic lack o f energy resources, countermeasures have been
taken which include developing a greater domestic supply o f renewable energy,
diversifying supply sources, independently conducting overseas development, and

7 Ibid.
8 Atsuo Sagawa, “Outlook for International Coal Market, 2014,” 4 1 4 th Regular Report Presentation to the
Fossil Fuels and Electric Power Industry Institute, December 20, 2013.
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strengthening companies as players.9 South Korea has also initiated similar measures to
increase their energy supply security and China has long been investing in African
natural resources. These combined actions may increase the competition and hoarding of
resources, destabilizing the regional and international energy markets.
Widening the Scope
General demand for electrical power is expected to increase in the coming
decades, though much o f that demand will move from OECD countries to developing,
non-OECD countries. Accordingly, nuclear power capacity is steadily increasing
worldwide with over 60 new reactors scheduled for construction in 13 countries, 120 new
reactors are planned, and, by some estimates, 320 are proposed.10 Most of the new
reactors will be in the Asian region in countries with rapidly growing economies and
increased energy demand. After Fukushima, the OECD’s International Energy Agency
projected a 60 percent increase in nuclear capacity in the world, a decrease from the
previous year’s 90 percent projection but a sizable increase nonetheless. In addition to
new reactors, there has also been a general move to increase the operating capacity and to
extend the operating lives of existing reactors in countries with established nuclear
programs such as Finland. In the following section, I will briefly examine 3 cases where
nuclear energy is expected to grow: Russia, China and Ukraine. These 3 cases offer an
opportunity to test the various conclusions o f this study in non-OECD countries that do
not necessarily possess all the characteristics (democracy, economic development) that
determined this project’s initial case studies.
9 Masakuza Toyoda, “Energy Security in North Asia,” Report from The Institute o f Energy Economics,
Japan, March 2014.
10 “Plans for N ew Reactors Worldwide,” World Nuclear Association, Last Updated March 2013, A ccessed
April 3, 2014, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/current-and-future-generation/plans-for-new-reactorsworldwide/.
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Russia
Russia is the world’s largest supplier o f natural gas, providing the European
Union alone with 27 percent o f its total natural gas im ports11. In addition to the world’s
largest natural gas reserves, Russia is also the largest oil supplier outside o f OPEC.
Despite these abundant endowments of natural resources, Russia is actively pursuing
increased nuclear energy capacity with new reactors and expansion o f existing plants. In
2010, the Russian government approved a program to create a new reactor technology
program to the nuclear industry based on fast reactors. This program envisions nuclear
energy providing up to 50 percent o f Russian energy by 2050.12 Based on this
information, Russia provides an ideal case in which to test the theory that countries with
greater endowments o f natural resources will be less likely to pursue nuclear energy.
Though one may assume that Russia offers a case in which this conclusion about nuclear
energy and other resources is proven wrong, a closer examination reveals that this theory
may need more refinement to incorporate considerations o f natural gas prices and export
capability.
Russia is currently faced with rapidly rising electricity demand after decades of
economic stagnation. Resource supply to meet this increasing demand, however, is
surprisingly constrained, especially considering Russia’s vast supply o f natural gas. The
explanation lies in the Russian national gas company Gazprom’s economic incentive to
export Russian gas to its Western European neighbors at much higher prices and make
five times the profits than by utilizing the same gas domestically for electricity. Russia
currently delivers natural gas to Europe through 12 pipelines, one o f which goes directly
11 “Nuclear Power in Russia,” World Nuclear Association, Last Updated March 2014, A ccessed April 3,
2014, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Countrv-Profiles/Countries-Q-S/Russia--Nuclear-Power/.
12 Ibid.
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through the Baltic Sea to Germany. As demand for natural gas has increased in Western
Europe, so has the motivation to sell it at the resulting higher prices. Because there is an
already established transportation infrastructure in place and an established market to
which to sell, Gazprom plans to half its supply o f natural gas to Russian electrical energy
utilities by 2020.13 Russia also has been known to use its exports o f natural gas to Europe
as an energy weapon for political control, most recently increasing the price o f natural
gas to Ukraine by 40 percent as a response to mounting strains between the two countries
of Russia’s March 2014 takeover of Crimea.14 This increase is a direct reversal o f the
natural gas discount policy the two countries had agreed on just months earlier when
relations between Ukraine and Russia were friendlier. This prospective economic payoff
and tenuous political control from selling natural gas to Europe rather than consume it
explains the Russian motivation to increase domestic nuclear energy.

However, this

Russian plan may backfire if Europe is able to find other supplies of natural gas that
would give it independence from Russia, a supply that may just come from the US
natural gas boom. Though Russia is the world’s largest natural gas exporter, the US has
risen to become the world’s largest producer o f natural gas, though it does not currently
have the infrastructure for mass exports that Russia has in its pipeline system. This lack
o f export infrastructure explains the uniquely low gas prices in the US market compared
to the Asian or European market—without many regional options to sell the glut of
natural gas (Canada has its own) US companies have been selling within a supply-heavy
domestic market. As this infrastructure continues to develop, however, the US State
13 “Nuclear Power in Russia,” World Nuclear Association, Last Updated March 2014, A ccessed April 3,
2014, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Countrv-Profiles/Countries-Q-S/Russia—Nuclear-Power/.
14 “Gazprom Raises Gas Prices for Ukraine,” A1 Jazeera, April 1, 2014, Accessed April 4, 2014,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/04/gazprom-raises-gas-price-ukraine2014417162367581.htm l.
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Department has already incorporated American supplies o f natural gas into its diplomacy
policy to give Europe options for natural gas besides Russia. This may have two future
consequences for nuclear energy is the US and Russia. First, as US natural gas becomes
more competitive in a demand-heavy international market, prices will increase and, as
this study has shown, nuclear energy pursuance also increases with natural gas prices.
This will account for a medium-term increased reliance on nuclear energy within the next
decade, though the long-term consequences are difficult to discern. Even if Europe turns
to the US for natural gas to such an extent that it significantly damages Russian exports,
there will likely always be other countries that will be willing to import natural gas from
Russia, especially at special trade agreement prices. Russia is likely unworried about
damage to its natural gas sector, and increasing nuclear energy to satisfy domestic
demand will remain part o f their energy strategy, regardless o f what happens in the
coming months with Ukraine and the rest o f Europe. Consequently, Russia is also a
leading exporter o f nuclear technology, an industry from which it sees great profits and
devotes much research and development monies.
To return to the original theory this brief discussion of Russia was supposed to
test, does a greater endowment of other natural resources necessarily equal a decreased
pursuance o f nuclear energy? This analysis seems to suggest that may only be true when
the prices o f those other natural resources are relatively low. The incentive will be for
nationalized or privatized energy companies to sell resources at prices that are higher in
international markets than in the domestic market. If that results in subsequent increases
in the price o f that resource in the domestic market, then nuclear energy will again
become competitive. This condition explains the future forecast for nuclear energy in the
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US: as export infrastructure grows and demand for US natural gas increases, so will the
domestic price o f natural gas. Given this increased natural gas price, utility companies
may find that investment in nuclear energy either by building new reactors or restarting
old ones may again be comparatively profitable. The greatest explanatory factor, then,
may not lie with access to other resources in countries where resources are abundant but
in the relative price of those resources compared to nuclear energy on the global market.
As renewable technology, investment and generated energy increase in the coming
decades, domestic supplies o f solar or wind energy may further alter this relationship that
pits the power of resource abundance against the dependence of resource scarcity.
China
Public opinion and citizen dissent may not seem like a fitting variable to examine
in China, considering its status as an authoritative regime that naturally limits public
input into state decisions. Recent citizen dissent activities in China, however, and a
generally increasing pattern of social mobilization through social networking sites may
suggest that citizen opposition to nuclear energy could gain a foothold in this one-party
regime. The world’s second largest economy and one o f the fastest growing economies,
Chinese electrical energy demand has increased exponentially in the past two decades. In
addition to massive investment in Africa and other parts o f Asia, China also plans to
increase its nuclear capacity four-fold by 2020 to counter a serious problem with
pollution from coal-fired plants, which generate 80 percent o f its electrical energy.15
In 2013, approximately 2000 residents o f Jiangmen protested the building o f a
uranium processing plant that would have provided China with half of its nuclear fuel
15 Charlie Zhu, “Public Trust Crisis Threatens China’s Nuclear Power Ambitions,” Reuters, July 18, 2013,
Accessed April 4, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/Q7/18/us-china-nuclear-protestsidUSBRE96H 1B T 20130718.
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needs. Concerned with issues such as pollution and food safety, many local organizations
also became involved. It was the official concern expressed by neighboring cities of
Hong Kong and Macau, however, which finally inspired Jiangmen authorities to shelve
plans for the uranium plant, though many local citizens report skepticism that the facility
will not eventually be built, anyway, citing a lack o f governmental credibility and
responsibility to the people.16 These protests come at a time when civil society is
becoming increasingly organized in China, a fact that President Xi Jingping has
acknowledge by saying the future survival o f the Communist Party o f China rests on
attaining public approval.
The conclusions o f this study in relation to public opinion and nuclear energy
were that citizens are more successful at stopping nuclear pursuance when they had
access to a variety of democratic opportunity structures, such as proportionally
representative government and multiple viable-party voting options that include an antinuclear party. These options do not exist for Chinese citizens, who are left with only
organization into protest movements and involvement o f civil society organizations as
tools to create costly roadblocks to facility construction. In this case, however, the theory
that citizens are most successful at stopping nuclear pursuance when they can involve
other governmental bodies (in this case, other cities) on their behalf holds true.
The integration o f bureaucracy and industry in China, which is characteristic of a
one-party regime, is not dissimilar to the close ties between industry and the LDP in
Japan. This study has shown that Japanese citizens have been largely unsuccessful at
slowing the government’s pursuit of nuclear energy, and if public dissent has little effect
16 Minnie Chan, “Jiangmen Uranium Plant Scrapped After Thousands Take Part in Protests,” South China
M orning Post, July 14, 2013, Accessed April 4 , 2014.
http://w w w .scm p.com /new s/china/article/1281748/iiangm en-uranium -plant-scraD Ped-after-protest.
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in Japan, a country the world considers a democratic nation, then it is unlikely citizens
will have much o f an effect on Chinese nuclear pursuance, either, though to what extent
the Chinese Communist Party will have to satisfy increasing citizen demands to hold on
to power is a developing issue. Examining other pro-nuclear energy, nondemocratic
countries would offer some insight into this decision-making process in the context of
nondemocratic governmental systems. Iran, for example, certainly has political and
national interests vested in pursuing a “peaceful” nuclear energy program, even at great
personal cost. Future studies could expand the findings o f this study, especially those
related to citizen participation, to countries without democratic government that are still
marginally accountable to its citizens.
Ukraine
This study began with the hypothesis that nuclear disasters anywhere impact state
decisions to pursue nuclear energy. The course o f research revealed this relationship
between disasters and anti-nuclear policies to be weak , though it does seem that there is
an anti-nuclear reactionary phase in countries where nuclear disasters occur, even if the
there is a subsequent, eventual return to nuclear pursuance. This theory is supported by
the scholarly literature which was discussing this “rebound hypothesis,” at least in terms
of public opinion trends, in 1994.17 Since the Chernobyl incident took place in current
day Ukraine, it poses an interesting case to briefly examine in the context o f this
hypothesis.
Original Ukrainian nuclear energy was obviously tied to Russian technology.
Even after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, however, Ukraine/USSR continued operation

17 See: Eugene A. Rosa and Riley Dunlap, “Nuclear Power: Three Decades of Public Opinion,” Public
Opinion Q uarterly, 58:2 (1994), 295-324.
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of nuclear reactors, operation which remained relatively stable even after independence
from the collapsing Soviet Union. 2011 energy forecasts included an increased demand in
electricity, and the Ukrainian government created policies to emphasize the role nuclear
energy would play creating this electrical energy supply. By 2030, the hope is that half of
the electricity supply in Ukraine will come from nuclear generation.18
This example o f Ukraine seems to suggest that, in the long-run nuclear disasters
have little impact on state decision to pursue nuclear energy, in the long or short term.
The worst nuclear disaster in history happened within the borders o f present day Ukraine,
and it is still actively pursuing a nuclear energy program. The United States, Germany
and Japan would suggest similar support for the same argument. The lone outlier to this
conclusion is Germany’s decision to move away from nuclear energy after Fukushima,
but that nuclear phase-out policy is a decision that was merely hastened rather than
created by the Fukushima disaster. There are, however, a handful o f cases countries that
have banned nuclear energy, some since Fukushima. Italy, for example, has never had
nuclear energy capacity and both Spain and Switzerland voted to phase out nuclear
energy following Fukushima. Though an examination of these cases is beyond the scope
o f this study, future projects could offer analysis that would reveal the motivation behind
these decisions to moves away from nuclear energy, perhaps in comparison with the
German decision to do the same.
Final Comments
The intent o f this research project was to create an educated guess as to the future
viability o f nuclear energy as a resource o f the future. That future seems to vary by

18 “Nuclear Power in Ukraine,” World Nuclear Association, Last Updated March 2014, A ccessed April 3,
2014, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Countrv-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/Ukraine/.
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country, and upon a host of other factors: availability o f other resources, price of
competing resources, an accepting civil society, and even, in some cases, clean energy
goals. The gamut o f current levels o f nuclear energy pursuance ranges from a complete
phase-out, to reductions in nuclear reliance, to the construction o f many new future
reactors. As electricity demand becomes relatively stable in developed countries, the need
for initially expensive nuclear energy will decrease, especially as other energy options,
such as renewable sources, become more viable and states become more committed to
future clean energy goals. Among developing countries, however, the race to diversify
energy supply is on as electricity demand will only increase. For countries without
reliable and affordable access to resources, nuclear energy still represents one path to a
degree of energy independence, especially as competition for resources becomes
increasingly heated.
This project ultimately concludes, first, that the future o f nuclear energy is
uncertain in the short-term and somewhat dismal in the long-term. The preceding
chapters illustrate that when faced with other, equally affordable energy options, states
can rarely be expected to invest in initially expensive nuclear energy. A future expansion
of this project may choose to comparatively engage states’ various market structures with
the hypothesis that the stronger the free market, the less likely a state will be to pursue
nuclear, while a stronger state presence in the market may provide a more hospitable
environment for nuclear investment. This may at least partly explain the expansion of
nuclear power in places like China or the United Arab Emirates, in addition to limited
citizen-input structures. Expected future electrical demand also seems to be a consistently
important factor, evidenced by the growth o f nuclear energy in primarily developing
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countries that are expecting future growth and the waning of nuclear energy in some
developed countries where electrical demand has stabilized or even begun to decrease.
The course o f reaching this conclusion about nuclear energy’s future also
generated knowledge that I did not initially seek out but has proven to be vital in
formulating this study’s primary conclusions. Among these are that, first, the structure of
a state’s licensing and regulating body can significantly hasten or impede the process of
approving new reactors as well as the continued operation o f those reactors. Centralized
approval systems like those found in Japan and the US are more susceptible to the
problem of regulatory capture where there are close ties between the nuclear commission
and the nuclear industry. These ties create a system in which it is easier to gain initial
approval for new reactors and more likely that safety regulations will be lax and therefore
in financial favor o f the nuclear industry at the expense o f overall safety. De-centralized
systems, like those found in Germany, where individual Lander have final approval over
new reactors and work in accordance with the state regulating and approval body as well
as the European Commission for Nuclear Energy, tend to exhibit fewer symptoms of
regulatory capture and allow citizens greater access to the nuclear policy decision-making
process.
Secondly, democratic systems o f proportional representation likewise offer
citizens the opportunity to influence nuclear energy pursuance through the democratic
process o f voting. In systems o f multi-party representations where there are multiple
party options and at least anti-nuclear party, there is a greater chance that an anti-nuclear
party will gain a voting threshold for legislative representation and can even form a
coalition with similar parties to initiate anti-nuclear policy. In two-party, pro-nuclear
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states (the US), or states with a history o f pro-nuclear one-party dominance (Japan),
citizens’ opportunity to elect anti-nuclear representation is limited. Both o f these points
represent a greater argument about citizen opportunity structures, or systems in which
citizens are more likely to influence state nuclear decisions. In a de-centralized approval
system, citizen protests are more successful as local legislators are concerned with the
next election season. The result is increased willingness to hear citizen demands or
concerns, and though there is no guarantee o f a response, it is more likely than in a
centralized system that may be beholden to the nuclear industry. Future projects should
not neglect an examination of these opportunity structures, though it may be that citizens
will have less influence over nuclear pursuance in the future simply because most nuclear
expansion is occurring in non-democratic countries.
Finally, the discussion o f the “nuclear narrative” offered here is, as far as I am
aware, something entirely new in academic studies of nuclear energy. The pervasiveness
o f the state-centric political theory o f realism is largely due to a significant body of
historical evidence that supports it. States do often make decisions that, while at times
unpopular domestically or internationally, seem to be primarily about preserving their
own survival and power. Many could argue that state decisions about pursuing or not
pursuing nuclear energy are also a product of this line o f reasoning, whether it is a party
trying to preserve their political power or a state trying to ensure it has access to enough
energy resources. However, these decisions cannot be made in a vacuum, for if a country
claims to be democratic, it has to exhibit some amount o f concern for the welfare o f its
people and some responsiveness to the will of the people, if for no other reason than to
prevent a coup d ’etat. Therefore, to varying degrees, states are forced to operate within
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issue narratives that prevail in a country, in this case, the narrative about nuclear energy.
States can actively participate in the creation o f these narratives, have little control over
these narratives, or leave well-enough alone in the absence o f a narrative.
For example, this project has previously discussed the ways in which the Japanese
state attempted to create and control citizens’ sentiments about nuclear energy; that is, the
state actively worked to create the perception that nuclear energy was intrinsically linked
to economic growth and energy independence, a perception that eventually became an
ideological norm. Within this narrative, it became much easier for the state to gain
approval for nuclear reactors placed in citizen’s backyards, though the subsidy money
that poured into reactor communities likely did not hurt, either. In Germany, the
prevailing narrative about nuclear energy was largely shaped by outside forces such as
the Cold War, nuclear weapons, unfortunate geopolitical positioning, and a strong de
militarized sentiment. Had leaders even wanted to actively create a positive image of
nuclear energy, the persistent link between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons would
have been difficult to overcome given the regional political climate o f the Cold War. By
way o f contrast, the nuclear narrative is largely absent in the US, though films engaging
energy issues such as Pandora’s Promise or Promised Land have become more popular
in the last decade. Examining the construction and content o f these “nuclear narratives”
will reveal much about states’ resolve (or desperation) to pursue nuclear energy. By also
determining where nuclear-promotion funds are coming from, future studies can also
determine the extent to which states are linked (or beholden) to the nuclear industry.
Lastly, the extent to which citizens react to the forces creating these nuclear narratives
and the ways in which these narratives do or do not become ideological norms can lead to
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a greater understanding o f how citizens self-identify as political participants. In other
words, the success or failure of these narratives, especially when states actively expend
time and money to create them, will be significant, though perhaps only in democratic
countries where citizen consent matters.
The initial goal o f this project was simply to offer an educated guess as to the
future viability o f nuclear energy in a world market o f competing electrical power
sources such as coal, natural gas, and emerging renewable technologies. Among these
resources, nuclear energy poses an interesting case to study for two prim ary reasons.
First, nuclear technology possesses an immense capacity for use in good and evil, not just
in terms of the “weapons versus energy” dichotomy, but even within its operation as a
peaceful energy source. In this respect, the Henry Wadsworth Longfellow poem about a
little girl with a curl on her forehead comes to mind, for when this girl was good, she was
very good; however, when she was bad, she was horrid.19 Nuclear energy similarly has
the capacity for efficient and clean energy generation, but the other side o f that coin
depicts scenes of reactor meltdowns, radiation leakages, contamination and disaster with
which the world is all too familiar based on reporting from Chernobyl and Fukushima.
Nuclear energy has also been depicted in popular culture perhaps more than any other
form o f energy, in manga series such as Astro Boy, in films such as The China Syndrome
(1979), Barefoot Gen (1986) and Chernobyl Diaries (2012); satirized in television shows
such as The Simpsons; and in poems and popular literature such as The Crazy Iris (1984).
In this way, nuclear energy has a sort o f “personality” that other forms o f energy do not
have, a personality that is further explore in this project through a discussion o f what I

19 Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, “There Was a Little Girl.”
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term the “nuclear narrative” and how that personification of risk influences states’
abilities to pursue nuclear energy.
Secondly, nuclear energy is a rare resource that can be produced domestically and
in abundance while simultaneously allowing states to further their clean energy goals. We
currently live in a world o f energy yins and yangs, a world of competing interests that
push against each other to form a tentative status quo. Preserving the environment,
reducing pollution, and protecting citizens’ quality o f life have all become popular policy
goals, especially in Western countries. In tension with those goals is the global
economy’s need for more and more energy resources. As developed countries strive to
maintain their economies and developing countries inevitably continue to grow, there will
be fewer and fewer resources to go around. While renewable technologies based on solar,
wind, and hydrothermal sources are increasing in popularity and attracting increased
investment, these sources are still decades from being capable o f replacing traditional
fossil fuels. Excluding the needed enriched uranium, nuclear energy also offers states a
degree o f energy security and independence in a world o f resource “haves and havenots.” If our future is to be characterized by resource competition and clean energy goals,
then the role nuclear energy— a clean, domestic resource— will play in that future will
only become increasingly important.
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